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ABSTRACT
This research investigates the impact of order rationing strategies, shortage
gaming responses, and retail promotions demand shock on the long-term system
performance of the inventory ordering and fulfillment process between competing
retailers and a shared upstream manufacturer. The research addresses a need to
understand the horizontal dynamics of competition for supply inventory among
interconnected entities within business systems. It also expands understanding of the
interactions between various manufacturer order rationing strategies and retailer shortage
gaming responses, in the context of supply capacity constraints arising from a retail
promotions demand shock.
A discrete event simulation based on a US major appliance supply chain was
developed. Results from the simulation experiment indicate a strong impact from order
rationing strategies and shortage gaming responses on long-term outcomes such as
demand variance, order fill rates, opportunity loss, and inventory carrying cost. In
contrast, a single retail promotions demand shock has limited long-term impact on system
1

performance.
Overall, the findings suggest that both vertical and horizontal entities within
business systems are significantly impacted by each entity’s actions within the inventory
ordering and fulfillment feedback loop. Also, interactions between manufacturer order
rationing strategies, retailer shortage gaming responses, and retail promotions demand
shock are complex, particularly when considered over time. There are both positive and
negative impacts relative to each entity within the inventory ordering and fulfillment
feedback loop.

INDEX WORDS: Supply Chain Management, Simulation, Experiment, Order Rationing,
Shortage Gaming, Retail Promotions, Demand Shock, Industrial Dynamics
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
1.0 INTRODUCTION
This research investigates the impact of order rationing strategies, shortage
gaming responses, and retail promotions demand shock on the long-term system
performance of the inventory ordering and fulfillment process between competing
retailers and a shared upstream manufacturer. The research addresses a need to
understand the horizontal dynamics of competition for supply inventory among
interconnected entities within business systems. It also expands understanding of the
interactions between various manufacturer order rationing strategies and retailer shortage
gaming responses, in the context of supply capacity constraints arising from a retail
promotions demand shock.
This first chapter addresses the study of supply inventory competition in five
sections. First, it provides the necessary background to justify a need for this research.
Second, it defines the study’s research questions and objectives. Third, it describes the
study’s contributions. Fourth, it proposes an appropriate research method with which to
investigate the research questions. Finally, it presents this dissertation’s organization.

1.1 BACKGROUND
Forrester’s theory of industrial dynamics (1958; 1961), alternatively known as
system dynamics, is the root of many key supply chain management concepts (Mentzer et
al. 2001) such as the bullwhip effect (Lee et al. 1997) and the total cost paradigm (Ellram
1995; Ellram & Siferd 1998; Stringfellow et al. 2008). The theory explains the dynamic
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behavior of a system connected by flows of information, materials, and finances through
an understanding of how feedback structures and cause-effect delays create change over
time (Forrester 1968). In conceptualizing multiple business entities as a structural system
with interdependencies, Forrester (1958; 1961) paved the foundation for the idea that one
firm’s activities can impact another firm’s performance (Größler et al. 2008).
Accordingly, research within the domain of supply chain management has sought
to identify, describe, analyze, optimize, and mitigate the impact of interconnected
business systems (Mentzer et al. 2001; Min & Zhou 2002). These business systems are
often modeled as a simplified vertical or serial supply chain with one member per
echelon (Morgan 2007). This allows for research to be tractable and to attribute causal
inferences to relevant parties. However, most supply chains have multiple members
within a given echelon, and there exists differences in results and findings from supply
chain models that incorporate multiple horizontal entities compared to those modeling
single entities within an echelon (Wan & Evers 2011). Often, horizontal entities share a
common supplier and/or customers and their relationships are competitive in nature (Li
2002). Moorthy (1985) describes the essence of competition as interdependence and
conflict, where the consequences to a firm of taking an action depend not only on that
firm’s actions but also on the actions of its competitors. However, conflicts of interest are
also present among the interdependent firms, as the optimal action for each firm may
differ from what is optimal for other firms (Moorthy 1985). As a result, it is likely that
the decisions and actions of each retailer may impact not only their trading partner
(manufacturer) but may also negatively impact other retailers as well (Almadoss et al.
2008) through indirect linkages with the shared manufacturer. Unfortunately, the
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presence of competing horizontal entities and their linkages to a focal vertical supply
chain are rarely considered despite the existence of interconnected information, material,
and financial flows (Li 2002; Wan & Evers 2011).
One situation in which consideration of multiple, competing horizontal entities
may be particularly relevant would be when demand exceeds supply and therefore
customers within a horizontal echelon compete for supply inventory. A common issue
when firms attempt to balance supply and demand involves retail promotions and
production capacity (Coyle et al. 2013; Bowersox et al. 2013). Consider the following
scenario: entities within a two-echelon (manufacturer and retailers) supply chain come
together in a quarterly sales and operations planning meeting in order to determine final
distribution of a branded product. Retailer 1, who buys a large proportion of the
manufacturer’s product, demands a large amount of inventory above their order history
due to a large retail promotions initiative they have planned for the coming quarter. This
creates a shock in demand (Lummus et al. 2003; Tokar et al. 2011; Coyle et al. 2013),
defined as sudden and temporary demand beyond that normally experienced by the
manufacturer. The manufacturer, in attempting to accommodate this unplanned demand
shock, must ration inventory capacity among their customers or fear damage to their
ongoing relationship with Retailer 1, an important part of their business. In the process,
other customers may receive less inventory than ordered and each can choose to react by
competitively gaming their future orders (Lee et al. 1997) and inflating them in various
ways to hedge against shortage of the branded product. As each customer competes for
inventory from the manufacturer, it is likely that one horizontal entity’s inventory
ordering actions will cause variance in other horizontal entities’ inventory actions in
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subsequent quarters according to Forrester’s theory of industrial dynamics (1958). Within
the feedback structure of the inventory ordering and fulfillment process, these actions
may impact the total demand variance experienced by the manufacturer, resulting in
mismatches between supply and demand and therefore operational inefficiencies (Fisher
1997; Lee 2004).
The dynamic nature of horizontal competition for supply over time remains
unclear because it requires not only a concurrent consideration of a manufacturer and
horizontal entities (multiple retailers), but also the interactions of each entity’s choice of
order rationing/shortage gaming strategies over time. Although Lee, Padmanabhan, and
Whang (1997) mathematically demonstrated that order rationing and shortage gaming
could lead to amplification of demand variance in a vertical supply chain (i.e. the
bullwhip effect), the model assumed symmetric actions on the part of multiple retailers
and did not allow for interaction of various competitive strategies. Moreover, while
additional research on rationing and shortage gaming has confirmed the existence of
various strategic choices within each area, they have proceeded in separate streams and
do not consider interactions among horizontal entities. For example, in determining
optimal policies for manufacturer order rationing, research assumes that there is no
competition among retailers (e.g. Cachon & Lariviere 1999a) or that competing retailers
will all respond similarly (e.g. Mallik & Harker 2004). Likewise, in exploring the
behavioral basis of various shortage gaming strategies (e.g. Sterman 1989a; Croson &
Donohue 2003; Nirajan et al. 2011), research has focused on individual level decisionmaking and their impact on vertical supply chain entities rather than explore interactions
among the horizontal entities within an echelon.
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In summary, there is a need to explore the impact of supply inventory competition
within a horizontal echelon in order to understand the full dynamics of business systems.
In the context of supply inventory competition arising from a retail promotion demand
shock, explicit investigation of the interactions between manufacturer order rationing and
multiple retailers’ shortage gaming over time is a needed step in exploring the impact of
inventory competition.

1.2 RESEARCH QUESTIONS AND OBJECTIVES
1.2.1 Research Questions
Given the gap in literature regarding the impact of supply inventory competition,
two research questions arise:
1. Does supply inventory competition impact vertical industrial business systems?
2. How can supply inventory competition impact the inventory ordering and
fulfillment process in the context of a retail promotions demand shock over time?
1.2.2 Research Objectives
These research questions yield three research objectives. The objectives are:
1. To examine the impact of supply inventory competition on the long-term
performance of involved entities.
2. To explore the dynamics of supply inventory competition over time in the
context of retail promotions demand shock.
3. To identify the interactive impact of various manufacturer order rationing
strategies and retailer shortage gaming strategies on long-term system behavior.
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1.3 RESEARCH CONTRIBUTION
Results from this research will make several potential contributions. First, this
research will fill a gap in the literature as few supply chain management studies explicitly
investigate the impact of supply inventory competition among multiple horizontal entities
on a connected upstream entity. Doing so will further test Forrester’s theory of industrial
dynamics (1958; 1961) and increase understanding of the interconnected nature of
business systems. This research will also complement vertically oriented supply chain
management research by highlighting horizontally oriented inventory competition as an
overlooked factor in supply chain management performance.
Second, this research will expand understanding of order rationing and shortage
gaming strategies through exploration of their overlooked interactions. Although previous
research on order rationing has attempted to provide prescriptive advice regarding the
optimal strategy for manufacturers to employ when faced with the need to ration orders,
these analyses do not incorporate interaction with multiple retailers’ shortage gaming
responses. Results of this research can provide additional insight regarding the relative
effectiveness of various order rationing strategies that manufacturers can employ to
counteract retailers’ shortage gaming and thus minimize the negative consequences of
demand variance generated through supply inventory competition.
Finally, this research will contribute to a greater understanding of the
consequences of demand shock and subsequent supply inventory competition arising
from marketing initiatives such as retail promotions. Despite the pervasive use of retail
promotions to stimulate consumer demand (Blattberg et al. 1995), research specific to the
demand impact of retail promotions is limited (Tokar et al. 2011). Literature regarding
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retail promotions has largely focused on the consumer impact of retail promotions rather
than the demand impact on upstream supply chain entities despite the importance of
supply chains in making product available on retail shelves (Tokar et al. 2011). It is noted
that the intensity and frequency of retail promotions have increased over time
(Huchzermeier & Iyer 2006). Coupled with decreased inventory levels throughout the
supply chain as a result of trends toward cost reduction and increased efficiency in the
flow of goods (Weitz & Whitfield 2006), an unplanned demand shock arising from retail
promotions poses significant management challenges to upstream supply chain entities
and requires research attention. This research addresses that need.

1.4 RESEARCH METHOD
Discrete event simulation is chosen for this research. Simulation is a research
method using computer software to model the operation of real-world processes, systems,
or events (Law & Kelton 2000). It is the most appropriate method to investigate the
interaction of complex variables and multiple elements of an interdependent system
(Ballou 1989), a key component of this research. Specific to this research, simulation is
also the method advocated by Forrester (1958; 1961) in understanding industrial
dynamics.
The method’s strengths include the ability to control the system under study
through operator control of the simulation design and input parameters (Law et al. 1994),
allowing for precise representation of the proposed inventory replenishment process.
Simulation provides advantages over other methodologies in terms of the ability to be
replicated such that “what if” analysis can be conducted, temporal advantage, and cost
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(Ballou 1989; Manuj et al. 2009). This allows for the exploration of main and interactive
effects from various manufacturer order rationing strategies and retailer shortage gaming
responses within an inventory ordering and fulfillment process.

1.5 ORGANIZATION OF DISSERTATION
This dissertation is organized in five sections. Chapter 1 sets forth the research
motivation, research questions and objectives, contribution, and rationale for the research
methodology. Chapter 2 presents the literature review and develops the experimental
design including the simulation’s process model, identifies independent and dependent
variables, and proposes hypotheses. Chapter 3 discusses the research’s experimental
design and data analysis, as well as the simulation’s parameters, assumptions, and
validation / verification methods. Chapter 4 reviews the results of the experiments.
Chapter 5 provides a conclusion of the research.
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CHAPTER 2
LITERATURE REVIEW
2.0 INTRODUCTION
This chapter synthesizes literature to establish a theoretical rationale for the
research. First, the chapter reviews Forrester’s theory of industrial dynamics. Second, the
chapter establishes gaps in the application of industrial dynamics in supply chain
management research, particularly in regard to horizontal relationships and supply
inventory competition. Third, the research discusses supply inventory competition and
identifies three research elements of interest: manufacturer order rationing, retailer
shortage gaming, and retail promotions demand shock. Finally, the chapter develops an
experimental framework and research hypotheses through application of Forrester’s
theory of industrial dynamics to the three research elements.

2.1 FORRESTER’S THEORY OF INDUSTRIAL DYNAMICS
Forrester’s theory of industrial dynamics provides the theoretical foundation of
this research. This section reviews its origins, core tenets, and theoretical implications in
order to provide a clear understanding of the theory.
2.1.1 Origins
Jay W. Forrester published the seminal article (1958) “Industrial Dynamics - a
Major Breakthrough for Decision Makers” and book (1961) “Industrial Dynamics”
following insights gained from a serendipitous project he conducted with the General
Electric Corporation (Lane 2007).
According to Lane (2007), managers at GE’s Kentucky appliance plant had
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observed oscillations with a three-year period in their component inventories and
workforce numbers. Although the oscillations were attributed to various exogenous
effects such as business cycles and general “noise” from the market, efforts to eradicate
the oscillations were unsuccessful. Forrester saw the situation as a system of multiple
feedback loops through interviews with managers. Each feedback loop consisted of an
inventory level, a manager’s collecting information on that level, the decision he then
made and the subsequent effects on the level (Lane 2007). This insight was based on
Forrester’s prior experience in systems engineering in the military, where his work with
servomechanisms (a mechanical device that uses negative feedback systems to selfregulate its actions) established a foundation for understanding how interconnected
feedback control systems could result in counterintuitive effects (Lane 2007).
When Forrester mapped the various inventory levels, actions, and therefore
feedback loops, he confirmed that GE’s policies actually amplified existing oscillations.
He observed that subjected to a single small change, the system was capable of
generating endogenously large and sustained oscillations without complex external
explanations (Lane 2007). Based on his model, Forrester was then able to design policies
that GE’s managers could use successfully to calm the oscillations (Lane 2007).
2.1.2 Core Elements
“Industrial dynamics is the study of the information-feedback characteristics of
industrial activity to show how organizational structure, amplification (in policies), and
time delays (in decisions and actions) interact to influence the success of the enterprise”
(Forrester 1961, p 13).
The core tenet of industrial dynamics stems from the idea that economic and
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industrial activities are closed-loop, information-feedback systems (Forrester 1961). In an
information-feedback system, conditions are converted to information that is a basis for
decisions that control action to alter the surrounding conditions (Forrester 1961).
Information-feedback systems owe their overall behavior to three characteristics:
structure, delays, and amplification (Forrester 1961).
The structure of a system identifies the component parts and tells how the parts
are related to one another. This describes the feedback loops relevant to the system of
interest. These feedback loops can be related to the six types of interconnected flows
(materials, orders, money, personnel, capital equipment, and information) that represent
industrial activity. Forrester (1961) recommended that the inclusion of any specific flow
into the system to be studied should be based on the management question to be
answered. However, information flow is considered to be most important for inclusion as
it is not only a stand-alone flow, but it is also the interconnecting tissue between all of the
other flows. For example, in studying a production-distribution system such as GE’s
appliance system, Forrester (1961) focused on flows and feedback loops of information
(orders) as well as of physical goods at the factory, distributor, and retailer echelons.
Delays refer to the time relationships between parts of the system (Forrester
1961). Delays occur through the availability of information, in making decisions based on
the information, and in taking action on the decisions. This is represented by time lags in
the flows between component parts of the system. Within Forrester’s (1961) productiondistribution system example, delays of one week or more exist between various parts of
the system, such as when a customer places an order and when goods are delivered.
Amplification also exists throughout information-feedback systems, particularly in
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the decision policies that control the rates of flow within these systems (Forrester 1961).
Amplification is “a response from some part of a system which is greater than would at
first seem to be justified by the causes of that response” (Forrester 1961, p 62). Order and
inventory policies in the production-distribution system example are good examples of
amplification forces. At any given component part of the system, policies to replace
goods sold and orders to adjust inventories upward or downward as the level of business
activity changes, all impact the rates of flow of information and goods throughout this
system (Forrester 1961).
2.1.2 Theoretical Implications
Taken together, the pattern of system interconnection (structure), the time
relationships between parts of the system (delays), and the impact of decisions and
policies (amplification) all combine to determine the stability and behavior of
information-feedback systems (Forrester 1961). A central premise of Industrial Dynamics
(1961) is that these systems exhibit behavior as a whole that may not be evident from
their individual parts. In addition, it is the interaction of these parts that impact the
system’s behavior over time. Small changes from a single exogenous force may set into
motion long-term effects from endogenous elements of the system.
For example, within Forrester’s (1961) production-distribution system illustration,
he demonstrated through simulation (tracing step by step the actual flow of orders, goods,
and information and observing the series of new decisions that take place) that a simple
10% increase in retail sales results in cycles of oscillation for order rates, factory output,
factory warehouse inventory, and unfilled orders. Moreover, this model of a productiondistribution system showed increasing variance of orders between retailer, distributor,
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and factory echelons after the 10% increase in retail sales. Over a year was required
before all ordering and manufacturing rates stabilize to levels prior to the 10% increase in
retail sales (Forrester 1961).
Managerially, Forrester (1961) advocated the use of controlled simulation
experiments to understand the industrial dynamics of a given system. By holding all
conditions but one constant, managers have the ability to determine changes to
endogenous elements that will positively impact the system of study. For example,
additional experimental variations to the production-distribution system such as speeding
up time for order handling, eliminating the distributor echelon, or changing inventory
policies show that in the system under study, adjustments in inventory ordering policies
led to greater system stability over time relative to managerial changes in order handling
times or distribution network structure (Forrester 1961). Although Forrester’s example of
a production-distribution system was most detailed, he also discussed how industrial
dynamics could be applied to product life cycles, commodity industries, and the research
and development process. In each case, the system of study should include mechanisms
of interaction relevant to the management problem being investigated. In addition,
Forrester also highlighted the importance of considering competition among firms in an
industry because “the factors interlocking their behavior are sufficiently strong” (1961,
p336) such that each firm is impacted by the actions of similar firms.
2.1.3 Summary
In summary, as the theoretical foundation of this research, industrial dynamics
can explain the behavior of an interconnected system of information-feedback loops
through interactions of its structure, time relationship delays, and amplification relevant
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decision policies. In order to understand industrial dynamics, it is necessary to identify
feedback loops that are relevant to the phenomena under study, which can encompass a
wide range of business activity.
Following, section 2.2 discusses the application of industrial dynamics within
supply chain management research in order to identify the literature gaps that this
research seeks to fill.

2.2 INDUSTRIAL DYNAMICS IN SUPPLY CHAIN MANAGEMENT RESEARCH
The previous section discussed Forrester’s theory of industrial dynamics as the
theoretical foundation of this research. This section reviews the application of industrial
dynamics within supply chain management research in order to identify the literature
gaps that this research seeks to fill.
2.2.1 Supply Chain Management Research
Since Forrester’s initial publications (1958; 1961), the theory of industrial
dynamics has expanded to a discipline of system dynamics that applies the theory’s core
tenets to broader social systems in the domain of public policy, urban planning, social
welfare and education (Forrester 2007a; 2008b; Lane 2007; Größler et al. 2008). The
theory has also had a large impact in supply chain management. In defining supply chain
management, Mentzer and colleagues (2001) identifies Forrester’s theory of industrial
dynamics as the foundation for the discipline. Core elements of industrial dynamics,
where interaction of flows impact interconnected business entities, are central to
definitions of supply chain management (e.g. Coyle et al. 2013; Bowersox et al. 2013;
Simchi-Levi et al. 2008). Broad streams of research that have explicitly acknowledged
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roots in industrial dynamics include the bullwhip effect where demand variance is
amplified as one travels upstream in a vertical supply chain (Mentzer et al. 2001; Lee et
al. 2004), beer game simulations which investigate managerial misperceptions of
feedback loops in the context of inventory management (Mentzer et al. 2001; e.g.
Sterman 1989a; e.g. Sterman 1989b), as well as supply chain coordination models which
attempt to align the actions of interconnected firms through incentives and contract
mechanisms (Fugate et al. 2006; Cachon & Lariviere 2005). In each of these examples,
industrial dynamics provides the rationale for supply chain management’s goals of
coordination and alignment.
2.2.2 Horizontal Elements
Scholars have noted that supply chain management research often uses a dyadic
buyer-supplier relationship or a simplified vertical/serial supply chain with one member
per echelon to represent the supply chain management relevant interactions within
industrial systems (e.g. Choi & Wu 2009; Wan & Evers 2011; Wathne & Heide 2004).
However, real-world supply chains may be more complex than the linear, hypothetical
supply chains (Morgan 2007). Real-world supply chains are increasingly described as
large interconnected and decentralized networks with many participants linked by
demand and supply relationships (Majumder & Srinivasan 2008). Firms may be part of
several supply chains, can take different positions within different supply chains, and
have a multitude of business relationships with firms beyond the strict vertical
(upstream/downstream) movement of goods (Coyle et al. 2013; Mentzer et al. 2001;
Bergenholtz & Waldstrom 2011). In addition, Forrester’s (1958; 1961) discussion of
industrial dynamics did not constrain the theory to only vertical elements of a supply
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chain. Rather, relevant entities should be considered based on their role in feedback loops
of interest (Forrester 1958; 1961).
Morgan (2007) warns about the advantages and disadvantages of taking a
reductionist approach in representing real-life supply chains as a series of connected
dyads. The advantage of this approach is that research can achieve focus by using a
“ceritus paribus” argument. Nevertheless, the disadvantage is that research ignores the
inherent variability of real world systems where causes of variability may originate
outside the vertical dyadic relationship (Morgan 2007; Wathne & Heide 2004). For
example; Lambert, Cooper, and Pagh (1998) identify both horizontal and vertical
elements as important structural dimensions of a supply chain, because both the number
of suppliers/customers represented within each echelon as well as the number of supply
chain echelons considered will impact the ability of any given focal firm to effectively
describe, analyze, and manage the supply chain when corporate resources are limited.
Unfortunately, studies that consider entities beyond a single focal firm within a horizontal
echelon are limited (Wan & Evers 2011; Li 2002), despite calls for greater attention on
the network context in which dyadic relationships exist (e.g. Choi & Wu 2009; Wathne &
Heide 2004) and Forrester’s (1958; 1961) original conceptualization of industrial
dynamics.
One exception, Wan and Evers (2011), provides empirical support for the value of
incorporating multiple horizontal entities to a simplified vertical/serial supply chain
model. Wan and Evers investigates how differences in the supply chain network structure
impact the bullwhip effect (measured by the ratio of an upstream entity’s order variance
to that of a downstream entity’s order variance), stockouts, and on-hand inventory.
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Findings suggest that supply chain networks modeled with more than one retailer
essentially split the impact of end-consumer demand at the retailer echelon. This action
mitigates the bullwhip effect experienced by a shared upstream manufacturer by limiting
the fluctuation of orders from any particular retailer (Wan & Evers 2011). In addition,
stockouts at the retail echelon were also mitigated while on-hand inventories were found
to be generally higher at the retailer echelon with models of two or three retailers
compared to one retailer.
Wan and Evers (2011) center their study on the demand-side phenomenon of
order splitting among competing retailers as a context in which the addition of multiple
entities within an echelon has an impact on supply chain performance. As such, their
model assumes unlimited supply and no capacity constraints from the shared
manufacturer in order to focus on the demand-side phenomenon of order splitting. The
authors note that a more realistic situation would be if the manufacturer is constrained in
supply capacity while serving multiple retailers (Wan & Evers 2011), since constraints on
production capacity is more common than unlimited production capacity (Cachon &
Lariviere 1999b; Van Mieghem 2003; Furuhata et al. 2006). If supply capacity is
constrained, retailers may consistently compete for inventory due to the shared
manufacturer’s limited supply (Li 2002). Overall, supply inventory competition is a
promising area where consideration of multiple horizontal retailers is necessary, as there
is still considerable ambiguity regarding the dynamics between supply capacity
constraints and competition among horizontal entities (Wan & Evers 2011).
2.2.3 Summary
In summary, most supply chain management research has to date focused on a
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simplified, vertical supply chain and have overlooked the impact of horizontal elements
such as multiple, competing retailers within an echelon. Yet, the feedback loops of
interest within industrial dynamics encompass both vertical as well as horizontal supply
chain elements. One situation where multiple horizontal entities may be important to
consider and model is when retailers compete for supply inventory from a shared
manufacturer with constrained supply capacity. An explicit investigation of supply
inventory competition between interconnected retailers and a shared manufacturer is thus
the focus of this research.
Following, section 2.3 discusses supply inventory competition and identifies the
variables of interest in this research.

2.3 SUPPLY INVENTORY COMPETITION
The previous section identified supply inventory competition as an area where
consideration of multiple entities within a horizontal echelon may impact the
performance of interconnected retailers and manufacturer. This section discusses supply
inventory competition in order to identify variables of interest in the research.
2.3.1 Supply Inventory Competition
Competition occurs among firms within a horizontal supply chain echelon in
many forms. Often, competition refers to competing for sales/customers when firms
provide competing, substitutable goods (e.g. Mahajan & van Ryzin 2001; Netessine &
Rudi 2003; Carr & Karmarkar 2005; Zhao 2008; Krishnan & Winter 2010). However,
firms also compete for supply inventory. This research focuses on competition for supply
inventory as a natural context in which multiple, interconnected retailers may impact a
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vertical supply chain.
Supply inventory competition among horizontal entities (e.g. retailers) within an
echelon occur when retailers who purchase the same good from a shared supplier (e.g. a
single manufacturer) encounter supply/demand misalignment (Li 2002; Cachon 2001;
Cachon & Lariviere 1999; Lee et al. 1997). Supply/demand misalignment arises when
total demand exceeds supply, and results in competitive, reactionary behaviors on the part
of the manufacturer and each retailer that are related through an inventory ordering and
fulfillment feedback loop (Li 2002; Lee et al. 1997).
2.3.2 Context of Supply/Demand Misalignment and Retail Promotions Demand Shock
Supply and demand misalignment occurs when limits in manufacturer production
capacity or uncertainty of production yield is coupled with demand uncertainty (Fisher
1997; Lambert et al. 1998; Lee et al. 1997). In attempting to balance supply and demand,
firms may address either part of the equation. When demand exceeds capacity but is
known and stable, then additional manufacturing can be secured by either investing in
more capacity internally or securing contract capacity externally (Coyle et al. 2013). If
demand is uncertain, investment in additional capacity may result in additional costs over
the long run (Coyle et al. 2013) and expansion can be time consuming (Furuhata &
Zhang 2006). It is likely that a supplier “will not build an amount of capacity sufficient to
cover every possible demand realization” (Cachon & Lariviere 1999b, p. 835) and in
some industries such as the semiconductor industry, it is common to have a tight supply
(Sun et al. 2011). Firms may also carry larger inventories in order to accommodate
demand uncertainty, however trends within supply chain management to minimize
inventory and emphasize efficient flow of goods have resulted in less inventory buffer to
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accommodate sudden increases in demand (Weitz & Whitfield 2006).
2.3.2.1 Retail Promotions Demand Shock
Retail promotions are considered a real-world factor that causes or exacerbates
supply/demand misalignment because it is a common form of demand uncertainty (Coyle
et al. 2013; Bowersox et al. 2010, van Heerde & Neslin 2008; Tokar et al. 2011). Defined
as temporary incentives targeted to consumers, retail promotions such as coupons,
rebates, price discounts are used as a temporary means to competitively stimulate or
shape consumer demand when retailers sell a common good (Blattberg et al. 1995).
Retailers and their supply chains all benefit from retail promotions due to the immediate
and substantial increase in sales when it an item is put on promotion (Ailawadi et al.
2009). For retailers, the “lift” or increase in sales from consumer promotions can
represent a large portion of a retailer’s revenue, and has been reported to account for
anywhere from 25% of retailers’ sales in Great Britain (Gedenk et al. 2006) to 30% of a
large national US retailer’s total sales (Ailawadi et al. 2007). The increase in consumer
sales is also passed upstream to the manufacturer in the form of increased demand.
Retail promotions can create a “shock” in the total demand experienced by the
manufacturer due to its temporary nature (Coyle et al. 2013; Bowersox et al. 2010),
particularly when promotional activity is initiated by the retailer rather than the
manufacturer (Tokar et al. 2011). Retailers commonly make decisions regarding
consumer promotions close to the time of execution and this timeframe rarely coincides
with suppliers’/manufacturers’ order fulfillment schedules (Huchzermeier & Iyer 2006),
resulting in a mismatch between supply and demand. In a case study on the demand
management challenges in food supply chains, Adebanjo (2009) report that a retailer did
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not finalize retail promotions decisions until four weeks before the start of the promotion
despite the ten week lead time required by involved contract manufacturers, a significant
disconnect in supply and demand needs.
Although the demand management challenges of retail promotions are generally
discussed as a problem within supply chain management (e.g. Coyle et al. 2013;
Bowersox et al. 2010; Daugherty et al. 2002), limited empirical research exists
addressing their impact on supply chains (Tokar et al. 2011). Most research has focused
on the consumer-side impact of retail promotions because of the wide range of its impact
on consumer behaviors such as brand switching, store switching, category switching,
stockpiling, or increased consumption informs the evaluation of the short- and long-term
effectiveness and profitability of a promotional initiative (Ailawadi et al. 2009; Gedenk et
al. 2006; Uncles 2006; Blattberg 1995).
2.3.3 Manufacturer Order Rationing and Retailer Shortage Gaming
In the context of supply/demand misalignment when total demand exceeds
supply, the literature describes actions on the part of manufacturers (manufacturer order
rationing) and retailers (retailer shortage gaming) that interact within an inventory
ordering and fulfillment feedback loop.
2.3.3.1 Manufacturer Order Rationing
A manufacturer must ration, or allocate their supply amongst the retailers when
filling orders if they do not have enough supply to fill total demand (Hall & Liu 2010;
Cachon & Lariviere 1999a; Lee et al. 1997). Manufacturer order rationing results in
unfilled orders for some or all retailers, depending on the specific order rationing strategy
employed (Cachon & Lariviere 1999a). Commonly discussed strategies include
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proportional rationing, linear rationing, and uniform rationing (Cachon & Lariviere
1999b). Proportional rationing dictate that retailers receive the same percentage of
capacity as their relative demand is to total demand. Linear rationing shorts each retailer
order by an equal absolute amount. If a negative allocation results for a retailer, then that
retailer receives zero allocation and the process is repeated with the remaining retailers.
Uniform rationing divides capacity equally among retailers. If any retailer orders less
than their equally allocated share, they receive their full order and the remaining capacity
is allocated equally among the remaining retailers.
Literature within this research stream is normative in nature and utilizes analytical
models in order to determine the best strategy the manufacturer can apply to maximize
profit for themselves as well as their customer (retailer). Cachon and Lariviere (1999b)
note that a proportional strategy is most intuitive and a commonly used scheme for
managers to use in dividing capacity. However, differences may exist in each strategy’s
impact on retailers’ ordering behavior. For example, Cachon and Lariviere (1999b) assert
that both proportional and linear rationing is “order-inflating” whereas uniform rationing
is “truth-inducing”. With either proportional or linear rationing, a retailer will always
receive less than their order if supply is rationed and will thus have an incentive to
strategically inflate orders to ensure they receive close to their actual need. With uniform
rationing, there is no incentive for retailers to inflate their orders (Cachon & Lariviere
1999b).
The rationale is thus: both proportional and linear rationing is sensitive to total
demand (the sum of all orders from all of the manufacturer’s customers) and can
therefore be influenced by demand inflation by a retailer. A retailer will benefit by
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receiving more inventory than they would normally if they inflate their order, such that
their order is a larger portion of the total demand experienced by the manufacturer. In
comparison, uniform rationing is not dependent on total demand but only the number of
retailers that inventory must be allocated amongst. If the manufacturer chooses to employ
uniform rationing, then retailers are seen to have no incentive to inflate their orders
because the amount they will be rationed is independent of what each retailer orders
(Cachon & Lariviere 1999b). Table 2-1 provides an illustration of the differences
between the order rationing strategies.
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Table 2-1 Comparison of Manufacturer Order Rationing Strategies
Manufacturer Order Rationing Strategies
“Order-Inflating”
“Order-Inflating”
“Truth-Inducing”
Proportional
Linear
Uniform
Rule

Calculation

If Retailer
ordered
150 units
If Retailer
ordered
200 units
Conclusion

A retailer receives the
same percentage of
capacity as their
relative demand is to
total orders
(Retailer’s Order /
Total Orders) *
Supply

Each retailer order is
shorted an equal
absolute amount

Capacity is divided
equally among
retailers

= (200 / 600) * 500
= 166.6 units allocated

= 200 – ((600 – 500) / 5) = 500 / 5
= 180 units allocated
= 100 units allocated

Retailer benefits by
inflating their order

Retailer benefits by
inflating their order

Retailer’s Order –
Supply /
((Total Order AmountNumber of Retailers
Supply) /
Number of Retailers)
Example:
Retailer’s Actual Need = 150 units
Manufacturer’s Supply = 500 units
Number of Retailers Competing for Supply Inventory = 5
Total Orders from Retailers = 600 units
= (150 / 600) * 500
= 150 – ((600 – 500) / 5) = 500 / 5
= 125 units allocated
= 130 units allocated
= 100 units allocated

Retailer does not
benefit if they inflate
their order

Cachon and Lariviere (1999b) suggest that order-inflating strategies may be
beneficial for increasing the manufacturer’s profits because it generally increases their
capacity utilization by encouraging higher volume orders from retailers, and may be
beneficial in increasing the retailer’s profits by ensuring that the rationing of capacity
closely matches the retailer’s true needs. However, the authors state that their conclusion
applies only if the retailer’s order inflation is moderate and orderly (consistent over time).
If a retailer’s order inflation is moderate and orderly, an equilibrium that maximizes
profit for both retailer and manufacturer can be determined within the analytical model. If
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order inflation is rampant and unpredictable, equilibrium may not exist (Cachon &
Lariviere 1999b) and therefore, it may not be possible to find an optimal solution for both
parties. In this case, the truth-inducing uniform strategy may be beneficial for the
manufacturer to use. However, it may not perform as well as the other strategies in
matching retailers’ inventory fill with their orders because it essentially does not take into
account each retailer’s relative demand (Cachon & Lariviere 1999b).
Additional investigations in order rationing strategies have focused on rationing
rules within specific industries or by investigating the performance of rationing rules
under different model assumptions. For example, Karabuk and Wu (2005) discuss
capacity allocation problems specific to the semiconductor industry and also conclude
that there is an incentive for customers to manipulate demand information in order to
increase their desired allocation. Mallik and Harker (2004) confirm that a proportional
allocation strategy is prone to manipulation and discuss how a bonus payment mechanism
for managers could elicit truthful demand. Furuhata and Zhang (2006) re-examine
Cachon and Lariviere’s (1999b) conclusion regarding the ability of a proportional
allocation mechanism to achieve analytical equilibrium if all retailers submit truthful
orders. Their model is designed for situations where retailers compete for sales in a
downstream market, in comparison to Cachon and Lariviere’s (1999b) model, which
applies to situations where a single manufacturer supplies multiple numbers of retailers
who enjoy local monopoly (exclusive distribution). When retailers compete for
downstream sales, a proportional rationing rule may no longer yield an optimal
coordination mechanism to maximize profits for all entities involved (Furuhata & Zhang
2006).
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Among this literature, competition among retailers is considered from a game
theoretic perspective, which provides a framework to mathematically optimize the
decisions of multiple entities when each decision affect other’s performance (Nagarajan
& Sošić 2008; Chinchuluun et al. 2008; Cachon & Netessine 2004; Moorthy 1985).
Within this perspective, it is assumed that retailers will behave rationally, and will choose
an action in order to maximize their expected payoff. This leads to predictability in
retailers’ actions (Cachon & Lariviere 1999a). However, some have noted that retailers,
as human decision-makers, may not always behave optimally and can exhibit substantial
heterogeneity in their choices (Chen et al. 2011; Almadoss 2008). Thus, the “best”
strategy for a manufacturer to utilize in order to minimize demand variance when
retailers behave rationally is unclear if each retailer deviates from what is considered
optimal, or rational decision-making.
2.3.3.2 Retailer Shortage Gaming
When retailers are faced with supply shortage, affected retailers may shortage
game and inflate their subsequent order to hedge against future shortage (Nirajan et al.
2011; Sheffi 2010). Lee et al. (1997) recognize that proportional rationing creates an
incentive for retailers to raise their orders above their desired need. Even so, they do not
determine by how much the retailers will inflate their orders or if order inflation is
predictable (Cachon & Lariviere 1999b). Differing levels of order inflation on the part of
a retailer may result. In addition, the ordering decisions of any given retailer may be
dynamic and change over time.
Research on inventory ordering behavior report various types of inventory
ordering behaviors that may translate to heterogeneity in order inflation: no gaming,

48

correction gaming and overreaction gaming.
No gaming results when actual demand is ordered consistently, regardless of
external cues (Nienhaus et al. 2006). The response can result from the retailer’s strict
adherence to a base-stock policy (Croson & Donohue 2006), also called a 1 to 1 policy
(Kimbrough et al. 2002). The strategy is seen as the best solution for minimizing cost in a
serial supply chain system if other parameters (e.g. price) are stationary (Chen 1999),
because there is no distortion of demand. Retailers essentially order exactly what they
determine they need.
Correction gaming results in order inflation that is grounded in the observed
shortage. Nirajan, Wagner and Bode (2011) observe the use of a dynamic decision rule to
order inventory from a case study of an Asian automotive steering systems producer.
They propose a “correction” mechanism, whereby inventory decision-makers notices that
their previous ordering decision does not result in the expected outcome, and therefore
their propensity to over-order increases. When managers utilize a correction mechanism,
they adjust actual demand by their perception of unmet demand from the recent past
because they assume that orders from unmet demand will never be shipped. In addition,
this type of over-ordering is proposed as a method of communicating to, or getting the
attention of, an unreliable supplier (Nirajan et al. 2011). The authors assert that a
correction mechanism provides an alternative theoretical explanation for non-optimal
inventory behavior compared to supply line underweighting which was first advanced by
Sterman (1989a; 2006). Supply line underweighting results in an inflation of orders based
on a dynamic adjustment heuristic similar to Nirajan, Wagner and Bode’s (2011)
correction mechanism. However, its rationale assumes that managers ignore the supply
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line (filled orders in transit) when making current ordering decisions. Supply line
underweighting is attributed to the cognitive limitations on the part of managers and the
difficulties inherent in managing a complex dynamic system, as their most salient
concern is an immediate lack of critically needed inventory (Sterman 2006; Croson &
Donohue 2006).
Overreaction gaming occurs when retailers aggressively inflate orders. Olivia and
Goncalves (2006) propose that the experience of inventory shortage create a dramatic,
vivid, and disruptive event in comparison to the experience of holding excess inventory.
Likewise, Rong, Shen and Snyder (2008) observe through a Beer Game experiment that
overreaction to supply-side inventory disruptions resulted in significant changes in 44
percent of retailers’ ordering behavior. While a larger percentage of Beer Game
participants inflated their orders during a supply disruption, some did the opposite,
indicating that people respond to disruptions differently (Rong et al. 2008).
2.3.4 Inventory Ordering and Fulfillment Feedback Loop
Overall, retailer shortage gaming places demands on the supply system that
inevitably leads to future unfilled orders or unreliable deliveries (Disney & Towill 2003)
and may increase the total demand variance experienced by the supply system (Lee et al.
1997). Increasing demand variance can lead to tremendous inefficiencies in the supply
chain overall, arising from excess inventory investment, poor customer service, lost
revenues, misguided capacity plans, ineffective transportation, and missed production
schedules (Lee et al. 1997).
Over time, order rationing and shortage gaming can be characterized as an
information feedback loop, where the order fill experienced by each retailer may signal
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supply shortage and trigger shortage gaming behaviors (Li 2002; Lee et al. 1997). These
orders contribute to the total demand experienced by the manufacturer, which may then
trigger additional shortage gaming on the part of retailers. The inventory ordering and
fulfillment feedback loop is illustrated in Figure 2-1.

Figure 2-1 Simplified Inventory Ordering and Fulfillment Feedback Loop

2.3.5 Summary
Within supply inventory competition, there are three relevant elements when
investigating the impact of multiple horizontal entities on the performance of
interconnected retailers and manufacturer. First, manufacturer order rationing and second,
retailer shortage gaming, both represents the respective behavior that each entity may
exhibit in situations of constrained supply capacity and retail promotions demand shock.
Third, retail promotions demand shock represents a real-world event that exacerbates
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constrained supply capacity, a prerequisite for supply inventory competition.
These elements may impact various performance measures relevant to the
inventory ordering and fulfillment feedback loop as suggested by Lee, Padmanabhan, and
Whang (1997). Specifically, relevant performance measures include the total demand
variance experienced by the shared upstream manufacturer, customer service measures
such as order fill rate for the manufacturer as well as each affected retailer, excess
inventory investment in the form of inventory carrying costs for the manufacturer, and
lost revenues in the form of the manufacturer’s opportunity costs when they are unable to
fulfill demand.
Following, section 2.4 discusses the experimental framework and hypotheses for
this research.

2.4 EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN AND HYPOTHESES
The previous sections highlighted two research gaps in the supply chain
management literature in order to present a conceptual framework of this research. First,
the literature review shows that the impact of horizontal entities within an industrial
business system has not been adequately addressed in supply chain management research.
Most studies have treated the dynamics of these systems from a simplified, vertical
perspective and omitted its horizontal aspects. Yet, phenomena such as supply inventory
competition involve horizontal elements such as multiple, competing retailers. To fill this
gap, this research explores the impact of supply inventory competition with explicit
consideration of multiple, competing retailers on the more commonly considered vertical
supply chain relationship between a manufacturer and a focal retailer.
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Second, the literature review suggests that supply inventory competition involves
three main elements of manufacturer order rationing, retailer shortage gaming, and retail
promotions demand shock when investigating the impact of multiple horizontal entities
on the performance of interconnected retailers and manufacturer. Manufacturer order
rationing and retailer shortage gaming both represents the respective behavior that each
entity may exhibit in situations of constrained supply capacity and retail promotions
demand shock. Retail promotions demand shock represents a real-world event that
exacerbates constrained supply capacity, a prerequisite for supply inventory competition.
These variables may impact the long-term performance of the overall inventory ordering
and fulfillment process connecting each entity. However, the dynamic and interactive
nature of the three factors involved in supply inventory competition remains unclear.
There is no research that concurrently and explicitly considers a manufacturer and
horizontal entities (multiple retailers) as well as the interactions of a manufacturer’s
choice of order rationing strategies with multiple retailer’s response of shortage gaming
in the context of constrained supply/retailer promotions demand over time.
This research seeks to fill these gaps by using discrete event simulation modeling
to examine the impact of supply inventory competition on the long-term performance of
the inventory ordering and fulfillment process between a manufacturer and multiple
retailers, explore the dynamics of supply inventory competition over time in the context
of retail promotions demand shock, and identify the interactive impact of various
manufacturer order rationing strategies and retailer shortage gaming strategies on longterm system behavior.
Forrester’s theory of industrial dynamics (1958; 1961) suggests that interaction of
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the structural elements, time relationship delays, and amplification relevant decision
policies will interact within an information feedback system to impact the stability and
long-term performance of the system. Structural elements relevant to supply inventory
competition consist of the manufacturer and multiple retailers. Delays, or time
relationships, are represented by the cycle of inventory ordering and fulfillment. Decision
policies are represented by three different order rationing strategies the manufacturer may
employ as well as a range of order inflation response each retailer may exhibit. The longterm performance of the system can be inferred from measures such as the demand
variance experienced by the manufacturer, order fill rates for each affected retailer as
well as order fill rates for the shared upstream manufacturer, and costs associated with
supply / demand misalignment such as the manufacturer’s cost of lost opportunity when
they are unable to fulfill demand and the manufacturer’s cost of carrying excess
inventory. In addition, exogenous shocks to the system may set into motion sustained
instability within the system itself. Retail promotions demand shock represents a realworld example of exogenous shock to supply inventory competition.
Three elements of manufacturer order rationing, retailer shortage gaming, and retail
promotions demand shock are examined over multiple independent entities. As this
research seeks to determine the impact of horizontal elements (additional retailers) on a
focal vertical supply chain, one retailer is designated a “focal” retailer (Retailer 1) while
the additional retailers collectively represent supply inventory competition when they
engage in shortage gaming. Thus, four experimental factors are investigated. Table 2-2
(below) shows the experimental design and hypotheses proposed in the research.
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Table 2-2 Experimental Factors and Outcomes
Manufacturer
Order
Rationing
Strategies

Levels:
-Proportional
-Linear
-Uniform

Experimental Factors
Focal
Supply
Retailer Inventory
Shortage Competition
Gaming (Shortage
Gaming
from Other
Retailers)
Levels:
-No Gaming
-Correction Gaming
-Overreaction Gaming

Retail
Promotions
Demand
Shock

Levels:
-None
-Promotions

Outcomes
a. manufacturer’s demand
variance
b. manufacturer’s order fill
rate
c. focal retailer order fill rate
d. other retailers’ order fill
rates
e. manufacturer’s cost of lost
opportunity to fill demand
f. manufacturer’s inventory
carrying cost

Within the context of the inventory ordering and fulfillment, Forrester’s industrial
dynamics theory (1958; 1961) suggest that decision policies such as manufacturer order
rationing strategies will impact performance by decreasing the stability of the system.
This is represented by significant impact on relevant performance measures such as
demand variance, order fill rates for all involved entities, and manufacturer’s costs.
Literature investigating various order rationing strategies also detail the nature and
operationalization of “truth-inducing” versus “order-inflating” strategies. Cachon and
Lariviere (1999b) suggest that Uniform versus Proportional or Linear order rationing
strategies will result in outcome differences. A Uniform strategy may be less effective in
matching retailer’s inventory allocation to their demand because its outcomes do not take
into account each retailer’s relative demand, and may result in wide differences between
what a particular retailer orders and what they are allocated according to the Uniform
strategy (Cachon & Lariviere 1999b). When compared to the use of either Proportional or
Linear order rationing strategies, the use of a Uniform rationing strategy over time may
exacerbate the detrimental impact of supply/demand misalignment in the system. Thus,
the first two hypothesis are proposed:
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H1 - Manufacturer order rationing strategies significantly impact long-term system
performance in the form of: a. the manufacturer’s demand variance, b. the
manufacturer’s order fill rates, c. focal retailer order fill rate, d. other retailers’ order
fill rates, e. the manufacturer’s cost of lost opportunity, and f. the manufacturer’s
inventory carrying cost.
H2 - Uniform order rationing strategy, compared to either Proportional or Linear order
rationing strategies, has a greater positive impact on: a. increasing the manufacturer’s
demand variance, b. decreasing the manufacturer’s order fill rates, c. decreasing focal
retailer order fill rate, d. decreasing other retailers’ order fill rates, e. increasing the
manufacturer’s cost of lost opportunity, and f. increasing the manufacturer’s inventory
carrying cost.
Consistent with extant literature on order rationing and shortage gaming (e.g. Lee
et al. 1997; Cachon & Lariviere 1999b; Nirajan et al. 2011; Olivia & Goncalves 2006;
Rong et al. 2008), if the focal retailer inflates their order in response to shortage caused
by manufacturer order rationing, total demand variance will increase. The increased
demand variance will also translate to decreased fill rates and additional costs throughout
the inventory order and fulfillment system, suggesting the following hypothesis:
H3 - Focal retailer (Retailer 1) shortage gaming directly impacts long-term system
performance by: a. increasing the manufacturer’s demand variance, b. decreasing the
manufacturer’s order fill rates, c. decreasing focal retailer order fill rate, d. decreasing
other retailers’ order fill rates, e. increasing the manufacturer’s cost of lost opportunity,
and f. increasing the manufacturer’s inventory carrying cost.
As the absolute amount of their order inflation increases, the increasing stress on
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the system will be translated to additional detrimental impact on the long-term
performance of the system. The two different shortage gaming responses identified in the
literature rely on different decision rules on the part of each retailer. Correction gaming is
a dynamic rule and reflects order inflation that is based in prior experience. The absolute
amount of inflation may change and increase over time as the experience of inventory
shortage is compounded quarter after quarter. In contrast, Overreaction gaming calls for a
consistent inflation of each retailer’s actual demand if they were shorted in the previous
quarter. Over time, the compounded inflation of Correction gaming compared to the
consistent inflation of Overreaction gaming may result in higher absolute order inflation
levels, suggesting the following hypothesis:
H4 - For the focal retailer (Retailer 1), Correction shortage gaming when compared to
Overreaction shortage gaming, has a greater positive impact on: a. increasing the
manufacturer’s demand variance, b. decreasing the manufacturer’s order fill rates, c.
decreasing focal retailer order fill rate, d. decreasing other retailers’ order fill rates, e.
increasing the manufacturer’s cost of lost opportunity, and f. increasing the
manufacturer’s inventory carrying cost.
Forrester’s industrial dynamics theory (1958; 1961) also suggest that the
interactions of additional entities involved in the inventory ordering and fulfillment
feedback loop will contribute to system instability. If multiple retailers independently
react to inventory shortage as a result of manufacturer order rationing, then the system
should exhibit increased instability. In addition, research on order rationing strategies
indicate that differences in the relative demand of inventory orders may impact order fill
outcomes (Cachon & Lariviere 1999b) which suggest that retailers who order a large
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volume of inventory can be differentiated from retailers who order a small volume of
inventory. Therefore two hypotheses are proposed:
H5 - Supply inventory competition, in the form of either Correction or Overreaction
gaming by retailers other than the focal retailer directly impacts long-term system
performance by: a. increasing the manufacturer’s demand variance, b. decreasing the
manufacturer’s order fill rates, c. decreasing focal retailer order fill rate, d. decreasing
other retailers’ order fill rates, e. increasing the manufacturer’s cost of lost opportunity,
and f. increasing the manufacturer’s inventory carrying cost.
H6 - Supply inventory competition from retailers ordering a larger volume compared to
other retailers will exhibit a greater positive impact on: a. increasing the manufacturer’s
demand variance, b. decreasing the manufacturer’s order fill rates, c. decreasing focal
retailer order fill rate, d. decreasing other retailers’ order fill rates, e. increasing the
manufacturer’s cost of lost opportunity, and f. increasing the manufacturer’s inventory
carrying cost.
Per Forrester’s industrial dynamics theory (1958; 1961), if an exogenous shock
such as a retail promotions demand shock is added to the system, then the system will
exhibit sustained instability and suggests the following hypothesis:
H7 - Retail promotions demand shock directly impacts long-term system performance by:
a. increasing the manufacturer’s demand variance, b. decreasing the manufacturer’s
order fill rates, c. decreasing focal retailer order fill rate, d. decreasing other retailers’
order fill rates, e. increasing the manufacturer’s cost of lost opportunity, and f.
increasing the manufacturer’s inventory carrying cost.
Finally, a core concept of Forrester’s theory of industrial dynamics (1958; 1961)
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is that interactions between structural elements, time relationship delays, and
amplification relevant decision policies will impact the stability and long-term
performance of the system. Interactions include various two-way, three-way, and a fourway combination of the main factors: manufacturer order rationing, retailer shortage
gaming for a focal retailer, retailer shortage gaming for multiple other retailers (supply
inventory competition), and retailer promotions demand shock. Thus, the following
hypotheses are proposed:
H8 - The two-way interaction of manufacturer order rationing and focal retailer
shortage gaming significantly impact long-term system performance in the form of: a. the
manufacturer’s demand variance, b. the manufacturer’s order fill rates, c. the focal
retailer’s order fill rate, d. other retailers’ order fill rates, e. the manufacturer’s cost of
lost opportunity, and f. the manufacturer’s inventory carrying cost.
H9 - The two-way interaction of manufacturer order rationing and supply inventory
competition significantly impact long-term system performance in the form of: a. the
manufacturer’s demand variance, b. the manufacturer’s order fill rates, c. the focal
retailer’s order fill rate, d. other retailers’ order fill rates, e. the manufacturer’s cost of
lost opportunity, and f. the manufacturer’s inventory carrying cost
H10 - The two-way interaction of manufacturer order rationing and retail promotions
demand shock significantly impact long-term system performance in the form of: a. the
manufacturer’s demand variance, b. the manufacturer’s order fill rates, c. the focal
retailer’s order fill rate, d. other retailers’ order fill rates, e. the manufacturer’s cost of
lost opportunity, and f. the manufacturer’s inventory carrying cost
H11 – The two-way interaction of focal retailer shortage gaming and supply inventory
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competition significantly impact long-term system performance in the form of: a. the
manufacturer’s demand variance, b. the manufacturer’s order fill rates, c. the focal
retailer’s order fill rate, d. other retailers’ order fill rates, e. the manufacturer’s cost of
lost opportunity, and f. the manufacturer’s inventory carrying cost
H12 - The two-way interaction of focal retailer shortage gaming and retail promotions
demand shock significantly impact long-term system performance in the form of: a. the
manufacturer’s demand variance, b. the manufacturer’s order fill rates, c. the focal
retailer’s order fill rate, d. other retailers’ order fill rates, e. the manufacturer’s cost of
lost opportunity, and f. the manufacturer’s inventory carrying cost
H13 - The two-way interaction of supply inventory competition and retail promotions
demand shock significantly impact long-term system performance in the form of: a. the
manufacturer’s demand variance, b. the manufacturer’s order fill rates, c. the focal
retailer’s order fill rate, d. other retailers’ order fill rates, e. the manufacturer’s cost of
lost opportunity, and f. the manufacturer’s inventory carrying cost
H14 - The three-way interaction of manufacturer order rationing, focal retailer shortage
gaming, and supply inventory competition significantly impact long-term system
performance in the form of: a. the manufacturer’s demand variance, b. the
manufacturer’s order fill rates, c. the focal retailer’s order fill rate, d. other retailers’
order fill rates, e. the manufacturer’s cost of lost opportunity, and f. the manufacturer’s
inventory carrying cost
H15 - The three-way interaction of manufacturer order rationing, focal retailer shortage
gaming, and retail promotions demand shock significantly impact long-term system
performance in the form of: a. the manufacturer’s demand variance, b. the
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manufacturer’s order fill rates, c. the focal retailer’s order fill rate, d. other retailers’
order fill rates, e. the manufacturer’s cost of lost opportunity, and f. the manufacturer’s
inventory carrying cost
H16 - The three-way interaction of manufacturer order rationing, supply inventory
competition, and retail promotions demand shock significantly impact long-term system
performance in the form of: a. the manufacturer’s demand variance, b. the
manufacturer’s order fill rates, c. the focal retailer’s order fill rate, d. other retailers’
order fill rates, e. the manufacturer’s cost of lost opportunity, and f. the manufacturer’s
inventory carrying cost
H17 - The three-way interaction of focal retailer shortage gaming, supply inventory
competition, and retail promotions demand shock significantly impact long-term system
performance in the form of: a. the manufacturer’s demand variance, b. the
manufacturer’s order fill rates, c. the focal retailer’s order fill rate, d. other retailers’
order fill rates, e. the manufacturer’s cost of lost opportunity, and f. the manufacturer’s
inventory carrying cost
H18 – The four-way interaction of manufacturer order rationing, focal retailer shortage
gaming, supply inventory competition, and retail promotions demand shock significantly
impact long-term system performance in the form of: a. the manufacturer’s demand
variance, b. the manufacturer’s order fill rates, c. the focal retailer’s order fill rate, d.
other retailers’ order fill rates, e. the manufacturer’s cost of lost opportunity, and f. the
manufacturer’s inventory carrying cost
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CHAPTER 3
RESEARCH METHODS
3.0 INTRODUCTION
This chapter sets forth the research method used to test the hypotheses in five
sections. First, the chapter discusses why simulation is an appropriate research
methodology. Second, the chapter provides an overview of the simulation model based
on literature and interviews. Third, the chapter addresses the rigor of the simulation
model. Fourth, the chapter details the experimental design including experimental
scenarios, inputs, controls, and outputs of the model. Finally, the chapter concludes by
describing the statistical techniques that will be used for data analyses.

3.1 SIMULATION METHOD
3.1.1 Overview
This research uses discrete event simulation as an appropriate method to test the
hypotheses under a controlled experimental environment. Specifically, this research uses
ARENA, a dynamic simulation software tool that combines SIMAN simulation language
with a graphics component (Kelton et al. 2010).
Simulation refers to methods of studying a wide variety of models of real world
systems by numerical evaluation using software designed to imitate the system’s
operations or characteristics (Kelton et al. 2010; Forrester 1958; Forrester 1961). It is
ideally suited for modeling complex systems such as supply chains over time (Evers &
Wan 2012; Manuj et al. 2009) as well as for evaluating the interactions of multiple
variables (Davis et al. 2007). Thus, explicit calls have been made for the increased use of
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simulation modeling to study supply chain systems (e.g. Waller & Fawcett 2011; Min &
Zhou 2002; Bowersox & Closs 1989). In addition, simulation can provide robust
conclusions in investigations where tradeoffs between a specified set of alternatives (e.g.
various order rationing strategies and shortage gaming responses) can be evaluated
(Manuj et al. 2009).
Simulations are often used for hypothesis testing, as is the case for this research,
because its ability to be replicated provides separate observations (data points) to form
the foundation for experimentation (Ballou 1989). In comparison to research
methodologies such as surveys, experiments allow for a high level of precision and are
appropriate for determining causality (Creswell 2007a; McGrath 1982; Highhouse 2009).
A key advantage of simulations is their control, a necessary requirement for
experimentation (Evers & Wan 2012; Davis et al. 2007; Kelton & Barton 2003; Forrester
1961; Forrester 1958). An empirical test of any causal relationship needs to assess the
statistical correlation between independent and dependent variables, the temporal
precedence among these variables, and exclude the possibility of confounding variables
(Bachrach & Bendoloy 2011). Experiments through simulation allow for the precise
temporal sequencing of treatment and effects, and also allow for the randomization of
spurious causes so that they do not correlate with the treatment (Siemsen 2011).
Due to its inherent nature, simulations provide the precision, control, and
temporal control appropriate for this research. The research seeks to answer two
questions: 1. Does supply inventory competition impact vertical industrial business
systems? and 2. How can supply inventory competition impact the inventory ordering
and fulfillment process in the context of a retail promotions demand shock over time? In
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order to answer these questions, it is first necessary to precisely examine situations where
supply inventory competition can occur, when total demand exceeds supply in a system
where multiple retailers purchase the same good from a shared manufacturer. Methods
such as surveys may not be able to isolate the required context from possible confounding
elements as well as a simulation might (Manuj et al. 2009; McGrath 1982). Second, as
supply inventory competition involves conflicting actions from multiple parties
(manufacturer and multiple retailers) and each has choices in their actions (various order
rationing strategies and shortage gaming responses), it is necessary to identify and track
each participant-choice scenario such that cause-effect relationships with outputs of
interest can be determined. Methodologies such as analytical modeling with limits in
mathematical tractability (Evers & Wan 2012), may not be able to adequately address the
complex, interactive nature of this research. Finally, in order to understand the dynamics
of supply inventory competition, the variables and outputs of interest must be observed
and tracked over time, which is feasible for simulations (Kelton et al. 2010) and is ideal
for understanding industrial dynamics (Forrester 1958; 1961).
Simulations are logical representations of an actual system, and thus cannot
ensure generalizability beyond the system under consideration (Evers & Wan 2012;
Meredith 1998). As a representation of an actual system, some scholars have voiced
concern that simulations can be unrealistic and therefore unable to yield valid theoretical
insights (Chattoe-Brown 1998; Fine & Elsbach 2000 as cited in Davis et al. 2007). As a
compromise between model complexity and reality, the supply chain should be modeled
in such a way that it is reflective of key real-world dimensions (Min & Zhou 2002). This
is accomplished through the use of real-world settings in the simulation model and real-
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world data to inform the simulation parameters (Manuj et al. 2009; Reiner 2005; Van der
Zee & Van der Vorst 2005). The following sections detail the steps taken to ensure rigor,
and both internal validity as well as external validity in the simulation research.
3.1.2 Procedure for Rigorous Simulation Research
Manuj, Mentzer and Bowers (2009) recommend eight steps to ensure rigor in
simulation research. These steps are distilled and compiled from multiple sources on
building simulation models. They are summarized in Table 3-1.
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Table 3-1 Summary of Recommended Procedure for Rigorous Simulations
Recommended Steps
Description
1. Formulate the
• State the research question and objectives precisely such that
problem
performance measures of interest, scope of the model, time
frame and resources required may be determined accurately.
2. Specify
• Ensure that independent variables reflect the system
independent and
parameters while dependent variables reflect the performance
dependent variables
outputs of interest.
• A comprehensive literature review and consultation with
subject matter experts can help confirm that the identified
variables are appropriate to the research questions and
objectives.
3. Develop and
• Identify the process that is being modeled based on literature
validate the
and/or managerial interviews.
simulation’s
• This process is an abstraction of the real-world system under
conceptual model
investigation and is in the form of a
mathematical/logical/verbal representation (Sargent 2011).
• Identification of the relationships included in the model
ensures that the model develops in accordance with the
research question(s) and objectives.
4. Define data
• Establish data requirements in order to operationalize
requirements and
variables that reflect both experimental and fixed parameters
establish sources for of the model. This includes probability distributions of
data collection
variables of interest, obtained from objective sources and/or
managerial interviews.
5. Develop and verify • Develop a detailed sequence of events and crosscheck the
computer-based
model output against manual calculations in order to verify
model
that the computer-based model behaves in the manner
intended.
6. Validate the
• Validate the computer-based model to ensure accuracy and
computer-based
reliability.
model
• This can be done through consultation with subject matter
experts, performing a structured walk-through and checking
for reasonableness of results and performing sensitivity
analysis.
7. Perform
• Specify the number of independent replications required in
simulations
order to ensure confidence in the data.
• Additionally, run length and warm-up period is specified after
conducting initial runs on the simulation.
• Simulations are then run according to the experimental design
and data is collected for each run.
8. Analyze and
• Establish appropriate statistical techniques, making sure to
document results
address the assumptions required for those techniques such as
data normality and the absence of outliers.
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Steps 1 and 2 were addressed in both Chapters 1 and 2. The following sections of
this chapter will address Steps 3 through 7 by providing information regarding the
development and validation of the simulation model, the data sources of experimental
and fixed simulation parameters, as well as the verification and validation of the
simulation itself. Step 8 is reported in Chapter 4.

3.2 THE SIMULATION MODEL
This section discusses the simulation setting including data from interviews, the
supply chain structure, and the sequence of events. In order to ground the simulation in a
real-world setting (Manuj et al. 2009; Reiner 2005; Van der Zee & Van der Vorst 2005),
external face validity is provided through literature, publicly available industry data, and
managerial interviews regarding the characteristics of the system under investigation. The
simulation structure and event sequence reveals the logic and processes of the studied
system and indicates how the simulation captures key characteristics of the real-world
system.
3.2.1 Simulation Setting
The research is grounded in a real-world setting in order to ensure the
applicability of its results (Manuj et al. 2009; Reiner 2005; Van der Zee & Van der Vorst
2005). An appropriate setting for this research is a major household appliance supply
chain based in the US, similar to Forrester’s original industrial dynamics research setting
(1958; 1961). The setting is appropriate for several reasons. First, promotions are a large
part of the appliance industry (Zimmerman 2012), which is appropriate for the research’s
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context, objectives, and questions. Although manufacturers offer rebates directly to
consumers, retailers also offer their own promotions in the form of temporary price
discounts, free value-added services such as delivery and installation setup, or special
financing options in order to incentivize consumers to purchase. These marketing
initiatives are initiated by the retailer and are not always known in advance by
manufacturers, thus representing the retail promotion demand shock under investigation
in this research.
Second, the market for major appliances is mature due to high penetration rates in
US households (MarketLine 2012) and allow for reasonable representation of base
consumer demand. Major appliance purchases occur primarily for replacement purposes
and products such as refrigerators are characterized by a consistent annual seasonal
pattern that can be derived from publicly available data. Although technological advances
such as internet-enabled appliances are pursued by manufacturers as a way to impact
consumer preference, new product innovations are only beginning to impact consumer
demand (Bloomberg BusinessWeek Jan 26 2011). Overall, the market demand for major
appliances is steady and mature. This limits the possibility of confounding factors in
modeling base consumer demand, thus increasing the external validity of the simulation.
Finally, due to the maturity of the industry, major appliance manufacturers’
supply chains are well known which allows for an accurate simulation model to be
established. Major appliances manufacturers consist of several large firms. Collectively,
the top three firms (Whirlpool, GE, and AB Electrolux) command over 80% market share
in the US (Kelly 2012). Manufacturers typically sell directly to a consolidated set of
customers, consisting mostly of national retailers (Webb 2011; Sagar 2003). According to
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the Association of Home Appliance Manufacturers, the top nine retailers encompass 84%
of appliance sales in 2011 (TWICE 2012). These retailers include department stores,
home improvement or construction suppliers, electronics retailers and general
merchandise retailers (TWICE 2012) who compete against each other on a national level.
The large customers enjoy a degree of power within their relationships with appliance
manufacturers due to their high volume activity and hands-on facilitation of consumer
purchasing for high involvement “big ticket” appliances (Davis-Sramek et al. 2009).
In summary, the maturity of the major appliances industry allows the simulation
to be created based on a known supply chain structure with understood parameters (Webb
2011). This allows the simulation to recreate important aspects of the supply chain with
few assumptions in order to increase the simulation’s external validity (Webb 2011).
Moreover, characteristics such as supply inventory competition within the customer
echelon and the existence of retailer power within their relationship with manufacturers
fit within the research’s contextual requirements.
3.2.2 Data from Interviews
Data from first-person interviews were utilized in order to provide a sound basis
for the simulation design and inputs. Interviews are an important initial step in carrying
out simulation research and should reflect the research context (Nyaga 2006). Therefore,
individuals who are highly knowledgeable of inventory processes at two leading firms in
the US major appliances industry (a leading major appliance manufacturer and a leading
major appliance retailer) were asked to characterize important aspects of their inventory
replenishment process such that information from third-party sources (e.g. industry data
or literature) can be triangulated (Yin 2003) to build a robust simulation.
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Two interviews were conducted. The first was with a consultant to a leading
appliance manufacturer and the second was with a former Director of Logistics &
Merchandise Buyer at a leading appliance retailer. Each interview was conducted
following recommendations for qualitative research methodology (e.g. Corbin & Strauss
2008; Creswell 2007; Bryman 2008; Yin 2003). Interviews were semi-structured with
open-ended questions that allowed the participants to relate their understanding of the
inventory ordering and fulfillment process. These types of questions enabled respondents
to give a detailed narrative of events and sequences that are then reconstructed to develop
a typical inventory replenishment process flow. During the interview, probing questions
were asked to establish details (e.g. operational measures), which provided or
corroborated publicly available information for the simulation design and inputs.
Responses to these questions provided the basis for the design of a simulation model that
replicates the inventory replenishment process in a major household appliance supply
chain as closely as possible. Each interview lasted approximately one hour in length and
were recorded and transcribed. The resulting transcripts were sent to each participant for
verification of content.
The simulation model requires knowledge of the supply chain structure in order to
accurately depict the number of independent entities, the inventory ordering and
fulfillment process in order to model a sequence of events, and key variable distributions
in order to accurately reflect the system of interest. Data from interviews with a leading
appliance manufacturer and a leading appliance retailer, coupled with third-party data,
provided the following pertinent information on the: 1. supply chain structure, 2.
manufacturer’s production capacity, 3. inventory ordering and fulfillment process, 4.
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manufacturer order rationing, 5. retailer shortage gaming, and 6. retail promotions
activity.
3.3.2.1 Supply Chain Structure
Based on the interview, the manufacturer has nine primary customers; each
customer is a national retailer who competes against the other retailers. The nine retailers
vary by order volume in an approximate Pareto distribution with three classes of
customer types (“A”, “B”, or “C” retailers). The manufacturer’s “A” customers are
generally home repair or hardware stores or construction suppliers (Webb 2011).
Manufacturing occurs generally in North America and each factory has its own
distribution center. Customers either take delivery of product to their regional distribution
centers or to a manufacturer’s regional distribution center (Webb 2011). Orders are
communicated at a corporate level directly from retailer(s) to the manufacturer.
The manufacturer has two major competitors who also sell similar products to
national retailers. Although each manufacturer is in possession of a known brand, the
retailer has observed that to a certain degree consumers will substitute products from
competing manufacturers. Retailers who are unable to obtain inventory from a given
manufacturer may turn to other manufacturers to substitute demand.
3.2.2.2 Manufacturer’s Production Capacity
The manufacturer produces near capacity in order to minimize unit production
costs. In addition, excess capacity is limited as industry reports and investor
communications confirm that the manufacturer has undergone periodic reorganization of
manufacturing facilities in order to more closely match production capacity with demand
(MarketLine 2012; Kelly 2012; Company X 10-K). Analysts report that industry capacity
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is also constrained due to high fixed costs resulting from substantial manufacturing and
assembly plants (MarketLine 2012). Unlike simpler consumer products, there seems to be
limited possibility of outsourcing production for additional temporary capacity. For a
single representative product such as refrigerators, approximately 90,000 units per quarter
are representative of production capacity. This number is corroborated with third-party
data, obtained from publicly available shipment data from the Association of Home
Appliance Manufacturers (TWICE 2012) when the manufacturer’s market share (Kelly
2012) is taken into account.
3.2.2.3 Inventory Ordering and Fulfillment Process
At a corporate level, sales and operations planning between manufacturer and
retailers occur on a quarterly schedule. For the manufacturer, orders from all retailers are
aggregated and considered simultaneously at the beginning of each quarter. At this time,
total demand for the coming quarter is compared to available inventory and production
capacity as the manufacturer produces based on a make to stock strategy (Webb 2011).
Although both manufacturer and retailer are privy to shared POS data, the inventory
replenishment process seems to be more focused on forecasted demand from the retailer.
3.2.2.4 Manufacturer Order Rationing
The manufacturer utilizes order rationing policies if their total demand exceeds
supply for a given quarter. While the retailer is aware that order rationing occurs (for
example, they can physically observe competitor’s stock of product that they themselves
are shorted), they are not privy to the details of a specific order rationing policy. Thus this
simulation is based on an asymmetric information context that most closely mirrors the
real-life supply chain.
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3.2.2.5 Retailer Shortage Gaming
The retailer utilizes shortage gaming in order to ensure adequate fill rates. Order
fill rates for appliances tend to be lower than other products stocked by the retailer. The
retailer interview revealed that shortage gaming primarily occurs based on a correction
heuristic on the part of the inventory manager with an inflation range of 20 to 25 percent
over actual need, or can be significantly inflated as a tactic to obtain the manufacturer’s
attention similar to the literature discussion on overreaction gaming. In the instance of
overreaction gaming, an inflation range of 200 to 500 percent over actual need was given
as examples of prior actions. This was used by the retailer to “make a point” to the
manufacturer but also took into account the presence of promotions planned by the
retailer, to “be ready, just in case”. Overall, the practice of shortage gaming is not
explicitly acknowledged in the relationship between retailer and manufacturer.
3.2.2.6 Retail Promotions
The manufacturer experiences unplanned demand shock from retailer’s
promotions. The retailer is generally aware of other retailer’s promotions activity through
basic monitoring of competitor’s public actions as well as through inventory shortage
from the manufacturer. When the retailer has a promotions initiative planned, they are
reluctant to completely share this information due to fear that competitors will somehow
anticipate the promotion through communication with the shared manufacturer. In
anticipation of selling more units during a retail promotion, the retailer will increase their
order from the manufacturer. While the amount of order increase is a function of the
retailer’s promotional sales history, generally the lift in sales for the retailer would not
exceed more than 50% of normal sales due to the nature of major appliances (a big ticket
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item). When faced with increased demand from a retailer due to retail promotions, there
is a back and forth process of negotiation and compromise regarding the amount the
manufacturer can fill. The back and forth negotiation process was explicitly described as
a “game” by the retailer. The retailer reports that rarely 100% of the retailer’s retail
promotions order is filled whereas 80% of that order may be more feasible. The retailer is
also pragmatic regarding the ability of the manufacturer’s largest customer to command
better customer service and higher order fill from the manufacturer. As one of the
manufacturer’s largest customers, the retailer also expects the manufacturer to recognize
the importance of their high order volume compared to the manufacturer’s other
customers.
3.2.3 Simulation Structure and Sequence of Events
Figure 3-1 shows the simulated supply chain based on data from interviews and
industry reports. Order information (depicted with dashed lines) flows from each of nine
retailers to the manufacturer. Product (depicted with solid lines) flows from the
manufacturer to each retailer. The manufacturer’s two main competitors are represented
by “Other Manufacturers” who fill demand from retailers that the focal manufacturer
cannot meet each quarter. Figure 3-2 shows a flow chart of event sequences, based on
data from interviews.
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Figure 3-1 Simulated Supply Chain

Figure 3-2 Simulation's Sequence of Events
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On a typical simulated “day” which represents a quarterly period, the following
event sequence occurs:
Step 1. The manufacturer receives orders simultaneously from all retailers and aggregates
all orders to determine total demand.
Step 2. The manufacturer must determine if total demand exceeds supply. If it does not,
then orders are filled based on each retailer’s order and Step 3 is skipped. If it does, then
the process proceeds to Step 3.
Step 3. The manufacturer fills orders based on one order rationing rule (determined by the
experimental scenario).
Step 4. Retailers receive their product.
Step 5. Retailers determine if their order fill rate is less than 1. If it does not, then orders
are placed based on true demand and Step 6 is skipped. If it is, then the process proceeds
to Step 6.
Step 6. Each retailer places their individual order based on true demand and a shortage
gaming rule (determined by the experimental scenario).
Step 7. The last event is collection of statistics. Fill rates and orders for each retailer are
recorded. Individual statistics are then aggregated post experiment to calculate outcome
variables. The system returns to the first event after the last event is complete, repeating
the same sequence until the simulation period is over. This is repeated for a total of 30
replications for each scenario (see section 3.3.5 Simulation Replications for detailed
information).
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3.3 RIGOR
Sargent (2011) provides a comprehensive assessment of four types of simulation
validity that ensure that the simulation works as intended, can be replicated, and its
results can be applied to the system of interest with confidence. First, conceptual model
validity tests that the theories and assumptions underlying the conceptual model are
correct and that the mathematical, logical, and verbal model representation of the
problem is “reasonable” for the intended purpose. Second, computer-based model
verification ensures that the computer programming and implementation of the
conceptual model are correct. Third, operational validity determines whether the model
output behavior has sufficient accuracy for the research’s intended purpose. Finally, data
validity ensures that data necessary for model building, model evaluation and testing, and
conducting of model experiments are adequate and correct. In addition, the number of
replications of each simulation scenario is an important indicator of rigor (Webb 2011;
Law & Kelton 2000). Table 3-2 summarizes the techniques that will be used to ensure
rigor in this research.
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Table 3-2 Simulation Rigor
Test
Conceptual
Model
Validity

Purpose
Model representation
is consistent with its
intended application

ComputerBased Model
Verification

Computer
programming and
computer model
implementation are
correct
Model output behavior
has sufficient accuracy
and consistency
Data used in model
building, evaluation,
and testing are
adequate and correct
Sample size creates
adequate statistical
reliability

Operational
Validity
Data Validity

Replications

Technique Utilized
• Face validation
• Supply chain structure based on
characteristics of a major appliance supply
chain
• Characteristics determined through
interviews, third-party data, and literature
• Managers and academics reviewed the
model
• Traces of each simulation activity compared
to analytical hand calculations
• Traces to verify relationships of the entire
simulation
• Degenerate Tests
• Parameter Variability-Sensitivity Analysis
• Initialization bias testing
• Input parameters based on data from
interviews, third-party sources and literature
• Consistency checks and outlier screening
• Sample size calculation (Law & Kelton
2000, page 512)

3.3.1 Conceptual Model Validity
Sargent (2011) defines conceptual model validation as determining that the
theories and assumptions underlying the conceptual model are correct and that the model
representation of the problem entity is “reasonable” for the intended purpose of the
model.
A primary technique used to test conceptual validity is face validation (Sargent
2011). Face validation has subject matter experts evaluate the conceptual model to
determine if it is correct and reasonable for its purpose. This usually requires examining
the process model or the set of model equations. In this research, the conceptual model
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was verified through consultation with inventory ordering and fulfillment, major
appliance supply chain, and simulation methodology subject matter experts. In addition,
the use of empirical data from third-party sources bridges the gap between academic rigor
and managerial applicability (Shafer & Smunt 2004). This research models
characteristics of a major appliance supply chain in the US. The simulation is based on
data derived from interviews, third-party sources, and literature. By utilizing data from
different sources, the simulation ensures that face validity is established.
3.3.2 Computer-Based Model Verification
Computerized model verification is defined as assuring that the computer
programming and implementation of the conceptual model are correct (Sargent 2011).
Specifically, this is accomplished by testing if the model was programmed correctly in
the ARENA simulation software.
The primary technique used to determine that the model has been programmed
correctly is trace validation. The outputs of different activities in the model are traced
(followed) through the model to determine if the model’s logic is correct and if the
necessary accuracy is obtained (Sargent 2011). Simulation outputs are compared with
hand calculations to see whether the program passes information as intended (Law &
Kelton 2000). A file with each simulation activity performed (e.g. order fill) was created
and errors detected in the model were evaluated and fixed.
Traces were also run to verify the entire simulation (Law & Kelton 2000; Sargent
2011). Relationships between simulation inputs and outputs were tested using basic,
deterministic values. These were, in turn, compared to analytical values. The traces
through the system found no significant deviations from expected outcomes, thus
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verifying the computer-based model.
3.3.3 Operational Validity
Operational validity is defined as determining that the model’s output behavior
has sufficient accuracy for the model’s intended purpose over the domain of the model’s
intended applicability (Sargent 2011). A number of validation techniques can be used to
establish operational validity. Two techniques were used in this research: Degenerate
Tests and Parameter Variability–Sensitivity Analysis.
The degeneracy of the model’s behavior was tested by appropriate selection of
values for the input and control parameters (Sargent 2011). The model exhibited a
predictable behavior. For example, an increase in manufacturer production capacity such
that it exceeds total demand resulted in 100 percent order fill rates.
In parameter variability–sensitivity analysis, values of the input and internal
parameters of a model were changed to extreme values to determine the effect upon the
model’s behavior and its output. The extreme parameters caused no unexpected results
suggesting that the simulation is internally consistent and valid.
Initiation bias is also a threat to operational validity (Chen & Kelton 2008).
Initiation bias occurs when the simulation goes through an initial warm-up period.
Statistics collected during this period may bias output data from the steady state period.
In order to identify this bias, a comparison of histograms of the performance variables for
various run-lengths at independent time periods was made in order to identify the shortest
run-time with stable histogram quartiles (Chen & Kelton 2008). Follow-on examination
of simulation performance show that the simulation experienced a very limited
initialization bias of one year as the simulation was programmed with initial primed order
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fill rates of 100 percent. Based on this information, retail promotions demand shock was
programmed to occur in Year 4, Quarter 2. Data for analysis for all scenarios was
collected immediately post retail promotions demand shock for a total of 5 years.
3.3.4 Data Validity
Sargent (2011) defines data validity as ensuring that the data necessary for model
building, model evaluation and testing, and conducting of model experiments are
adequate and correct. This was done through internal consistency checks and screening
for outliers. Examination of output data showed consistency in range and no outliers.
3.3.5 Simulation Replications
The number of replications in a simulation study represents sample size, which
determines the accuracy of stochastic variables (Nyaga 2006). Law and Kelton (2000)
provide a procedure to calculate the number of replications required to estimate
population mean at a specified precision. This allows for the assumption regarding
normality of results, thus improving accuracy and confidence in the results. According to
Law and Kelton (2000, page 512), an approximate expression for the minimum number
of replications, na*(β), required to obtain an absolute error of β is given by:
na*(β) = min {i ≥ n: ti-1,1-α/2√(S2(n)/i) ≤ β}
The value for na*(β) can be determined by interactively increasing i by one until a
value of i is obtained for which ti-1,1-α/2√(S2(n)/i) ≤ β. For example, to estimate the
manufacturer’s order fill rate with an absolute error, β, of 0.05 and a confidence level, α,
of 90 percent, initial pilot runs of the most complex scenarios was done and initial mean
(µ) and variance (S2) were computed. An S2 = 0.0104 was obtained. According to the
formula above, a minimum of 14 replications was required. Critical values of t give t(13,
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0.05) =

1.7709. Using the equation {i ≥ n: ti-1,1-α/2√(S2(n)/i) ≤ β}, a minimum of 14

replications satisfy the ti-1,1-α/2√(S2(n)/i) ≤ β requirement.
A large sample size indicates that estimated mean is closer to true mean and a
large number of replications increases accuracy and confidence in simulation results
(Nyaga 2006). A statistically large, thirty-replication sample size produces an estimate of
actual relative error (the previously calculated confidence interval divided by the mean)
of .031 or an α of 97 percent (Law & Kelton 2000, page 513). Therefore, thirty
replications were run per experimental scenario following convention provided by extant
simulation research (e.g. Closs et al. 2010; Nyaga et al. 2007).

3.4 SIMULATION EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN
3.4.1 Overview
In simulations, the model processes experimental inputs in order for changes in
outputs to be examined (Kelton et al. 2010). In this research, various combinations of
order rationing and shortage gaming strategies for a manufacturer and its nine customers
(retailers), as well as retail promotion demand shock, are modeled as the inputs. Then, the
simulated supply chain based on fixed parameters acts as a control model. The resulting
outputs are dependent variables that enable the research to make conclusions about the
effects of horizontal competition and retail promotion demand shock on the demand
variance experienced by the manufacturer. The following sections define the inputs,
describe the fixed parameter supply chain model, and discuss the dependent variables.
3.4.2 Experimental Parameters
This research examines three major elements related to the topic of supply
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inventory competition: manufacturer order rationing strategies, retailer shortage gaming
responses, and retail promotions demand shock. These elements translate to four
experimental factors where retailer shortage gaming responses are split into a focal
retailer’s shortage gaming responses and supply inventory competition that is comprised
of multiple non-focal retailers’ shortage gaming responses. Within the experimental
factor of supply inventory competition, multiple retailers within the real-world supply
chain occupy different classes of customer types depending on order volume. “A” type
customers are large-sized retailers, “B” type customers are medium-sized retailers, and
“C” type customers are small-sized retailers.
Overall, this translates to a total of six independent inputs: manufacturer order
rationing; retailer shortage gaming for a focal retailer, retailer shortage gaming for each
of the three classes of other retailers (“A”, “B”, or “C” customers by volume
distribution); and retail promotion demand shock. There are three levels of manufacturer
order rationing strategies, three levels of retailer shortage gaming strategies, and two
levels of retail promotion demand shock. Thus, a 3x3x33x2 full factorial design yielding
486 scenarios will be used to generate data and test hypotheses. A total sample size of
14,580 observations result from 486 scenarios and 30 replications of each scenario. The
experimental parameters are summarized in Table 3-3.
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Table 3-3 Experimental Parameters
Variable
Manufacturer
Order Rationing
Strategy
(RATION)

Retailer Shortage
Gaming Strategy
(R1.GAME)
(RA.GAME)
(RB.GAME)
(RC.GAME)

Retail Promotions
Demand Shock
(PROMOTIONS)

Simulates

Categories Operationalization of the
Categories
Actions of the
3
Proportional = a customer
manufacturer in
receives the same percentage of
order fulfillment
capacity as their relative demand
if total demand
is to total orders
exceeds supply
Linear = each customer order is
for the given
shorted an equal absolute
quarter
amount
Uniform = capacity is divided
equally among customers
Actions of each
3
No Gaming = actual demand is
retailer in
ordered, no supply inventory
inventory
competition
ordering if their
Correction Gaming = each
previous quarter’s
customer orders actual demand
order was shorted
plus their unmet demand from
the previous period
Overreaction Gaming = orders
are inflated significantly, 2 times
actual demand
A large order by a
2
No Promotions = None
large volume
Promotions = Retail promotion
retailer, a
demand shock, 1.5 times base
minimum of 80%
demand for the focal Retailer 1
of which must be
filled by the
manufacturer

3.4.2.1 Manufacturer Order Rationing Strategy
Within simulation step 3, the manufacturer fills orders based on a single order
rationing rule if total demand exceeds supply for the quarter. These rules are set per each
experimental scenario and only one can be utilized within any given experimental
scenario. The rule can either be a proportional, linear, or uniform rationing rule, each
based on literature previously established in the literature review (e.g. Cachon &
Lariviere 1999b).
Proportional rationing dictates that retailers receive the same percentage of
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capacity as their relative demand is to total demand. It is operationalized in the following
manner: if a retailer’s order is x% of total orders, they receive x% of available capacity.
Linear rationing shorts each retailer order by an equal absolute amount. It is
operationalized as the difference between total orders and capacity, divided by the
number of retailers. This amount is then subtracted from each retailer’s order. If a
negative allocation results for a retailer, then that retailer receives zero allocation and the
process is repeated with the remaining retailers.
Uniform rationing divides capacity equally among retailers. It is operationalized
by an equal division of available inventory and capacity by the manufacturer among the
retailers; if any retailer orders less than their equally allocated share, they receive their
full order and the remaining capacity is allocated equally among the remaining retailers.
3.4.2.2 Retailer Shortage Gaming for Each Retailer
Within simulation step 6, each retailer determines next quarter’s order amount
based on a shortage gaming rule if they had experienced inventory shortage (i.e. their
order fill rate was less than 1) in simulation step 5. Similar to the manufacturer’s order
rationing strategy variable, these rules are set per each experimental scenario with only
one utilized per retailer within any given scenario. However, based on the scenario, some
retailers may utilize one rule whereas others may utilize another rule. The focal retailer
(Retailer 1) and each class of retailer, based on their volume distribution (see section
3.3.2.1 for discussion on the simulation’s supply chain structure), may each utilize
different rules in a given scenario. For example, the focal retailer (represented by Retailer
1), other “A” retailers (represented by Retailers 2 and 3), “B” retailers (represented by
Retailers 4, 5, 6, and 7), and “C” retailers (represented by Retailers 8 and 9) can all react
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differently to the manufacturer’s order rationing within a given scenario. Based on the
literature reviewed in section 2.3.3.2 Retailer Shortage Gaming, the rule can either be
one of no gaming, correction gaming, or overreaction gaming.
No gaming is operationalized as ordering the retailer’s actual demand. Despite
experiencing inventory shortage, the retailer does not react by inflating their next
quarter’s order. Essentially, retailers utilizing this rule do not actively engage in supply
inventory competition.
Correction gaming is operationalized as a dynamic rule, where the retailer orders
their actual demand plus their unmet demand from the previous period. Depending on the
amount the retailer was just shorted, the absolute amount of order may vary within a
given scenario.
Overreaction gaming is operationalized as a significant inflation of actual
demand. The retailer interview suggested that an inflation of 200 percent to 500 percent
over actual need is feasible and has been used by the retailer in the past. For this
simulation, Overreaction gaming was conservatively set at the low end of the inflation
range suggested by the retailer interview, at 200 percent over actual need each quarter, in
order to provide realistic bounds for the simulation.
3.4.2.3 Retail Promotions Demand Shock
The next experimental variable used in the simulation is retail promotion demand
shock. Depending on the experimental scenario, there are two categories: No promotions
and Promotions. When retail promotion demand shock is called for, a large volume
retailer will demand a one-time large order from the manufacturer at the beginning of the
simulation. This large order represents demand from a retailer’s marketing initiative such
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as retail promotions.
While a shock pattern is commonly discussed as a demand management issue
arising from retail promotions (e.g. Coyle et al. 2013; Bowersox et al. 2010), specific
data is limited. One study, utilizing historical sales information from a US Fortune 500
consumer products company, report that retail promotional activity resulted in spikes of
demand that were 5 times normal experienced by the manufacturer (Lummus et al. 2003).
Adebanjo (2009) detail the promotional profile for two food products. Demand during
inter-promotion periods was limited for both products and resulted in a demand pattern
that consisted primarily of promotional spikes. Base demand ranged from 5 percent to 10
percent of peak sales, suggesting that retail promotions increased demand by a factor of 9
times normal (Adebanjo 2009). The interview with the retailer suggested that promotions
demand varied. Although retailer primarily relied on prior promotions history to forecast
upcoming promotions demand, a factor of 1.5 normal demand was discussed for large
ticket item such as refrigerators. Given this information, the simulation conservatively
sets retail promotions demand at 1.5 times the base demand for the focal retailer (Retailer
1). If promotions demand within the scenario exceeds the base demand of a large retailer
by a large factor (such as 5) as suggested by the literature, there is the possibility that it
will exceed the total production of the manufacturer for each quarter.
As discussed in section 3.3.3 Operational Validity, the demand shock will be
applied in Year 4, Quarter 2 for appropriate scenarios. Once the retail promotions
demand is ordered, the retailer interview suggested that the manufacturer and retailer
undergo a series of negotiation regarding the order amount. In order to represent the back
and forth interaction between the retailer and manufacturer and its final outcome (see
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section 3.2.2.6 Retail Promotions), the simulation allows the manufacturer to fill the
retail promotions demand order to a minimum of 80% if there is limited supply. If there
is available supply for all, the entire promotions order is filled. The remaining orders
from other retailers are then filled according to the scenario rules. This action is
consistent with reports regarding the leverage large retailers possess in their relationships
with appliance manufacturers. The high volume activity and hand-on facilitation of
consumer purchasing for high involvement “big ticket” appliances ensures a degree of
power for large retailers in their relationships with appliance manufacturers (DavisSramek et al. 2009).
3.4.3 Fixed Parameters
The fixed parameters of the simulation reflect a simple inventory replenishment
process for one product between a single manufacturer and nine retailers. These
characteristics are based on data from interviews of a leading major appliance
manufacturer and retailer, third-party industry reports, and literature. The fixed
parameters are summarized in Table 3-4.
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Table 3-4 Fixed Parameters
Parameter
Unit of analysis
Manufacturer

Retailers

Total Base Demand
by Quarter

Operationalization
• Firm level
• Quarterly
• Produces to capacity each quarter
• 90,000 unit capacity/quarter for a single product
• Unsold inventory is accrued
• Orders are filled first out of accrued inventory and then
capacity for existing quarter
• Orders from retailers are batched and considered
simultaneously every quarter
• Order rationing strategies apply only when: (total demand) >
(accrued inventory + capacity for quarter)
• 9 total retailers
• Each employ shortage gaming strategy only when previous
quarter’s order fill rate < 1
• Approximate Pareto distribution by order volume
• “A” type: (3) retailers = 72% of order volume; 24% each
• “B” type: (4) retailers = 24% of order volume; 6% each
• “C” type: (2) retailers = 4% of order volume; 2% each
• Seasonal pattern based on industry data
• Q1 = TRIA(0.822, 0.825, 0.894)
• Q2 = TRIA(1.005, 1.105, 1.197)
• Q3 = TRIA(1.085, 1.145, 1.16)
• Q4 = TRIA(0.866, 0.895, 1.028)
• 432,000 units/year for a single product

3.4.3.1 Unit of Analysis
The unit of analysis for this simulation is firm level. Interviews revealed that sales
and operation planning between the manufacturer and retailers occur on a quarterly basis,
therefore each simulation “day” (where one cycle of the simulation’s sequence of events
occurs) represents one quarter (three months) of time.
3.4.3.2 Manufacturer
Based on data from interviews and industry reports, the simulation models the
manufacturer’s production as equal to capacity. In this simulation, capacity is set at
90,000 units per quarter for a single product, per data from the manufacturer interview.
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Any unsold inventory is accrued. Orders are filled first out of accrued inventory and then
out of capacity for existing quarter. Orders from retailers are batched and considered
simultaneously every quarter. Order rationing strategies apply only when total demand
exceeds supply (accrued inventory plus capacity for quarter). Within the simulation,
backorders are currently not considered in the inventory replenishment process for
several reasons. The simulation seeks to identify the interaction between manufacturer
order rationing and retailer shortage gaming. Factors such as backorders would confound
the simulation’s attempt to isolate the main experimental factors. In addition, the
inventory ordering and fulfillment process simulated takes place quarterly. Based on the
interviews, a moderate level of product substitutability exists, thus within the time frame
of a quarter, all unfilled demand can be filled by the manufacturer’s competitors (see
section 3.3.2.1 Supply Chain Structure and Figure 3-2).
3.4.3.3 Retailers
Nine total retailers are modeled within this simulation. Each retailer employs
shortage gaming only when shorted of inventory in the previous quarter, otherwise they
order actual demand. The shortage gaming strategy employed by each retailer is
determined by the experimental scenario. The nine retailers vary by order volume in an
approximate Pareto distribution based on data from interviews and is similar to industry
level data. Industry level data is obtained from TWICE (2012) who publishes a yearly
ranking of top major appliance retailers based on their major appliances sales. The
approximate Pareto distribution by order volume used in the simulation includes three
“A” retailers who collectively order 72% of the manufacturer’s sales, each ordering 24%
(Retailers 1, 2, and 3). Four other “B” retailers order a total of 24% of order volume, each
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ordering 6% (Retailers 4, 5, 6, and 7). The last two “C” retailers order a total of 4% of
order volume, each ordering 2% (Retailers 8 and 9). Table 3-5 shows data from TWICE
(2012) as well as the modeled order volume distribution.

Table 3-5 Retailer Order Volume Distribution
2011 Major
Appliance
Sales
($ millions)
$ 7,280
$ 5,390
$ 3,390
$ 1,800
$ 795
$ 771
$ 556
$ 214
$ 194
$ 24,198

Percentage

Cumulative
Percentage

Simulation
Distribution of
Order Volume

30 %
22 %
14 %
7%
3%
3%
2%
1%
1%

30 %
52 %
66 %
74 %
77 %
80 %
83 %
84 %
85 %

24 %
24 %
24 %
6%
6%
6%
6%
2%
2%
100 %

Retailer 1
Retailer 2
Retailer 3
Retailer 4
Retailer 5
Retailer 6
Retailer 7
Retailer 8
Retailer 9
Total Major
Appliance
Sales
Data from AHAM/TWICE 2012

3.4.3.4 Total Base Demand by Quarter
Base demand represents consumer demand experienced by the retailer(s) and is
essentially the amount needed for true replenishment of inventory for one product. For
this research it is modeled on refrigerators which represent the largest product category
within major appliances (Kelly 2012), based on two factors: 1. a seasonal pattern, which
allows for a description of quarterly activity relative to other quarters, and 2. an
estimation of unfilled orders, which allows for the establishment of base demand relative
to manufacturer production capacity.
Base demand is modeled with a seasonal pattern, based on the Association of
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Appliance Manufacturer’s reports of manufacturer’s shipment data (TWICE 2012).
Although this data represents activity at the manufacturer echelon and may not
necessarily reflect end consumer demand, the pattern of quarterly activity based on an
annual mean can be used to characterize differences between quarters. Analysis of this
data from 2005 through 2011 shows consistent differences by quarter when compared to
each year’s quarterly mean. Quarter 1 and Quarter 4 shipments are less than the mean
whereas Quarter 2 and 3 exceed the mean. Industry reports tie major appliances activity
to housing activity (e.g. MarketLine 2012; Kelly 2012). As many US homeowners either
purchase or move to a new rental home in the spring and summer months but do not
change housing in the winter months, the seasonal pattern observed from manufacturer’s
refrigerator shipments is reasonable. Table 3-6 shows data by quarter. Figure 3-3 exhibits
the seasonal pattern based on manufacturer’s refrigerator shipments. Based on this data,
the simulation adjusted each quarter’s mean to account for the observed seasonal pattern.
The quarterly seasonal pattern was operationalized via a triangular distribution based on
the observed minimum value, mode, and maximum value for each quarter (see Table 36). The following distributions were used: Q1 = TRIA(0.822, 0.825, 0.894), Q2 =
TRIA(1.005, 1.105, 1.197), Q3 = TRIA(1.085, 1.145, 1.16), and Q4 = TRIA(0.866,
0.895, 1.028).
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Table 3-6 Manufacturer's Shipment of Refrigerators as a Percentage of Annual
Quarterly Mean
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2005-2012
Standard deviation
Minimum value
Mode
Maximum value
Data from AHAM

Q1
82.2%
89.4%
86.1%
85.0%
82.2%
82.9%
87.3%
83.6%
84.8%
2.6%
82.2%
82.5%
89.4%

Q2
100.5%
107.2%
110.1%
114.3%
109.7%
119.7%
110.5%
110.0%
110.3%
5.5%
100.5%
110.5%
119.7%

Q3
114.5%
114.5%
113.1%
114.1%
116.0%
108.5%
111.5%
111.7%
113.0%
2.4%
108.5%
114.5%
116.0%

Q4
102.8%
88.9%
90.7%
86.6%
92.1%
88.9%
90.7%
94.6%
91.9%
5.0%
86.6%
89.5%
102.8%
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Figure 3-3 Seasonal Pattern of Manufacturer's Refrigerator Shipments 2005-2011
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In addition to a seasonal pattern, base demand must be based on absolute
numbers. An estimation of unfilled orders allows for the establishment of base demand
relative to manufacturer production capacity. Data from interviews indicated that order
fill rates for major appliances were 80% to 90% overall. This is corroborated by current
information from the Manufacturer’s Shipments, Inventories, and Orders Survey for
2008-2010 collected by the U.S. Census Bureau (2012), which shows consistent unfilled
orders for household appliance manufacturing. Therefore, this simulation model base
demand at 120% of the manufacturer’s annual production capacity. If production capacity
for a single product is set at 90,000 units per quarter, annual capacity equals 360,000
units (360,000 = 90,000 units per quarter x 4 quarters). Base demand for a single product
is therefore set at 432,000 units per year (432,000 = 360,000 units x 120%), or 108,000
units/quarter (108,000 = 432,000 units per year ÷ 4 quarters).
3.4.4 Dependent Variables
The dependent variables measured in this research are: long-term demand
variance for the manufacturer, the manufacturer’s order fill rate, the focal retailer’s order
fill rate, order fill rates for other “A”, “B”, and “C” type retailers, the manufacturer’s cost
of lost opportunity from unfilled demand, and the manufacturer’s cost of carrying excess
inventory. See Table 3-7.
Long-term demand variance represents the variability of total demand
experienced by the manufacturer over a given time period, calculated for a similar time
period after retail promotions demand shock. Five years post retail promotions demand
shock was used and all measures of the dependent variables were aggregated for this time
period. Total demand is the sum of all nine retailer’s orders for a given quarter. High
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variance in demand suggests greater difficulty for the manufacturer in matching supply
with demand and can result in operational inefficiencies such as the need to hold excess
inventories and poor customer service (Fisher 1997; Lee 2004). Long-term demand
variance is calculated by the coefficient of variation measure, a building block of vertical
bullwhip demand amplification calculations (Fransoo & Wouters 2000; McCullen &
Towill 2002) where:
Coefficient of variation of total demand = standard deviation /average value
Order fill rates indicate how successful a firm is in completing customer orders
(Coyle et al. 2013). An order with an item missing is considered incomplete. Therefore,
order fill rates measure complete shipments as a percentage of total orders. This is done
for the manufacturer as well as for each retailer. Order fill rate is a common measure of
manufacturer service performance and provides evidence of a firm’s ability to fulfill their
customers’ expectations. The measure is what manufacturers typically use when
evaluating their customer service performance. In addition, order fill rates are common
measures for retailers in evaluating their supplier’s performance. Lower service levels
suggest a firm’s difficulty in balancing demand and supply. Particularly for firms that
segment their customers by profit contribution, monitoring order fill rates for customers
enables the firm to track and establish corrective measures for the high impact customers
(Closs et al. 2010).
The manufacturer’s cost of lost opportunity from true unfilled demand represents
the unfilled potential units that are truly needed by the retailers, regardless of order
inflation. It is calculated by subtracting the quarterly order fill amount from the total true
demand. The quarterly average over five years is reported. A high relative amount of lost
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opportunity suggests a need for the manufacturer to address the constraint of supply
capacity.
The manufacturer’s cost of carrying excess inventory also represents excess cost
arising from difficulties in matching supply to demand from quarter to quarter. Inventory
carrying cost is the expense associated with maintaining inventory and is generally
calculated by multiplying an inventory carrying cost factor by average inventory cost
(Bowersox, Closs, Cooper, and Bowersox 2013). Bowersox, Closs, Cooper, and
Bowersox (2013, p155) suggest that a conservative carrying cost factor is 20% of the
average inventory value. As the unit of analysis for this simulation is quarterly and the
focus of this outcome is on identifying additional cost arising from carrying inventory
from one quarter to the next, average quarterly inventory value of excess inventory is
calculated by multiplying the amount of excess inventory recorded the end of each
quarter by an estimated cost per unit of inventory. The estimated cost per unit of
$1215.04 was determined by multiplying the mean suggested retail price of this
manufacturer’s range of refrigerators ($1412.84, manufacturer’s website as of 4/13/2013)
with the cost of goods sold suggested by the firm’s 10K annual report from the years
2009 through 2012 (86%). Consistent with the time frame of investigation for all
dependent variables, this outcome represents the cumulative cost of carrying inventory
for a total of five years (section 3.3.3 Operational Validity). A high inventory carrying
cost suggests a need for the manufacturer to address their ability to match supply with
demand closely.

96

Table 3-7 Dependent Variables
Measure
Coefficient of Variation
for Total Demand
(CV)
Manufacturer Order Fill
Rate
(M.OFR)
Retailer 1 Order Fill
Rate
(R1.OFR)
Retailers “A” Order Fill
Rate
(RA.OFR)
Retailers “B” Order Fill
Rate
(RB.OFR)
Retailers “C” Order Fill
Rate
(RC.OFR)
Opportunity Loss From
True Unfilled Demand
(OPP.LOSS)
Quarterly Inventory
Carrying Cost
(C.COST)

Calculation
= Standard Deviation/Average Value
= Total Orders Filled/Total Demand for Manufacturer
= Total Orders Filled/Demand for the focal retailer
represented by Retailer 1
= Total Orders Filled/Demand for type “A” retailers such as
Retailer 2 and Retailer 3
= Total Orders Filled/Demand for type “B” retailers such as
Retailer 4, Retailer 5, Retailer 6, and Retailer 7
= Total Orders Filled/Demand for type “C” retailers such as
Retailer 8 and Retailer 9
= Quarterly Total True Demand – Quarterly Total Order Fill
Amount
= Quarterly Excess Inventory * Inventory Carrying Cost
Percentage of 20% * Average MSRP for refrigerator of
$1,412.84 * COGS for 1 refrigerator unit of 86%

3.5 DATA ANALYSIS
After all data is collected, analysis will be done to determine differences between
scenarios in order to test the research hypotheses. Multivariate analysis of variance
(MANOVA) and univariate analysis of variance (ANOVA) will be used to test the main
and interactive impact of independent variables on dependent variables.
MANOVA is a dependence technique that measures differences for two or more
dependent variables based on a set of categorical variables acting as independent
variables (Hair et al. 2010). The ANOVA technique tests for differences in means
between groups and allows for detection of interaction effect between two variables (Hair
97

et al. 2010). Both techniques enable comparison of groups formed by categorical
independent variables, allowing comparison of the experimental conditions in the set of
dependent variables.
The detailed analysis of the data follows in Chapter 4.
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CHAPTER 4
RESULTS ANALYSIS
4.0 INTRODUCTION
This chapter presents the study’s results in four sections. First, the chapter
discusses assumptions for MANOVA tests and reviews the data’s conformity to those
assumptions. Second, the chapter details the multivariate results from the simulation.
Third, the chapter presents the univariate results. Finally, the chapter reviews results from
hypothesis testing.

4.1 MANOVA ASSUMPTIONS
MANOVA is a dependence technique that measures the differences for two or
more metric dependent variables based on a set of categorical variables acting as
independent variables (Hair et al. 2010). For the multivariate procedures of MANOVA to
be valid, the underlying data is assumed to (1) be randomly sampled from a population
and have independent observations, (2) follow a multivariate normal distribution for the
set of dependent variables, and (3) have equal variance-covariance matrices, and (4)
exhibit linearity among variables (Hair et al. 2010). Although there is evidence that these
tests are robust with regard to these assumptions, particularly when sample sizes are large
and groups are even in size (Hair et al. 2010), the data is examined with respect to each
assumption. All statistical tests were run on IBM SPSS Statistics, version 21.
4.1.1 Random Sampling and Statistical Independence
Lack of independence among observations is the most serious violation of
MANOVA assumptions (Hair et al. 2010). Lack of independence may be caused by
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gathering data within group settings. A common experience may cause that subset of
individuals with the common experience to have answers that are somewhat correlated.
In this study, the data consist of all scenarios generated from a full factorial design of the
independent variables. A total of 486 scenarios (3x3x33x2) were run with 30 replications
per scenario. This yielded a total sample size of 14,580. The experimental design used
independent scenarios and independent replications with random seeds for data
generation (Schriber & Brunner 2012), ensuring that data for each replication is not
related to each other. Thus, the assumption for random sampling from the population and
for statistical independence between scenarios is met.
4.1.2 Normality and Outlier Analysis
Multivariate normality assumes that joint effect of two variables is normally
distributed, however as no direct test of multivariate normality is available each variable
is tested for univariate normality (Hair et al. 2010). Results from the KolmogorovSmirnov tests of normality show that the dependent variables and the standard normal
distributions are not the same (see Table 4-1). However, the statistic is highly sensitive to
large samples (Hair et al. 2010, p. 74) such as this study’s. Thus additional information is
examined with respect to the data’s departure from normality.
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Table 4-1 Kolmogorov-Smirnov Test of Normality for Dependent Variables
Kolmogorov-Smirnov Test of Normality with Lilliefors Significance Correction
Dependent Variable
Statistic
df
Significance
Coefficient of Variation for Total Demand (CV)
0.190
14580
0.000
Manufacturer Order Fill Rate (M.OFR)
0.055
14580
0.000
Retailer 1 Order Fill Rate (R1.OFR)
0.114
14580
0.000
“A” Retailers Order Fill Rate (RA.OFR)
0.095
14580
0.000
“B” Retailers Order Fill Rate (RB.OFR)
0.217
14580
0.000
“C” Retailers Order Fill Rate (RC.OFR)
0.219
14580
0.000
Opportunity Loss From Unfilled Demand
0.191
14580
0.000
(OPP.LOSS)
Quarterly Inventory Carrying Cost (C.COST)
0.528
14580
0.000
Descriptive statistics provide additional information (see Table 4-2). In particular,
skew and kurtosis information show that all but one dependent variable (C.COST) falls
within recommended guidelines. Hair and colleagues (2010, p. 36) suggests that skew
statistics outside the range of negative one to one are substantially skewed. The skew for
C.COST is 7.286, indicating the data is substantially biased toward higher C.COST
levels. This dependent variable is also peaked in shape, with a kurtosis of 60.196, which
is greater than the recommended cutoff of seven (West, Finch, & Curran 1995). While
the F statistic is robust to deviations from skew, it is sensitive to kurtosis departures and
can be greatly influenced by outliers (Lindeman 1974), and therefore outliers were
examined.
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Table 4-2 Descriptive Statistics for Dependent Variables
Dependent
Variable
CV
M.OFR
R1.OFR
RA.OFR
RB.OFR
RC.OFR
OPP.LOSS
C.COST

N
14580
14580
14580
14580
14580
14580
14580
14580

Descriptive Statistics
Std
Mean
Skew
Deviation
0.121
0.044 0.966
0.481
0.189 0.083
0.526
0.226 -0.085
0.526
0.228 -0.298
0.578
0.354 -0.121
0.525
0.394 0.003
43671.989 22053.851 0.514
$427
$2,571 7.286

Std
Error
0.02
0.02
0.02
0.02
0.02
0.02
0.02
0.02

Kurtosis
0.148
-1.809
-1.087
-0.896
-1.287
-1.546
-0.362
60.196

Std
Error
0.041
0.041
0.041
0.041
0.041
0.041
0.041
0.041

Outliers for each dependent variable was determined through examination of their
respective standardized scores. Hair et al. (2010) suggest that for samples over twenty,
cases with a standard score outside the range of negative four to four to be considered
outliers. All but one dependent variable’s standardized scores met the above criteria (see
Table 4-3). C.COST exceeded the recommended range with an upper standardized score
of 12.02. Additional investigation revealed that for this dependent variable, cases with
standardized scores over four consist of a small percentage (1.9% = 288 cases out of
14,580 cases) of the relevant sample. These cases are evenly distributed across groups
within independent variable PROMOTIONS (see Table 4-4). However, outliers for this
dependent variable occur disproportionately more within scenarios utilizing a Uniform
manufacturer order rationing strategy than either Proportional or Linear strategies. In
addition, in scenarios where retailers do not shortage game, there are higher instances of
outliers compared to scenarios with either Correction or Overreaction shortage gaming.
These cases represent extreme but important information in illustrating the differential
impact of various independent variable groups. In these cases, the simulation shows
instances where the manufacturer incurred a high level of C.COST by carrying inventory
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over to a subsequent quarter.
The sensitivity of MANOVA results was tested by removing the outliers and
comparing the results with results from the full data set. No significant differences were
observed between MANOVA results for both sets of data. Still, readers may assume
diminished confidence in univariate C.COST analysis due to the non-normality of
C.COST values in the dataset.
In conclusion, the assumption of normality is violated by the data. However,
violations of this assumption have little impact with larger sample sizes and particularly
when outliers are minimized (Hair et al. 2010, p. 71). Therefore, the benign impact of the
C.COST outliers and size of dataset satisfy the requirements for multivariate analysis.

Table 4-3 Standard Score Ranges for Dependent Variables
Standard Score Ranges
Dependent Variable
Zscore:
Zscore:
Zscore:
Zscore:
Zscore:
Zscore:
Zscore:
Zscore:

CV
M.OFR
R1.OFR
RA.OFR
RB.OFR
RC.OFR
OPP.LOSS
C.COST

N
14580
14580
14580
14580
14580
14580
14580
14580

Minimum
-1.805
-1.781
-1.977
-1.886
-1.939
-1.334
-1.211
-0.166
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Maximum
2.769
1.969
1.780
1.765
1.193
1.205
2.534
12.024

Std
Deviation

Mean
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1

Table 4-4 Quarterly Inventory Carrying Cost Outlier Distribution Across
Independent Variables
Independent Variable
Manufacturer Order
Rationing
(RATION)

C.COST Outliers
Levels

Percent
28

10%

Linear
Uniform

26
234
288

9%
81%
100%

Retailer 1 Shortage Gaming
(R1.GAME)

No Gaming
Correction Gaming
Overreaction Gaming

288
0
0
264

100%
0%
0%
100%

Retail Promotions
(PROMOTIONS)

No Promotions
Promotions

144
144
288

50%
50%
100%

No Gaming

288

100%

Correction Gaming
Overreaction Gaming

0
0
288

0%
0%
100%

No Gaming

132

46%

Correction Gaming
Overreaction Gaming

78
78
288

27%
27%
100%

No Gaming

130

45%

Correction Gaming
Overreaction Gaming

80
78
288

28%
27%
100%

A Retailers Shortage
Gaming
(RA.GAME)

B Retailers Shortage
Gaming
(RB.GAME)

C Retailers Shortage
Gaming
(RC.GAME)

Proportional

N
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4.1.3 Equality of Variance-Covariance Matrices
Equality of variance-covariance matrices refers to the assumption that dependent
variables exhibit equal levels of variance across the range of independent variables.
Levene’s test of homogeneity of variance is used to test this assumption. Results show
the test is significant for all of the dependent variables at the p<0.001 level, which
suggests that the data fails the assumption of equal variances.
Commonly, Box’s M test also provides a singular statistic to determine if there is
equality of the group covariance matrices by comparing each independent variable’s
group singular covariance matrix with the total covariance matrix (IBM 2011). However,
in order for SPSS to compute and report this statistic, there must be variance in all groups
within each independent variable (IBM 2011). Examination of each independent
variable’s group covariance matrices shows zero variance for C.COST when A Retailers,
representing Retailers 2 and 3, shortage games, thus SPSS does not report a covariance.
The remaining covariance matrices show variation across groups. Box’s M test, run
without C.COST, rejects the null hypothesis that the observed covariance matrices of the
dependent variables are equal across groups (p<0.001). This result is not surprising as the
test is sensitive to departures of normality. Overall, the data generally violates the weak
assumption of variance-covariance matrices. However, the presence of relatively equal
sample sizes among the groups mitigates any violations of this assumption (Hair et al.
2010).
4.1.4 Linearity
Linearity is an implicit assumption of all multivariate techniques based on
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correlational measures of association such as MANOVA (Hair et al. 2010). Bartlett’s test
of sphericity was used to test for non-linear relationships. The test indicates that
significant inter-correlations exist (Chi-Square = 94545.34 df = 28, p<0.001), justifying
the use of MANOVA.
4.1.5 Proceed with Multivariate Analysis
The decision to proceed with MANOVA analysis is based on several reasons.
First, the data meets the most important assumption, that of independence of observations
through the experimental design and simulation’s use of random seeds for each
independent replication. Second, while the data exhibits non-normality, this violation of
assumption is deemed acceptable due to the mitigating influence of the study’s large
sample size and benign impact of outliers. Third, while the data generally does not meet
the assumption of equality of variance-covariance matrices, this violation is also
mitigated by the equal sample sizes in all treatment groups. Finally, the data meets the
implicit assumption of linearity. Overall, the data conforms to the most critical
requirements of MANOVA and violations of assumptions have been mitigated.
Therefore, it is appropriate to use MANOVA to test the study’s hypotheses.
4.2 MULTIVARIATE RESULTS
In this study, six independent variables are tested across 486 scenarios:
Manufacturer Order Rationing Strategy at three levels (RATION); Retailer 1’s Shortage
Gaming Strategy at three levels (R1.GAME); A Retailers’ Shortage Gaming Strategy at
three levels (RA.GAME); B Retailers’ Shortage Gaming Strategy at three levels
(RB.GAME); C Retailers’ Shortage Gaming Strategy at three levels (RC.GAME); and
Retail Promotions Demand Shock at two levels (PROMOTIONS). A Retailers represents
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Retailers 2 and 3; B Retailers represents Retailers 4, 5, 6 and 7; and C Retailers
represents Retailers 8 and 9; which refer to the order volume based categorization of each
retailer by the manufacturer (see section 3.3.2.1 Supply Chain Structure and section
3.4.3.3 Retailers). These multiple, non-focal retailers collectively represent supply
inventory competition. Each scenario is replicated 30 times, resulting in a total sample
size of 14,580.
There are eight dependent variables: the coefficient of variation of total demand
experienced by the manufacturer (CV), the manufacturer’s total fill rate (M.OFR) the
focal retailer’s order fill rate (R1.OFR), A Retailers’ order fill rate (RA.OFR), B
Retailers’ order fill rate (RB.OFR), C Retailers’ order fill rate (RC.OFR), the
manufacturer’s loss of opportunity from not meeting actual unfilled demand
(OPP.LOSS), and the manufacturer’s quarterly cost of carrying inventory (C.COST). The
dependent variables represent the aggregation of quarterly data for a period of five total
years, collected post retail promotions demand shock.
MANOVA tests were run on IBM SPSS Statistics, version 21. This study reports
Pillai’s Trace statistics for MANOVA tests. Pillai’s Trace is calculated as the sum of the
variance that can be explained by the calculation of discriminate variables (Hair et al.
2010). In comparison with Wilke’s Lambda, Hotelling’s trace, and Roy’s Largest Root
MANOVA tests, Pillai’s Trace is the most robust test when MANOVA assumptions are
not met.
MANOVA results are reported in Tables 4-5 through 4-10, separated by main
effects and each set of two-way, three-way, four-way, five-way, and six-way interactions.
Each table presents seven columns.
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The first column, “Effect”, shows independent variables and the interactions
between independent variables.
The second column, “F-ratio”, reports on the significant effect of each
independent variable on the multivariate. A larger F statistic indicates a greater likelihood
that mean differences are due to something other than chance.
The third and fourth columns, “degrees of freedom”, show the numbers used to
obtain observed significance levels of the multivariate test.
The fifth column “Significance,” shows the p-value, which is the conditional
probability that a relationship as strong as the one observed in the data would be present
if the null hypotheses were true (probability of making a Type 1 error).
The sixth column, “Partial ETA Squared”, represented by “Partial η2”, shows the
proportion of total variability in the dependent multivariate that is accounted for by
variation in the independent variable. It excludes other factors from total non-error
variations (Cohen 1973; Levine & Hullett 2002; Pierce et al. 2004). Partial η2 essentially
measures the magnitude of the observed relationships between variables, with values
ranging from zero to one. Larger values indicate stronger effect. Conservative
benchmarks for effect sizes suggest partial η2 value cutoffs of 0.2 for small effects, 0.5 for
medium effects, and 0.8 for large effects (Cohen 1988). These are indicated with asterisks
(*** = large effect size, ** = medium effect size, * = small effect size).
The seventh column, “Observed Power”, shows the power of the test or the ability
to reject the null hypotheses when it is actually false (chance of making a Type II error).
High observed power values over 0.9 are recommended. For all significant effects, all
power values are over 0.9.
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In MANOVA, interaction terms represent joint effect and must be examined
before interpreting main effect (Hair et al. 2010). Following are the multivariate
interactions and main effects.
4.2.1 Multivariate Results – Six-Way Interactions
There were no significant six-way interactions (see Table 4-5).
Table 4-5 Multivariate Results - Six-Way Interaction
Multivariate Tests – Six-Way Interactions
Effect

F

Hypothesis
df

Error df

Sig.

Partial
η2

RATION *
R1.GAME *
PROMOTIONS *
0.305
256
112,752
1.000
0.001
RA.GAME *
RB.GAME *
RC.GAME
Partial η2: *** Large effect size, ** Medium effect size, * Small effect size
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Observed
Power

0.921

4.2.2 Multivariate Results – Five-Way Interactions
Among five-way interactions, the interaction between RATION *
PROMOTIONS * R1.GAME * RA.GAME * RB.GAME and the interaction between
RATION * R1.GAME * RA.GAME * RB.GAME * RC.GAME is significant at p<0.001
(see Table 4-6). However, the effect sizes are very small (partial η2 = 0.007) and small
(partial η2 = 0.251), respectively.
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Table 4-6 Multivariate Results - Five-Way Interactions
Multivariate Tests – Five-Way Interactions
Effect

F

Hypothesis
df

Error df

Sig.

Partial η2

RATION *
PROMOTIONS *
R1.GAME *
5.825
128
112,752 0.000
0.007
RA.GAME *
RB.GAME
RATION *
PROMOTIONS *
R1.GAME *
0.359
128
112,752 1.000
0.000
RA.GAME *
RC.GAME
RATION *
PROMOTIONS *
R1.GAME *
0.332
128
112,752 1.000
0.000
RB.GAME *
RC.GAME
RATION *
PROMOTIONS *
RA.GAME *
0.269
128
112,752 1.000
0.000
RB.GAME *
RC.GAME
RATION *
R1.GAME *
RA.GAME *
147.914
256
112,752 0.000
0.251 *
RB.GAME *
RC.GAME
PROMOTIONS *
R1.GAME *
RA.GAME *
0.425
128
112,752 1.000
0.000
RB.GAME *
RC.GAME
Partial η2: *** Large effect size, ** Medium effect size, * Small effect size
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Observed
Power

1.000

0.809

0.762

0.624

1.000

0.897

4.2.3 Multivariate Results – Four-Way Interactions
Nine different types of four-way interactions are significant at p<0.001, most with
very small effect sizes (partial η2 < 0.2) (see Table 4-7). For these interactions, each
accounts for less than two percent of the overall (effect and error) variance. The
interactions are:
RATION * PROMOTIONS * R1.GAME * RA.GAME;
RATION * PROMOTIONS * R1.GAME * RB.GAME;
RATION * PROMOTIONS * RA.GAME * RB.GAME;
RATION * R1.GAME * RA.GAME * RB.GAME;
RATION * R1.GAME * RA.GAME * RC.GAME;
RATION * R1.GAME * RB.GAME * RC.GAME;
RATION * RA.GAME * RB.GAME * RC.GAME;
PROMOTIONS * R1.GAME * RA.GAME * RB.GAME; and
R1.GAME * RA.GAME * RB.GAME * RC.GAME.
Of note, the interaction of RATION * RA.GAME * RB.GAME * RC.GAME is
the only one with a small effect size (partial η2 = 0. 279) while the interaction of
RATION * R1.GAME * RA.GAME * RB.GAME is the only one with a medium effect
size (partial η2 = 0.577).
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Table 4-7 Multivariate Results - Four-Way Interactions
Multivariate Tests – Four-Way Interactions
Effect

F

Hypothesis
df

Error df

Sig.

Partial η2

RATION *
PROMOTIONS *
R1.GAME *
RA.GAME
325.176
64 112,752 0.000 0.156
RATION *
PROMOTIONS *
R1.GAME *
RB.GAME
7.984
64 112,752 0.000 0.005
RATION *
PROMOTIONS *
R1.GAME *
RC.GAME
0.448
64 112,752 1.000 0.000
RATION *
PROMOTIONS *
RA.GAME *
RB.GAME
16.846
64 112,752 0.000 0.009
RATION *
PROMOTIONS *
RA.GAME *
RC.GAME
0.153
64 112,752 1.000 0.000
RATION *
PROMOTIONS *
RB.GAME *
RC.GAME
0.107
64 112,752 1.000 0.000
RATION *
R1.GAME *
RA.GAME *
RB.GAME
1,199.750
128 112,752 0.000 0.577 **
RATION *
R1.GAME *
RA.GAME *
RC.GAME
218.238
128 112,752 0.000 0.199
2
Partial η : *** Large effect size, ** Medium effect size, * Small effect size
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Observed
Power

1.000

1.000

0.706

1.000

0.215

0.152

1.000

1.000

Table 4-7 Multivariate Results – Four-Way Interactions (continued)
Multivariate Tests – Four-Way Interactions
Effect

F

Hypothesis
df

Error df

Sig.

Partial η2

RATION *
R1.GAME *
RB.GAME *
RC.GAME
214.667
128 112,752 0.000 0.196
RATION *
RA.GAME *
RB.GAME *
RC.GAME
341.673
128 112,752 0.000 0.279 *
PROMOTIONS *
R1.GAME *
RA.GAME *
RB.GAME
5.106
64 112,752 0.000 0.003
PROMOTIONS *
R1.GAME *
RA.GAME *
RC.GAME
0.391
64 112,752 1.000 0.000
PROMOTIONS *
R1.GAME *
RB.GAME *
RC.GAME
0.401
64 112,752 1.000 0.000
PROMOTIONS *
RA.GAME *
RB.GAME *
RC.GAME
0.325
64 112,752 1.000 0.000
R1.GAME *
RA.GAME *
RB.GAME *
RC.GAME
214.833
128 112,752 0.000 0.196
2
Partial η : *** Large effect size, ** Medium effect size, * Small effect size
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Observed
Power

1.000

1.000

1.000

0.620

0.636

0.509

1.000

4.2.4 Multivariate Results – Three-Way Interactions
There are sixteen significant three-way interaction effects, each significant at
p<0.001(see Table 4-8). They are:
RATION * PROMOTIONS * R1.GAME;
RATION * PROMOTIONS * RA.GAME;
RATION * PROMOTIONS * RB.GAME;
RATION * R1.GAME * RA.GAME;
RATION * R1.GAME * RB.GAME;
RATION * R1.GAME * RC.GAME;
RATION * RA.GAME * RB.GAME;
RATION * RA.GAME * RC.GAME;
RATION * RB.GAME * RC.GAME;
PROMOTIONS * R1.GAME * RA.GAME;
PROMOTIONS * R1.GAME * RB.GAME;
PROMOTIONS * RA.GAME * RB.GAME;
R1.GAME * RA.GAME * RB.GAME;
R1.GAME * RA.GAME * RC.GAME;
R1.GAME * RB.GAME * RC.GAME; and
RA.GAME * RB.GAME * RC.GAME.
Three interactions, RATION * R1.GAME * RA.GAME (partial η2 = 0.662),
RATION * R1.GAME * RB.GAME (partial η2 = 0.439), and RATION * RA.GAME *
RB.GAME (partial η2 = 0.512) exhibit medium effects on dependent variables. Seven
additional interactions, RATION * PROMOTIONS * R1.GAME (partial η2 = 0.283),
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RATION * PROMOTIONS * RA.GAME (partial η2 = 0.289), RATION * R1.GAME *
RC.GAME (partial η2 = 0.220), RATION * RA.GAME * RC.GAME (partial η2 =
0.282), PROMOTIONS * R1.GAME * RA.GAME (partial η2 = 0.278), R1.GAME *
RA.GAME * RB.GAME (partial η2 = 0.491), and RA.GAME * RB.GAME * RC.GAME
(partial η2 = 0.214) exhibit small effects on dependent variables.
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Table 4-8 Multivariate Results - Three-Way Interactions
Multivariate Tests – Three-Way Interactions
Effect

F

Hypothesis
df

Error df

Sig.

Partial η2

RATION *
PROMOTIONS *
R1.GAME
695.841
32
56,360 0.000
0.283 *
RATION *
PROMOTIONS *
RA.GAME
714.411
32
56,360 0.000
0.289 *
RATION *
PROMOTIONS *
RB.GAME
38.702
32
56,360 0.000
0.022
RATION *
PROMOTIONS *
RC.GAME
0.498
32
56,360 0.992
0.000
RATION *
R1.GAME *
RA.GAME
3,452.408
64
112,752 0.000
0.662 **
RATION *
R1.GAME *
RB.GAME
1,376.501
64
112,752 0.000
0.439 **
RATION *
R1.GAME *
RC.GAME
497.342
64
112,752 0.000
0.220 *
RATION *
RA.GAME *
RB.GAME
1,847.326
64
112,752 0.000
0.512 **
RATION *
RA.GAME *
RC.GAME
692.789
64
112,752 0.000
0.282 *
RATION *
RB.GAME *
RC.GAME
391.563
64
112,752 0.000
0.182
PROMOTIONS *
R1.GAME *
RA.GAME
679.585
32
56,360 0.000
0.278 *
2
Partial η : *** Large effect size, ** Medium effect size, * Small effect size
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Observed
Power

1.000
1.000
1.000
0.533
1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000

Table 4-8 Multivariate Results – Three-Way Interactions (continued)
Multivariate Tests – Three-Way Interactions
Effect

F

Hypothesis
df

Error df

Sig.

Partial η2

PROMOTIONS *
R1.GAME *
RB.GAME
13.249
32
56,360 0.000
0.007
PROMOTIONS *
R1.GAME *
RC.GAME
0.485
32
56,360 0.994
0.000
PROMOTIONS *
RA.GAME *
RB.GAME
17.835
32
56,360 0.000
0.010
PROMOTIONS *
RA.GAME *
RC.GAME
0.175
32
56,360 1.000
0.000
PROMOTIONS *
RB.GAME *
RC.GAME
0.157
32
56,360 1.000
0.000
R1.GAME *
RA.GAME *
RB.GAME
1702.252
64
112,752 0.000
0.491 *
R1.GAME *
RA.GAME *
RC.GAME
273.526
64
112,752 0.000
0.134
R1.GAME *
RB.GAME *
RC.GAME
297.222
64
112,752 0.000
0.144
RA.GAME *
RB.GAME *
RC.GAME
479.876
64
112,752 0.000
0.214 *
2
Partial η : *** Large effect size, ** Medium effect size, * Small effect size
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Observed
Power

1.000
0.518
1.000
0.173
0.157
1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000

4.2.5 Multivariate Results – Two-Way Interactions
There are fourteen significant two-way interaction effects, each significant at
p<0.001(see Table 4-9). They are:
RATION * PROMOTIONS;
RATION * R1.GAME;
RATION * RA.GAME;
RATION * RB.GAME;
RATION * RC.GAME;
PROMOTIONS * R1.GAME;
PROMOTIONS * RA.GAME;
PROMOTIONS * RB.GAME;
R1.GAME * RA.GAME;
R1.GAME * RB.GAME;
R1.GAME * RC.GAME;
RA.GAME * RB.GAME;
RA.GAME * RC.GAME; and
RB.GAME * RC.GAME.
Four interactions exhibit large effects on dependent variables. They are: RATION
* R1.GAME (partial η2 = 0.981), RATION * RA.GAME (partial η2 = 0.994), RATION *
RB.GAME (partial η2 = 0.758), and R1.GAME * RA.GAME (partial η2 = 0.952). Four
additional interactions, RATION * PROMOTIONS (partial η2 = 0.513), RATION *
RC.GAME (partial η2 = 0.501), R1.GAME * RB.GAME (partial η2 = 0.711), and
RA.GAME * RB.GAME (partial η2 = 0.777) exhibit medium effects on dependent
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variables. Lastly, five interactions exhibit small effects on dependent variables. They are:
PROMOTIONS * R1.GAME (partial η2 = 0.495), PROMOTIONS * RA.GAME (partial
η2 = 0.494), R1.GAME * RC.GAME (partial η2 = 0.309), RA.GAME * RC.GAME
(partial η2 = 0.433), and RB.GAME * RC.GAME (partial η2 = 0.264).
Table 4-9 Multivariate Results - Two-Way Interactions
Multivariate Tests – Two-Way Interactions
Effect

F

Hypothesis
df

Error
df

Sig.

Partial η2

RATION *
PROMOTIONS
1,856.053
16
28,176 0.000 0.513 **
RATION *
R1.GAME
91,906.426
32
56,360 0.000 0.981 ***
RATION *
RA.GAME
272,386.165
32
56,360 0.000 0.994 ***
RATION *
RB.GAME
5,502.769
32
56,360 0.000 0.758 ***
RATION *
RC.GAME
1,766.011
32
56,360 0.000 0.501 **
PROMOTIONS
* R1.GAME
1,727.322
16
28,176 0.000 0.495 *
PROMOTIONS
* RA.GAME
1,720.108
16
28,176 0.000 0.494 *
PROMOTIONS
* RB.GAME
48.054
16
28,176 0.000 0.027
PROMOTIONS
* RC.GAME
0.416
16
28,176 0.979 0.000
R1.GAME *
RA.GAME
34,600.144
32
56,360 0.000 0.952 ***
R1.GAME *
RB.GAME
4,328.942
32
56,360 0.000 0.711 **
R1.GAME *
RC.GAME
786.593
32
56,360 0.000 0.309 *
RA.GAME *
RB.GAME
6,127.974
32
56,360 0.000 0.777 **
RA.GAME *
RC.GAME
1,346.294
32
56,360 0.000 0.433 *
RB.GAME *
RC.GAME
632.681
32
56,360 0.000 0.264 *
2
Partial η : *** Large effect size, ** Medium effect size, * Small effect size
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Observed
Power

1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000
0.288
1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000

4.2.6 Multivariate Results - Main Effects
All main effects are significant at p<0.001 (see Table 4-10). The main effects are
RATION, PROMOTIONS, R1.GAME, RA.GAME, RB.GAME, and RC.GAME. All
significant main effects exhibit large effects with the exception of RC.GAME, which
exhibits a medium effect (partial η2 = 0.748).
Table 4-10 Multivariate Results - Main Effects
Multivariate Tests - Main Effects
F

Hypothesis
df

Error
df

2,644,014.358

16

24,940.878

R1.GAME

Partial η2

Observed
Power

28,176

0.000 0.999 ***

1.000

8

14,087

0.000 0.934 ***

1.000

389,999.311

16

28,176

0.000 0.996 ***

1.000

RA.GAME

967,289.002

16

28,176

0.000 0.998 ***

1.000

RB.GAME

73,179.561

16

28,176

0.000 0.977 ***

1.000

Effect

RATION
PROMOTIONS

Sig.

RC.GAME
5,231.046
16
28,176 0.000 0.748 **
2
Partial η : *** Large effect size, ** Medium effect size, * Small effect size
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1.000

4.3 UNIVARIATE RESULTS
This section discusses univariate test results for interaction and main effects.
Univariate tests evaluate the relationship between independent variable interactions or an
independent variable on a single dependent variable. Statistics and plots are shown for
significant relationships only.
4.3.1 Univariate Results – Four-Way and Five-Way Interactions
There were no significant univariate six-way interactions. Five-way interactions
are shown in Table 4-11. Four-way interactions are shown in Table 4-12.
Significant five-way interactions include RATION * PROMOTIONS *
R1.GAME * RA.GAME * RB.GAME and RATION * R1.GAME * RA.GAME *
RB.GAME * RC.GAME. For RATION * PROMOTIONS * R1.GAME * RA.GAME *
RB.GAME, partial η2 values (partial η2 < 0.2 for all) indicate a very small effect of the
five-way interaction on all dependent variables. For RATION * R1.GAME * RA.GAME
* RB.GAME * RC.GAME, partial η2 values indicate a very small effect (partial η2 < 0.2)
of the five-way interaction on CV, M.OFR, RA.OFR, OPP.LOSS, and C.COST. The
five-way interaction’s relationship to R1.OFR and RB.OFR exhibit small effects (partial
η2 = 0.213 and partial η2 = 0.297 respectively) while the relationship with RC.OFR
exhibit medium effects (partial η2 = 0.597).

122

Table 4-11 Univariate Results - Five-Way Interactions
Between Effects Tests – Five-Way Interactions
Source

RATION *
PROMOTIONS *
R1.GAME *
RA.GAME *
RB.GAME

Dependent
Variable

F

CV
M.OFR
R1.OFR
RA.OFR
RB.OFR
RC.OFR

3.786
6.019
6.040
8.240
4.718
2.549

df

16
16
16
16
16
16

Sig.

0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.001

Partial η2

0.004
0.007
0.007
0.009
0.005
0.003

CV
7.095
32
0.000
0.016
M.OFR
59.195
32
0.000
0.118
RATION *
R1.OFR
119.289
32
0.000
0.213 *
R1.GAME *
RA.OFR
59.541
32
0.000
0.119
RA.GAME *
RB.OFR
185.943
32
0.000
0.297 *
RB.GAME *
RC.OFR
653.253
32
0.000
0.597 **
RC.GAME
OPP.LOSS
15.990
32
0.000
0.035
C.COST
6.577
32
0.000
0.015
Partial η2: *** Large effect size, ** Medium effect size, * Small effect size
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Observed
Power

1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000
0.995
1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000

There were nine different significant four-way interactions totaling 66 significant
relationships with dependent variables (see Table 4-12). The first four-way interaction,
RATION * PROMOTIONS * R1.GAME * RA.GAME show a significant effect at p
<0.001 on all dependent variables with the exception of C.COST. Partial η2 values
indicate a very small effect on all outcomes with the exception of medium effects on the
manufacturer’s order fill rate (partial η2 = 0.666) and small effects on the manufacturer’s
opportunity loss (partial η2 = 0.227).
The second four-way interaction, RATION * PROMOTIONS * R1.GAME *
RB.GAME, show a significant effect on CV, M.OFR, R1.OFR, RA.OFR, RB.OFR, and
RC.OFR at p<0.001. Partial η2 values indicate a small effect on all significant outcomes.
The third four-way interaction, RATION * PROMOTIONS * RA.GAME *
RB.GAME, show a significant effect on CV, M.OFR, R1.OFR, RA.OFR, RB.OFR, AND
RC.OFR (p<0.001) as well as on OPP.LOSS (p<0.01). Partial η2 values show a very
small effect on significant dependent variables.
The fourth four-way interaction, RATION * R1.GAME * RA.GAME *
RB.GAME, show a significant effect on all dependent variables (p<0.001). Partial η2
values show that effects are large for M.OFR, R1.OFR, RA.OFR, RB.OFR, and RC.OFR
(partial η2 = 0.809, 0.875, 0.888, 0.889, and 0.811 respectively). There was a medium
effect on OPP.LOSS (partial η2 = 0.701) a small effect on CV (partial η2 = 0.411).
The fifth four-way interaction, RATION * R1.GAME * RA.GAME * RC.GAME,
show a significant effect on all dependent variables (p<0.001). However, partial η2 values
show that effects were very small for CV, M.OFR, R1.OFR, RA.OFR, and C.COST.
Partial η2 values indicate small effects for RB.OFR, RC.OFR, and OPP.LOSS (partial η2
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= 0.272, 0.324, and 0.204 respectively).
The sixth four-way interaction, RATION * R1.GAME * RB.GAME *
RC.GAME, show a significant effect at p<0.001 for CV, M.OFR, R1.OFR, RA.OFR,
RB.OFR, RC.OFR and C.COST. There was also a significant effect at p=0.05 for
OPP.LOSS. All effect sizes were very small, with the exception of RC.OFR (partial η2 =
0.486).
The seventh four-way interaction, RATION * RA.GAME * RB.GAME *
RC.GAME, show a significant effect at p<0.001 for all dependent variables. Partial η2
values show that most effects are very small. However, partial η2 for RC.OFR indicates a
medium effect (partial η2 = 0.627). There were also small effects for RA.OFR and
RB.OFR (partial η2 = 0.220 and 0.260 respectively).
The eighth four-way interaction of PROMOTIONS * R1.GAME * RA.GAME *
RB.GAME show a significant effect on five dependent variables: CV (p<0.01), M.OFR
(p<0.001), R1.OFR (p<0.001), RA.OFR (p<0.001), RB.OFR (p<0.001), and RC.OFR
(p<0.05). Partial η2 values show that the effects are very small for all significant
relationships.
Lastly, the ninth four-way interaction of RI.GAME * RA.GAME * RB.GAME *
RC.GAME show a significant effect on all eight dependent variable at p<0.001. Partial η2
values show that the effects are very small for all significant relationships with the
exception of the relationships with RB.OFR and RC.OFR (partial η2 = 0.205 and 0.392
respectively). See Table 4-12 (below).
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Table 4-12 Univariate Results - Four-Way Interactions
Between Effects Tests – Four-Way Interactions
Source

Dependent
Variable

F

RATION *
PROMOTIONS *
R1.GAME *
RA.GAME

CV
M.OFR
R1.OFR
RA.OFR
RB.OFR
RC.OFR
OPP.LOSS

121.268
3519.923
48.834
85.069
67.038
100.077
517.604

8
8
8
8
8
8
8

0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000

0.064
0.666 **
0.027
0.046
0.037
0.054
0.227 *

1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000

RATION *
PROMOTIONS *
R1.GAME *
RB.GAME

CV
M.OFR
R1.OFR
RA.OFR
RB.OFR
RC.OFR

8.525
7.661
10.368
10.214
6.832
5.621

8
8
8
8
8
8

0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000

0.005
0.004
0.006
0.006
0.004
0.003

1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000

RATION *
PROMOTIONS *
RA.GAME *
RB.GAME

CV
M.OFR
R1.OFR
RA.OFR
RB.OFR
RC.OFR
OPP.LOSS

6.020
5.947
24.784
7.324
11.645
8.769
3.340

8
8
8
8
8
8
8

0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.001

0.003
0.003
0.014
0.004
0.007
0.005
0.002

1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000
0.978

df

Sig.

Partial η2

CV
613.796
16 0.000
0.411 *
M.OFR
3733.862
16 0.000
0.809 ***
R1.OFR
6174.474
16
0.000
0.875 ***
RATION *
RA.OFR
6977.102
16 0.000
0.888 ***
R1.GAME *
RA.GAME *
RB.OFR
7085.440
16 0.000
0.889 ***
RB.GAME
RC.OFR
3778.357
16 0.000
0.811 ***
OPP.LOSS 2067.289
16 0.000
0.701 **
C.COST
8.962
16 0.000
0.010
Partial η2: *** Large effect size, ** Medium effect size, * Small effect size
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Observed
Power

1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000

Table 4-12 Univariate Results – Four-Way Interactions (continued)
Between Effects Tests – Four-Way Interactions
Source

Dependent
Variable

F

df

Sig.

Partial η2

Observed
Power

CV
M.OFR
R1.OFR
RA.OFR
RB.OFR
RC.OFR
OPP.LOSS
C.COST

13.161
89.817
205.736
127.901
329.402
422.115
225.856
6.577

16
16
16
16
16
16
16
16

0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000

0.015
0.093
0.189
0.127
0.272 *
0.324 *
0.204 *
0.007

1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000

RATION *
R1.GAME *
RB.GAME *
RC.GAME

CV
M.OFR
R1.OFR
RA.OFR
RB.OFR
RC.OFR
OPP.LOSS
C.COST

7.305
153.781
168.251
78.391
147.191
832.354
1.643
6.577

16
16
16
16
16
16
16
16

0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.050
0.000

0.008
0.149
0.160
0.082
0.143
0.486 *
0.002
0.007

1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000
0.928
1.000

RATION *
RA.GAME *
RB.GAME *
RC.GAME

CV
M.OFR
R1.OFR
RA.OFR
RB.OFR
RC.OFR
OPP.LOSS
C.COST

44.278
334.143
126.669
247.773
309.347
1481.890
9.862
6.577

0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000

0.048
0.275
0.126
0.220 *
0.260 *
0.627 **
0.011
0.007

1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000

CV
2.582
8 0.008
0.001
8.888
8 0.000
0.005
PROMOTIONS * M.OFR
R1.OFR
7.670
8 0.000
0.004
R1.GAME *
RA.GAME *
RA.OFR
11.830
8 0.000
0.007
RB.GAME
RB.OFR
7.190
8 0.000
0.004
RC.OFR
2.028
8 0.039
0.001
Partial η2: *** Large effect size, ** Medium effect size, * Small effect size

0.925
1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000
0.835

RATION *
R1.GAME *
RA.GAME *
RC.GAME
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16
16
16
16
16
16
16
16

Table 4-12 Univariate Results – Four-Way Interactions (continued)
Between Effects Tests – Four-Way Interactions
Source

Dependent
Variable

F

df

Sig.

Partial η2

CV
15.734
16 0.000
0.018
M.OFR
117.387
16 0.000
0.118
R1.GAME *
R1.OFR
200.231
16 0.000
0.185
RA.GAME *
RA.OFR
109.170
16 0.000
0.11
RB.GAME *
RB.OFR
227.134
16 0.000
0.205 *
RC.GAME
RC.OFR
568.640
16 0.000
0.392 *
OPP.LOSS
36.261
16 0.000
0.040
C.COST
25.226
16 0.000
0.028
2
Partial η : *** Large effect size, ** Medium effect size, * Small effect size
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Observed
Power

1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000

4.3.2 Univariate Results – Three-Way Interactions
Three-way interactions with significant relationships to dependent variables are
shown in Table 4-13. There were sixteen different significant three-way interactions,
totaling 121 significant relationships with dependent variables. Of these relationships,
eight different three-way interactions with 31 significant relationships to dependent
variables show partial η2 values over 0.5, indicating at least a medium effect. Due to the
simulation’s large sample size, small differences between groups are statistically
significant. For clarity of interpretation, the remaining discussion on three-way univariate
results will focus on those relationships with a medium or large effect size in order for
differences of practical significance to be identified.
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Table 4-13 Univariate Results - Three-Way Interactions
Between Effects Tests – Three-Way Interactions
Source

Dependent
Variable

Partial η2

4
4
4
4
4
4
4

0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000

0.320 *
0.821 ***
0.850 ***
0.061
0.065
0.079
0.464 *

1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000

200.767
3692.540
84.411
26.178
7.427
7.072
1064.024

4
4
4
4
4
4
4

0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000

0.054
0.512 **
0.023
0.007
0.002
0.002
0.232 *

1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000
0.997
0.995
1.000

10.878
8.596
84.214
7.959
18.810
11.131

4
4
4
4
4
4

0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000

0.003
0.002
0.023
0.002
0.005
0.003

1.000
0.999
1.000
0.998
1.000
1.000

df

CV
M.OFR
R1.OFR
RA.OFR
RB.OFR
RC.OFR
OPP.LOSS

1656.887
16184.144
19908.509
228.088
244.536
303.044
3044.577

RATION *
PROMOTIONS *
RA.GAME

CV
M.OFR
R1.OFR
RA.OFR
RB.OFR
RC.OFR
OPP.LOSS

RATION *
PROMOTIONS *
RB.GAME

CV
M.OFR
R1.OFR
RA.OFR
RB.OFR
RC.OFR

RATION *
PROMOTIONS *
R1.GAME

Observed
Power

Sig.

F

CV
12429.933 8
0.000
0.876 ***
M.OFR
85459.478 8
0.000
0.980 ***
R1.OFR
25619.439 8
0.000
0.936 ***
RATION *
RA.OFR
12709.178 8
0.000
0.878 ***
R1.GAME *
RB.OFR
41605.610 8
0.000
0.959 ***
RA.GAME
RC.OFR
14478.031 8
0.000
0.892 ***
OPP.LOSS
34528.358 8
0.000
0.951 ***
C.COST
436.363 8
0.000
0.199
Partial η2: *** Large effect size, ** Medium effect size, * Small effect size
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1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000

Table 4-13 Univariate Results – Three-Way Interactions (continued)
Between Effects Tests – Three-Way Interactions (continued)
Source

RATION *
R1.GAME *
RB.GAME

RATION *
R1.GAME *
RC.GAME

RATION *
RA.GAME *
RB.GAME

Dependent
Variable

F

df

CV
M.OFR
R1.OFR
RA.OFR
RB.OFR
RC.OFR
OPP.LOSS
C.COST

808.205
5575.053
2850.775
10148.888
19500.939
11673.150
291.643
8.962

CV
M.OFR
R1.OFR
RA.OFR
RB.OFR
RC.OFR
OPP.LOSS
C.COST
CV
M.OFR
R1.OFR
RA.OFR
RB.OFR
RC.OFR
OPP.LOSS
C.COST

Observed
Power

Sig.

Partial η2

8
8
8
8
8
8
8
8

0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000

0.314 *
0.760 **
0.618 **
0.852 ***
0.917 ***
0.869 ***
0.142
0.005

1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000

13.900
113.262
483.324
100.127
555.711
1242.975
291.643
6.577

8
8
8
8
8
8
8
8

0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000

0.008
0.06
0.215 *
0.054
0.240 *
0.414 *
0.142
0.004

1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000

3069.678
20990.799
46240.787
18855.015
35604.310
28834.381
1314.385
8.962

8
8
8
8
8
8
8
8

0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000

0.635 **
0.923 ***
0.963 ***
0.915 ***
0.953 ***
0.942 ***
0.427 *
0.005

1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000

CV
79.098 8
0.000
0.043
M.OFR
327.327 8
0.000
0.157
R1.OFR
362.611 8
0.000
0.171
RATION *
RA.OFR
379.134 8
0.000
0.177
RA.GAME *
RB.OFR
2459.907 8
0.000
0.583 **
RC.GAME
RC.OFR
4406.020 8
0.000
0.714 **
OPP.LOSS
88.298 8
0.000
0.048
C.COST
6.577 8
0.000
0.004
Partial η2: *** Large effect size, ** Medium effect size, * Small effect size

131

1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000

Table 4-13 Univariate Results – Three-Way Interactions (continued)
Between Effects Tests – Three-Way Interactions (continued)
Source

RATION *
RB.GAME *
RC.GAME

PROMOTIONS *
R1.GAME *
RA.GAME

PROMOTIONS *
R1.GAME *
RB.GAME

Dependent
Variable

F

df

Sig.

Partial η2

Observed
Power

CV
M.OFR
R1.OFR
RA.OFR
RB.OFR
RC.OFR
OPP.LOSS
C.COST

213.890
116.230
99.475
91.145
475.275
3149.434
107.490
6.577

8
8
8
8
8
8
8
8

0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000

0.108
0.062
0.053
0.049
0.212 *
0.641 **
0.058
0.004

1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000

CV
M.OFR
R1.OFR
RA.OFR
RB.OFR
RC.OFR
OPP.LOSS

32.268
1847.529
247.479
132.548
95.505
96.299
456.271

4
4
4
4
4
4
4

0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000

0.009
0.344 *
0.066
0.036
0.026
0.027
0.115

1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000

CV
M.OFR
R1.OFR
RA.OFR
RB.OFR
RC.OFR
OPP.LOSS

5.329
29.488
29.865
36.353
22.505
11.743
5.223

4
4
4
4
4
4
4

0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000

0.002
0.008
0.008
0.010
0.006
0.003
0.001

0.974
1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000
0.971

CV
3.333 4 0.010
0.001
M.OFR
10.310 4 0.000
0.003
PROMOTIONS * R1.OFR
54.193 4 0.000
0.015
RA.GAME *
RA.OFR
5.740 4 0.000
0.002
RB.GAME
RB.OFR
10.035 4 0.000
0.003
RC.OFR
5.807 4 0.000
0.002
OPP.LOSS
9.742 4 0.000
0.003
2
Partial η : *** Large effect size, ** Medium effect size, * Small effect size
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0.847
1.000
1.000
0.982
1.000
0.983
1.000

Table 4-13 Univariate Results – Three-Way Interactions (continued)
Between Effects Tests – Three-Way Interactions (continued)
Source

R1.GAME *
RA.GAME *
RB.GAME

R1.GAME *
RA.GAME *
RC.GAME

R1.GAME *
RB.GAME *
RC.GAME

Dependent
Variable

F

df

Sig.

Partial η2

Observed
Power

CV
M.OFR
R1.OFR
RA.OFR
RB.OFR
RC.OFR
OPP.LOSS
C.COST

2181.891
4534.104
6613.250
8398.440
8165.012
5205.591
6186.086
34.766

8
8
8
8
8
8
8
8

0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000

0.553 **
0.720 **
0.790 **
0.827 ***
0.823 ***
0.747 **
0.778 **
0.019

1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000

CV
M.OFR
R1.OFR
RA.OFR
RB.OFR
RC.OFR
OPP.LOSS
C.COST

7.930
82.985
172.604
106.072
406.610
313.415
420.911
25.226

8
8
8
8
8
8
8
8

0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000

0.004
0.045
0.089
0.057
0.188
0.151
0.193
0.014

1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000

CV
M.OFR
R1.OFR
RA.OFR
RB.OFR
RC.OFR
OPP.LOSS
C.COST

5.771
216.297
225.667
96.023
232.481
609.926
5.213
25.226

8
8
8
8
8
8
8
8

0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000

0.003
0.109
0.114
0.052
0.117
0.257 *
0.003
0.014

1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000
0.999
1.000

CV
98.516
8 0.000
0.053
M.OFR
355.690
8 0.000
0.168
R1.OFR
126.621
8 0.000
0.067
RA.GAME *
RA.OFR
225.125
8 0.000
0.113
RB.GAME *
RC.GAME
RB.OFR
340.836
8 0.000
0.162
RC.OFR
1339.197
8 0.000
0.432 *
OPP.LOSS
32.566
8 0.000
0.018
C.COST
25.226
8 0.000
0.014
Partial η2: *** Large effect size, ** Medium effect size, * Small effect size
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1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000

4.3.2.1 Interaction of RATION * PROMOTIONS * R1.GAME
The first three-way interaction with at least medium effect sizes, RATION *
PROMOTIONS * R1.GAME show a significant effect at p<0.001 on CV, M.OFR,
R1.OFR, RA.OFR, RB.OFR, RC.OFR, and OPP.LOSS. Partial η2 values indicate large
effects on the manufacturer’s order fulfillment rate (partial η2 = 0.821) and Retailer 1’s
order fill rate (partial η2 = 0.850). There were also small effects on the manufacturer’s
demand variance (partial η2 = 0.320) and the manufacturer’s opportunity loss (partial η2 =
0.464). See Table 4-13. Following, profile plots are shown for those relationships with at
least a medium sized effect.
Figure 4-1 shows the profile plot of RATION * PROMOTIONS * R1.GAME effect
on M.OFR while Figure 4-2 shows the profile plot of RATION * PROMOTIONS *
R1.GAME effect on R1.OFR.
The three-way interaction of manufacturer rationing strategy, retail promotions
demand shock and focal retailer shortage gaming most strongly impacts order fill rates
for the manufacturer as well as the focal retailer as evidenced by the large effects of the
significant relationships (Table 4-13). Specifically, when the manufacturer utilizes a
Uniform strategy and the focal retailer responds with Correction gaming, a retail
promotions demand shock results in higher order fill rates for both parties compared to
No promotions (Figures 4-1 and 4-2). These results, while also reflected in the two-way
interactions of RATION * PROMOTIONS (see section 4.3.3.1) and PROMOTIONS *
R1.GAME (see section 4.3.3.6), are counterintuitive. A retail promotions shock is
hypothesized to set off a feedback cycle of excessive demand and low order fill (see
section 2.4 Experimental Design and Hypotheses). However, the higher rather than lower
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estimated marginal means under a retail promotions demand shock may be due to the
simulation parameters. The simulation allows Retailer 1 to gain directly from ordering
additional inventory for their retail promotions because the single retail promotions order
is met by the manufacturer at a minimum of 80 percent order fill (see section 3.4.2.3
Retail Promotions Demand Shock). Subsequent quarters within the simulation are subject
to the normal functioning of inventory ordering and fulfillment per each scenario’s rules,
which, with all else being equal, yields mean order fulfillment rates at 43 percent for the
manufacturer (see Figure 4-80 RATION’S effect on M.OFR) and at 44 percent range for
the focal retailer (see Figure 4-81 RATION’S effect on R1.OFR). The higher long-term
order fill rates under a retail promotions demand shock may reflect the initial high order
fill rate coupled with low subsequent order fill rates for both parties directly involved in
the retail promotions demand shock. When the manufacturer utilizes a Uniform rationing
strategy and when Retailer 1 responds with Correction gaming, the interaction of these
elements is more evident compared to other rationing strategies. A Uniform rationing
strategy allocates inventory equally to all retailers and therefore their order fill rate is
generally the same absolute number after the receiving their retail promotions order.
Coupled with Retailer 1’s Correction gaming response, the initial high retail promotions
order fill rate’s beneficial rate is compounded over time, resulting in a higher long-term
order fill rate.
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No Promotions;
R1 No Gaming

No Promotions;
R1 Correction Gaming

No Promotions;
R1 Overreaction Gaming

Promotions;
R1 No Gaming

Promotions;
R1 Correction Gaming

Promotions;
R1 Overreaction Gaming

0.65
0.60

0.583

0.586

Estimated Marginal Means

0.55

0.542
0.506

0.50
0.45

0.456
0.445

0.40
0.367
0.35
0.30
0.258

0.25
0.20
Proportional

Linear

Uniform

Manufacturer Order Rationing

Figure 4-1 RATION * PROMOTIONS * R1.GAME effect on M.OFR
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No Promotions;
R1 No Gaming

No Promotions;
R1 Correction Gaming

No Promotions;
R1 Overreaction Gaming

Promotions;
R1 No Gaming

Promotions;
R1 Correction Gaming

Promotions;
R1 Overreaction Gaming

0.90

0.80

Estimated Marginal Means

0.70

0.60

0.776

0.657
0.618

0.581

0.50

0.456
0.445

0.40

0.30
0.248
0.20
0.112
0.10
Linear

Proportional

Uniform

Manufacturer Order Rationing

Figure 4-2 RATION * PROMOTIONS * R1.GAME effect on R1.OFR
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4.3.2.2 Interaction of RATION * PROMOTIONS * RA.GAME
The second three-way interaction with at least medium effect sizes, RATION *
PROMOTIONS * RA.GAME show a significant effect at p<0.001 on CV, M.OFR,
R1.OFR, RA.OFR, RB.OFT, RC.OFR, and OPP.LOSS. Partial η2 values indicate
medium and small effects respectively on the manufacturer’s order fulfillment rate
(partial η2 = 0.512) and the manufacturer’s opportunity loss (partial η2 = 0.232). See Table
4-13. Following, profile plots are shown for those relationships with at least a medium
sized effect.
Figure 4-3 shows the profile plot of RATION * PROMOTIONS * RA.GAME
effect on M.OFR. According to this plot, when the manufacturer utilize a Uniform
rationing strategy, when A Retailers respond with either No gaming or Overreaction
gaming, and when there is a retail promotions demand shock, over the long-term, the
manufacturer will experience higher order fulfillment rates than if there were no retail
promotions demand shock. As with the three-way interaction of RATION *
PROMOTIONS * R1.GAME (section 4.3.2.1), this interaction reveals the differential
impact of a Uniform rationing strategy when coupled with a retail promotions demand
shock.
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No Promotions;
RA No Gaming

No Promotions;
RA Correction Gaming

No Promotions;
RA Overreaction Gaming

Promotions;
RA No Gaming

Promotions;
RA Correction Gaming

Promotions;
RA Overreaction Gaming

0.80

0.674

0.70

0.681
0.642

Estimated Marginal Means

0.60

0.50

0.40

0.619

0.641

0.487

0.485

0.448

0.445

0.445

0.400

0.372

0.399
0.30

0.20

0.191

0.10
Proportional

Linear

Uniform

Manufacturer Order Rationing

Figure 4-3 RATION * PROMOTIONS * RA.GAME effect on M.OFR
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4.3.2.3 Interaction of RATION * R1.GAME * RA.GAME
The third three-way interaction with at least medium effect sizes, RATION *
R1.GAME * RA.GAME show a significant effect at p<0.001 on eight dependent
variables: CV, M.OFR, R1.OFR, RA.OFR, RB.OFR, RC.OFR, OPP.LOSS and C.COST.
Partial η2 values indicate large effects on the manufacturer’s demand variance (partial η2
= 0.876), the manufacturer’s order fulfillment rate (partial η2 = 0.980), Retailer 1’s order
fill rate (partial η2 = 0.936), A Retailers’ order fill rate (partial η2 = 0.878), B Retailers’
order fill rate (partial η2 = 0.959), C Retailers’ order fill rate (partial η2 = 0.892), and the
manufacturer’s opportunity loss (partial η2 = 0.951). See Table 4-13. Following, profile
plots are shown for those relationships with at least a medium sized effect.
Figure 4-4 shows the profile plot of RATION * R1.GAME * RA.GAME effect on
CV. Figure 4-5 shows the profile plot of RATION * R1.GAME * RA.GAME effect on
M.OFR. Figure 4-6 shows the profile plot of RATION * R1.GAME * RA.GAME effect
on R1.OFR. Figure 4-7 shows the profile plot of RATION * R1.GAME * RA.GAME
effect on RA.OFR. Figure 4-8 shows the profile plot of RATION * R1.GAME *
RA.GAME effect on RB.OFR. Figure 4-9 shows the profile plot of RATION *
R1.GAME * RA.GAME effect on RC.OFR. Figure 4-10 shows the profile plot of
RATION * R1.GAME * RA.GAME effect on OPP.LOSS.
For the manufacturer and large retailers, when the manufacturer utilizes a Uniform
rationing strategy and the focal retailer (Retailer 1) as well as A Retailers responds with
shortage gaming, there is a greater range of outcomes compared to when the
manufacturer utilizes other rationing strategies. The manufacturer experiences a greater
range in demand variance (Figure 4-4), order fulfillment rates (Figure 4-5), and
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opportunity loss (Figure 4-10). At the same time, large retailers such as the focal retailer
and A Retailers also experience a greater range in order fill rates under this specific threeway interaction (Figures 4-6 and 4-7). However, smaller retailers such as B and C
Retailers experience the opposite. A Uniform rationing strategy coupled with any
response by the focal retailer and A Retailers yields a consistently high order fill rate of
100 percent (Figures 4-8 and 4-9).
One interesting outcome to note would be the convergence of outcomes when the
manufacturer utilizes a Uniform rationing strategy for larger retailers. Regardless of the
level of response from the focal retailer and A Retailers, a Uniform rationing strategy
yields three distinct levels of order fill rates (at approximately 70 percent, 30 percent, and
10 percent) for the focal retailer (Figure 4-6) and A Retailers (Figure 4-7). These results
are clustered by specific shortage gaming responses by either the focal retailer (Figure 46) or by A Retailers (Figure 4-7). Although the results show three clusters of outcomes,
they actually reflect the imperviousness of a Uniform rationing strategy to shortage
gaming, as each distinct cluster of order fill rate reflect the amount of inflation under a
particular shortage gaming response scenario coupled with the unchanging amount of
inventory allocated under the Uniform rationing strategy.
With regard to the manufacturer’s demand variance, the specific three-way
interaction of the focal retailer’s No gaming, A Retailers’ Correction gaming, and a
Uniform rationing strategy yields the highest observed demand variance of 0.220 (Figure
4-4). If a Proportional rationing strategy is substituted in this specific interaction, the
lowest observed demand variance of 0.081 results (Figure 4-4).

141

R1 No Gaming;
RA No Gaming

R1 No Gaming;
RA Correction Gaming

R1 No Gaming;
RA Overreaction Gaming

R1 CorrectionGaming;
RA No Gaming

R1 Correction Gaming;
RA Correction Gaming

R1 Correction Gaming;
RA Overreaction Gaming

R1 Overreaction Gaming;
RA No Gaming

R1 Overreaction Gaming;
RA Correction Gaming

R1 Overreaction Gaming;
RA Overreaction Gaming

0.24
0.220
0.22

Estimated Marginal Means

0.20

0.18

0.16

0.14
0.121
0.12

0.118

0.120

0.10

0.08

0.081

0.084

0.06
Proportional

Linear
Manufacturer Order Rationing

Figure 4-4 RATION * R1.GAME * RA.GAME effect on CV
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Uniform

R1 No Gaming;
RA No Gaming

R1 No Gaming;
RA Correction Gaming

R1 No Gaming;
RA Overreaction Gaming

R1 CorrectionGaming;
RA No Gaming

R1 Correction Gaming;
RA Correction Gaming

R1 Correction Gaming;
RA Overreaction Gaming

R1 Overreaction Gaming;
RA No Gaming

R1 Overreaction Gaming;
RA Correction Gaming

R1 Overreaction Gaming;
RA Overreaction Gaming

0.90
0.843
0.80
0.756

0.715

Estimated Marginal Means

0.70

0.60

0.50

0.40
0.376
0.30
0.279
0.20
0.165
0.10
Proportional

Linear
Manufacturer Order Rationing

Figure 4-5 RATION * R1.GAME * RA.GAME effect on M.OFR
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Uniform

R1 No Gaming;
RA No Gaming

R1 No Gaming;
RA Correction Gaming

R1 No Gaming;
RA Overreaction Gaming

R1 CorrectionGaming;
RA No Gaming

R1 Correction Gaming;
RA Correction Gaming

R1 Correction Gaming;
RA Overreaction Gaming

R1 Overreaction Gaming;
RA No Gaming

R1 Overreaction Gaming;
RA Correction Gaming

R1 Overreaction Gaming;
RA Overreaction Gaming

0.90
0.830
0.80

0.782

0.756

Estimated Marginal Means

0.70

0.60

0.50

0.40

0.387
0.360

0.30
0.279
0.20

0.180

0.10
Proportional

Linear
Manufacturer Order Rationing

Figure 4-6 RATION * R1.GAME * RA.GAME effect on R1.OFR
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Uniform

R1 No Gaming;
RA No Gaming

R1 No Gaming;
RA Correction Gaming

R1 No Gaming;
RA Overreaction Gaming

R1 CorrectionGaming;
RA No Gaming

R1 Correction Gaming;
RA Correction Gaming

R1 Correction Gaming;
RA Overreaction Gaming

R1 Overreaction Gaming;
RA No Gaming

R1 Overreaction Gaming;
RA Correction Gaming

R1 Overreaction Gaming;
RA Overreaction Gaming

0.90

0.830

0.80

0.772

0.760

Estimated Marginal Means

0.70

0.60

0.50
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0.40

0.30

0.386

0.279

0.20
0.104

0.10

0.00
Proportional

Linear

Uniform

Manufacturer Order Rationing

Figure 4-7 RATION * R1.GAME * RA.GAME effect on RA.OFR
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Figure 4-8 RATION * R1.GAME * RA.GAME effect on RB.OFR
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Figure 4-9 RATION * R1.GAME * RA.GAME effect on RC.OFR
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Figure 4-10 RATION * R1.GAME * RA.GAME effect on OPP.LOSS
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4.3.2.4 Interaction of RATION * R1.GAME * RB.GAME
The fourth three-way interaction with at least a medium effect size, RATION *
R1.GAME * RB.GAME show a significant effect at p<0.001 on eight dependent
variables: CV, M.OFR, R1.OFR, RA.OFR, RB.OFR, RC.OFR, OPP.LOSS and C.COST.
Partial η2 values indicate large effects on A Retailers’ order fill rate (partial η2 = 0.852), B
Retailers’ order fill rate (partial η2 = 0.917), and C Retailers’ order fill rate (partial η2 =
0.869). Partial η2 values indicate medium effects on the manufacturer’s order fulfillment
rate (partial η2 = 0.760) and the focal retailer’s order fill rate (partial η2 = 0.618). There
were also small effects on the manufacturer’s demand variance (partial η2 = 0.314). See
Table 4-13. Following, profile plots are shown for those relationships with at least a
medium sized effect.
Figure 4-11 shows the profile plot of RATION * R1.GAME * RB.GAME effect on
M.OFR. Figure 4-12 shows the profile plot of RATION * R1.GAME * RB.GAME effect
on R1.OFR. Figure 4-13 shows the profile plot of RATION * R1.GAME * RB.GAME
effect on RA.OFR. Figure 4-14 shows the profile plot of RATION * R1.GAME *
RB.GAME effect on RB.OFR. Figure 4-15 shows the profile plot of RATION *
R1.GAME * RB.GAME effect on RC.OFR.
The interaction of manufacturer order rationing with both focal retailer’s (Retailer
1) and B Retailers’ shortage gaming yields different outcomes depending on different
combinations of order rationing strategies and shortage gaming responses. With regard to
impact on the manufacturer’s order fulfillment rate, specific combinations of the threeway interaction results in a range of outcomes (Figure 4-11). Under a Proportional
rationing strategy scenario, combinations of focal retailer and B Retailers’ shortage
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gaming response yields a range of 39 to 68 percent order fulfillment rate. Under a Linear
rationing strategy scenario, the manufacturer’s order fulfillment rate ranges from 31
percent to 70 percent. Finally, under a Uniform strategy, the manufacturer experiences
order fulfillment rates from 34 to 51 percent (Figure 4-11).
In general, the specific interaction of No gaming by focal retailer and B Retailers
results in the higher observed mean order fill rates for all parties within a given
manufacturer order rationing scenario, particularly under a Proportional or Linear
strategy (Figures 4-11, 4-12, 4-13, 4-14 and 4-15). Interactions of shortage gaming by
either focal retailer or B Retailers results in the lower observed mean order fill rates for
all parties within a given manufacturer order rationing scenario, particularly under a
Proportional or Linear manufacturer order rationing scenario (Figures 4-11, 4-12, 4-13, 414 and 4-15).
When the manufacturer utilizes a Uniform rationing strategy, B and C Retailers
benefit, as they experience 100 percent order fill rates regardless of A or B Retailers’
responses under this strategy (Figures 4-14 and 4-15). A Retailers do not benefit under
this order rationing scenario as the Uniform strategy results in a low order fill rate of 43.7
percent regardless of other retailers’ actions (Figure 4-13). Under a Uniform rationing
strategy, the focal retailer’s order fill rates are grouped into three clusters according to its
own shortage gaming responses (Figure 4-12). These results are similar to the effects of
RATION * RI.GAME * RA.GAME on R1.OFR (Figure 4-6) and RA.OFR (Figure 4-7).
Although the results show three clusters of outcomes, they actually reflect the
imperviousness of a Uniform rationing strategy to shortage gaming, as each distinct
cluster of order fill rate reflect the amount of inflation under a particular shortage gaming
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response scenario coupled with the unchanging amount of inventory allocated under the
Uniform rationing strategy.
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Figure 4-11 RATION * R1.GAME * RB.GAME effect on M.OFR
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Figure 4-12 RATION * R1.GAME * RB.GAME effect on R1.OFR
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Figure 4-13 RATION * R1.GAME * RB.GAME effect on RA.OFR
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Figure 4-14 RATION * R1.GAME * RB.GAME effect on RB.OFR
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Figure 4-15 RATION * R1.GAME * RB.GAME effect on RC.OFR
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4.3.2.5 Interaction of RATION * RA.GAME * RB.GAME
The fifth three-way interaction with at least medium effect sizes, RATION *
RA.GAME * RB.GAME show a significant effect at p<0.001 on eight dependent
variables: CV, M.OFR, R1.OFR, RA.OFR, RB.OFR, RC.OFR, OPP.LOSS and C.COST.
Partial η2 values indicate large effects on the manufacturer’s order fulfillment rate (partial
η2 = 0.923), Retailer 1’s order fill rate (partial η2 = 0.963), A Retailers’ order fill rate
(partial η2 = 0.915), B Retailers’ order fill rate (partial η2 = 0.953), and C Retailers’ order
fill rate (partial η2 = 0.942). There was also a medium effect on the manufacturer’s
demand variance (partial η2 = 0.635), See Table 4-13. Following, profile plots are shown
for those relationships with at least a medium sized effect.
Figure 4-16 shows the profile plot of RATION * RA.GAME * RB.GAME effect on
CV. Figure 4-17 shows the profile plot of RATION * RA.GAME * RB.GAME effect on
M.OFR. Figure 4-18 shows the profile plot of RATION * RA.GAME * RB.GAME effect
on R1.OFR. Figure 4-19 shows the profile plot of RATION * RA.GAME * RB.GAME
effect on RA.OFR. Figure 4-20 shows the profile plot of RATION * RA.GAME *
RB.GAME effect on RB.OFR. Figure 4-21 shows the profile plot of RATION *
RA.GAME * RB.GAME effect on RC.OFR.
The plots show that the interaction of manufacturer order rationing with A and B
Retailers’ shortage gaming yields different outcomes depending on different
combinations of order rationing strategies and shortage gaming responses. When the
manufacturer utilizes a Uniform rationing strategy, higher demand variance results,
particularly when combined with Correction gaming by A Retailers (Figure 4-16).
Consequently, this specific set of interactions also results in the lowest observed order
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fulfillment rates for the manufacturer (Figure 4-17). The Uniform rationing strategy
benefits B and C Retailers, as they experience 100 percent order fill rates regardless of A
or B Retailers’ responses under this strategy (Figures 4-20 and 4-21). A Retailers appear
to benefit under this particular order rationing scenario if they do not engage in shortage
gaming (Figure 4-19), however, this result reflects the inclusion of order inflation by A
Retailers in the order fill rate calculation. Although the results under a Uniform rationing
strategy scenario show three clusters of outcomes, the results reflect the imperviousness
of a Uniform rationing strategy to shortage gaming, as each distinct level of order fill rate
reflect the amount of inflation under a particular shortage gaming response scenario
coupled with the unchanging amount of inventory allocated under the Uniform rationing
strategy.
In general, the specific interaction of No gaming by A and B Retailers results in the
highest observed mean order fill rates for all retailers within a Proportional or Linear
manufacturer order rationing scenario (Figures 4-18, 4-19, 4-20, and 4-21). The specific
interaction of Correction gaming by A Retailers and either Correction or Overreaction
gaming by B Retailers results in the lowest observed mean order fill rates for all retailers
within a Proportional or Linear manufacturer order rationing scenario (Figures 4-18, 419, 4-20, and 4-21).
Overall, these results are similar to the results obtained from the three-way
interaction of RATION * R1.GAME * RB.GAME (see section 4.3.2.4).
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Figure 4-16 RATION * RA.GAME * RB.GAME effect on CV

159

Uniform

RA No Gaming;
RB Correction Gaming

RA No Gaming;
RB No Gaming

RA No Gaming;
RB Overreaction Gaming

RA Correction Gaming;
RB Correction Gaming

RA Correction Gaming;
RB No Gaming

RA Correction Gaming;
RB Overreaction Gaming

RA Overreaction Gaming;
RB Correction Gaming

RA Overreaction Gaming;
RB No Gaming

RA Overreaction Gaming;
RB Overreaction Gaming

0.80

0.752
0.752

0.70
0.650

Estimated Marginal Means

0.60

0.50

0.503
0.465

0.40

0.30
0.271

0.279

0.20

0.193

0.10
Proportional

Linear

Uniform

Manufacturer Order Rationing

Figure 4-17 RATION * RA.GAME * RB.GAME effect on M.OFR
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Figure 4-18 RATION * RA.GAME * RB.GAME effect on R1.OFR
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Figure 4-19 RATION * RA.GAME * RB.GAME effect on RA.OFR
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Figure 4-20 RATION * RA.GAME * RB.GAME effect on RB.OFR
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Figure 4-21 RATION * RA.GAME * RB.GAME effect on RC.OFR
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4.3.2.6 Interaction of RATION * RA.GAME * RC.GAME
The sixth three-way interaction with at least medium effect sizes, RATION *
RA.GAME * RC.GAME show a significant effect at p<0.001 on eight dependent
variables: CV, M.OFR, R1.OFR, RA.OFR, RB.OFR, RC.OFR, OPP.LOSS and C.COST.
Partial η2 values indicate medium effects on B Retailers’ order fill rate (partial η2 = 0.583)
and C Retailers’ order fill rate (partial η2 = 0.714). See Table 4-13. Following, profile
plots are shown for those relationships with at least a medium sized effect.
Figure 4-22 shows the profile plot of RATION * RA.GAME * RC.GAME effect on
RB.OFR while Figure 4-23 shows the profile plot of RATION * RA.GAME *
RC.GAME effect on RC.OFR.
The interaction of manufacturer order rationing, A Retailers’ shortage gaming, and
C Retailers’ shortage gaming impact both B and C Retailers strongly. If the manufacturer
utilizes a Uniform strategy, neither B nor C Retailers are affected by shortage gaming
from other retailers connected in the inventory ordering and fulfillment feedback loop
(Figures 4-22 and 4-23). However, if the manufacturer utilizes either a Proportional or
Linear strategy, mean order fill rates are lower than 100 percent.
For B Retailers specifically, order fill rates appear to be primarily influenced by the
interaction of shortage gaming by A Retailers along with the manufacturer’s rationing
strategy as evidenced by clusters of outcomes when A Retailers either do not shortage
game, Correction games, or Overreaction games (Figure 4-22). B Retailers suffer the
lowest observed order fill rates when the manufacturer utilizes a Linear strategy and
when A Retailers respond with Overreaction gaming, regardless of C Retailers’ response.
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Figure 4-22 RATION * RA.GAME * RC.GAME effect on RB.OFR
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Figure 4-23 RATION * RA.GAME * RC.GAME effect on RC.OFR
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4.3.2.7 Interaction of RATION * RB.GAME * RC.GAME
The seventh three-way interaction with at least medium effect sizes, RATION *
RB.GAME * RC.GAME show a significant effect at p<0.001 on eight dependent
variables: CV, M.OFR, R1.OFR, RA.OFR, RB.OFR, RC.OFR, OPP.LOSS and C.COST.
Partial η2 values indicate a medium effect on C Retailers’ order fill rate (partial η2 =
0.641). See Table 4-13.
Figure 4-24 shows the profile plot of RATION * RB.GAME * RC.GAME effect on
RC.OFR. This plot shows that a Uniform rationing strategy benefits C Retailers
regardless of shortage gaming from B and C Retailers, consistently yielding 100 percent
fill rates (Figure 4-24). In contrast, when the manufacturer utilizes a Proportional
rationing strategy, specific interactions involving shortage gaming by B Retailers results
in lower order fill rates for C Retailers compared to when B Retailers do not shortage
game. Under a Linear order rationing strategy, order fill rates for C Retailers are
generally low, ranging from approximately 22 percent to zero percent.
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Figure 4-24 RATION * RB.GAME * RC.GAME effect on RC.OFR
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4.3.2.8 Interaction of R1.GAME * RA.GAME * RB.GAME
The eighth three-way interaction with at least medium effect sizes, R1.GAME *
RA.GAME * RB.GAME show a significant effect at p<0.001 on eight dependent
variables: CV, M.OFR, R1.OFR, RA.OFR, RB.OFR, RC.OFR, OPP.LOSS and C.COST.
Partial η2 values indicate large effects on A Retailers’ order fill rate (partial η2 = 0.827)
and B Retailers’ order fill rate (partial η2 = 0.823). There were medium effects on the
manufacturer’s demand variance (partial η2 = 0.553), the manufacturer’s order fulfillment
rate (partial η2 = 0.720), Retailer 1’s order fill rate (partial η2 = 0.790), C Retailers’ order
fill rate (partial η2 = 0.747), and the manufacturer’s opportunity loss (partial η2 = 0.778).
See Table 4-13.
Figure 4-25 shows the profile plot of R1.GAME * RA.GAME * RB.GAME effect
on CV. Figure 4-26 shows the profile plot of R1.GAME * RA.GAME * RB.GAME
effect on M.OFR. Figure 4-27 shows the profile plot of R1.GAME * RA.GAME *
RB.GAME effect on R1.OFR. Figure 4-28 shows the profile plot of R1.GAME *
RA.GAME * RB.GAME effect on RA.OFR. Figure 4-29 shows the profile plot of
R1.GAME * RA.GAME * RB.GAME effect on RB.OFR Figure 4-30 shows the profile
plot of R1.GAME * RA.GAME * RB.GAME effect on RC.OFR. Figure 4-31 shows the
profile plot of R1.GAME * RA.GAME * RB.GAME effect on OPP.LOSS.
The plots indicate that the specific three-way interaction of Correction gaming by
all large and medium sized retailers results in the highest observed demand variance
(Figure 4-25) and lowest observed order fulfillment rates for the manufacturer (Figure 426), the focal retailer (Figure 4-27), A Retailers (Figure 4-28), B Retailers (Figure 4-29),
and C Retailers (Figure 4-30). However, Correction gaming by the focal retailer, A
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Retailers, and B Retailers also results in low opportunity loss for the manufacturer,
similar in impact from No gaming by all three parties (Figure 4-31). In this situation, the
manufacturer’s excess inventory is taken up by the combined inflated orders from the
three groups of retailers. In contrast, when A and B Retailers engage in Correction
gaming, but Retailer 1 engages in Overreaction gaming, the manufacturer’s opportunity
loss is increased to 84,266 units of true unfilled demand over the five year period
observed (Figure 4-31). With regard to the manufacturer’s opportunity loss, the impact of
a consistent Overreaction gaming response rather than compounded dynamic Correction
gaming response by Retailer 1 appears to limit the detrimental impact of shortage gaming
by the three groups of retailers in this interaction. This general pattern is also seen in the
two-way interaction of R1.GAME * RA.GAME (see section 4.3.3.7 and Figure 4-65).
The addition of shortage gaming by B retailers appears to exacerbate the detrimental
impact of shortage gaming by Retailer 1 and A Retailers. For example, the specific threeway interaction of B Retailers’ Correction gaming, A Retailers’ Correction Gaming, and
Retailer 1’s Correction gaming generally yields greater opportunity loss when compared
to the three-way interaction of B Retailers’ No gaming, A Retailers’ Correction Gaming,
and Retailer 1’s Correction gaming (Figure 4-31).
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Figure 4-25 R1.GAME * RA.GAME * RB.GAME effect on CV
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Figure 4-26 R1.GAME * RA.GAME * RB.GAME effect on M.OFR
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Figure 4-27 R1.GAME * RA.GAME * RB.GAME effect on R1.OFR
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Figure 4-28 R1.GAME * RA.GAME * RB.GAME effect on RA.OFR
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Figure 4-29 R1.GAME * RA.GAME * RB.GAME effect on RB.OFR
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Figure 4-30 R1.GAME * RA.GAME * RB.GAME effect on RC.OFR
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Figure 4-31 R1.GAME * RA.GAME * RB.GAME effect on OPP.LOSS
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4.3.3 Univariate Results – Two-Way Interactions
Two-way interactions with significant relationships to dependent variables are
shown in Table 4-14. There were fourteen different significant two-way interactions,
totaling 107 significant relationships with dependent variables. Of these relationships, ten
different two-way interactions with 41 significant relationships with dependent variables
show partial η2 values over 0.5, indicating at least a medium effect. Due to the
simulation’s large sample size, small differences between groups are statistically
significant. For clarity of interpretation, the remaining discussion on two-way univariate
results will focus on those relationships with at least a medium effect size in order for
differences of practical significance to be identified.
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Table 4-14 Univariate Results - Two-Way Interactions
Between Effects Tests – Two-Way Interactions
Source

Dependent
Variable

F

df

Sig.

Partial η2

Observed
Power

CV
M.OFR
R1.OFR
RA.OFR
RB.OFR
RC.OFR
OPP.LOSS

1198.893
16020.473
22788.297
66.354
37.670
30.176
2081.021

2
2
2
2
2
2
2

0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000

0.145
0.695 **
0.764 **
0.009
0.005
0.004
0.228 *

1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000

CV
M.OFR
R1.OFR
RA.OFR
RB.OFR
RC.OFR
OPP.LOSS
C.COST

8988.325
158189.316
1168985.724
135671.928
188650.062
89898.354
2906.985
436.363

4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4

0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000

0.718 **
0.978 ***
0.997 ***
0.975 ***
0.982 ***
0.962 ***
0.452 *
0.110

1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000

CV
M.OFR
R1.OFR
RA.OFR
RB.OFR
RC.OFR
OPP.LOSS
C.COST

31398.292
494704.616
480540.095
1061724.777
540940.874
387202.776
64817.313
436.363

4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4

0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000

0.899 ***
0.993 ***
0.993 ***
0.997 ***
0.994 ***
0.991 ***
0.948 ***
0.110

1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000

CV
2634.739
4
0.000
0.428 *
M.OFR
233732.873
4
0.000
0.985 ***
R1.OFR
271028.311
4
0.000
0.987 ***
RATION *
RA.OFR
242397.747
4
0.000
0.986 ***
RB.GAME
RB.OFR
90419.333
4
0.000
0.962 ***
RC.OFR
91675.316
4
0.000
0.963 ***
OPP.LOSS
9880.825
4
0.000
0.737 **
C.COST
8.962
4
0.000
0.003
Partial η2: *** Large effect size, ** Medium effect size, * Small effect size

1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000
0.999

RATION *
PROMOTIONS

RATION *
R1.GAME

RATION *
RA.GAME
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Table 4-14 Univariate Results – Two-Way Interactions (continued)
Between Effects Tests – Two-Way Interactions
Source

RATION *
RC.GAME

PROMOTIONS
* R1.GAME

PROMOTIONS
* RA.GAME

Dependent
Variable

F

df

Sig.

Partial η2

Observed
Power

CV
M.OFR
R1.OFR
RA.OFR
RB.OFR
RC.OFR
OPP.LOSS
C.COST

1099.509
23240.858
7919.444
7786.298
4767.988
97154.960
1281.653
6.577

4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4

0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000

0.238 *
0.868 ***
0.692 **
0.688 **
0.575 **
0.965 ***
0.267 *
0.002

1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000
0.992

CV
M.OFR
R1.OFR
RA.OFR
RB.OFR
RC.OFR
OPP.LOSS

3024.460
23868.225
26189.020
446.406
211.692
317.859
3792.526

2
2
2
2
2
2
2

0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000

0.300 *
0.772 **
0.788 **
0.060
0.029
0.043
0.350 *

1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000

CV
M.OFR
RA.OFR
RB.OFR
RC.OFR
OPP.LOSS

22.135
3750.713
64.145
21.763
16.464
1614.826

2
2
2
2
2
2

0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000

0.003
0.347 *
0.009
0.003
0.002
0.186

1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000

CV
8.405
2
0.000
0.001
M.OFR
28.692
2
0.000
0.004
161.277
2
0.000
0.022
PROMOTIONS R1.OFR
* RB.GAME
RA.OFR
26.133
2
0.000
0.004
RB.OFR
7.553
2
0.001
0.001
RC.OFR
14.424
2
0.000
0.002
OPP.LOSS
5.820
2
0.003
0.001
Partial η2: *** Large effect size, ** Medium effect size, * Small effect size
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0.965
1.000
1.000
1.000
0.945
0.999
0.873

Table 4-14 Univariate Results – Two-Way Interactions (continued)
Between Effects Tests – Two-Way Interactions
Source

R1.GAME *
RA.GAME

R1.GAME *
RB.GAME

R1.GAME *
RC.GAME

Dependent
Variable

Observed
Power

Sig.

Partial η2

4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4

0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000

0.261 *
0.910 ***
0.930 ***
0.900 ***
0.960 ***
0.893 ***
0.996 ***
0.201 *

1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000

2981.599
14096.256
7325.202
19208.271
27580.035
22108.835
998.473
34.766

4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4

0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000

0.458 *
0.800 ***
0.675 **
0.845 ***
0.887 ***
0.863 ***
0.221 *
0.010

1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000

40.903
262.240
327.554
187.462
704.237
943.607
24.427
25.226

4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4

0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000

0.011
0.069
0.085
0.051
0.167
0.211 *
0.007
0.007

1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000

F

df

CV
M.OFR
R1.OFR
RA.OFR
RB.OFR
RC.OFR
OPP.LOSS
C.COST

1242.735
35506.655
47156.044
31569.161
83817.663
29266.652
875349.896
883.711

CV
M.OFR
R1.OFR
RA.OFR
RB.OFR
RC.OFR
OPP.LOSS
C.COST
CV
M.OFR
R1.OFR
RA.OFR
RB.OFR
RC.OFR
OPP.LOSS
C.COST

CV
11488.230 4
0.000
0.765 **
M.OFR
76383.969 4
0.000
0.956 ***
R1.OFR
120640.325 4
0.000
0.972 ***
RA.GAME *
RA.OFR
68102.154 4
0.000
0.951 ***
RB.GAME
RB.OFR
58178.096 4
0.000
0.943 ***
RC.OFR
46948.850 4
0.000
0.930 ***
OPP.LOSS
4283.687 4
0.000
0.549 **
C.COST
34.766 4
0.000
0.010
Partial η2: *** Large effect size, ** Medium effect size, * Small effect size
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1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000

Table 4-14 Univariate Results – Two-Way Interactions (continued)
Between Effects Tests – Two-Way Interactions
Dependent
Variable

Observed
Power

Sig.

Partial η2

0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000

0.077
0.211 *
0.234 *
0.071
0.440 *
0.591 **
0.051
0.007

1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000

CV
429.843 4
0.000
0.109
M.OFR
189.898 4
0.000
0.051
R1.OFR
218.524 4
0.000
0.058
RB.GAME *
RA.OFR
188.868 4
0.000
0.051
RC.GAME
RB.OFR
576.505 4
0.000
0.141
RC.OFR
2531.791 4
0.000
0.418 *
OPP.LOSS
226.795 4
0.000
0.060
C.COST
25.226 4
0.000
0.007
Partial η2: *** Large effect size, ** Medium effect size, * Small effect size

1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000

Source

RA.GAME *
RC.GAME

CV
M.OFR
R1.OFR
RA.OFR
RB.OFR
RC.OFR
OPP.LOSS
C.COST

F

df

294.301
941.453
1077.240
269.128
2771.255
5090.443
189.010
25.226
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4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4

4.3.3.1 Interaction of RATION * PROMOTIONS
The first two-way interaction with at least medium effect sizes, RATION *
PROMOTIONS show a significant effect at p<0.001 on seven dependent variables: CV,
M.OFR, R1.OFR, RA.OFR, RB.OFR, RC.OFR, and OPP.LOSS. Partial η2 values
indicate medium effects on the manufacturer’s order fulfillment rate (partial η2 = 0.695)
and Retailer 1’s order fill rate (partial η2 = 0.764). See Table 4-14.
Figure 4-32 shows the profile plot of RATION * PROMOTIONS effect on M.OFR
and Figure 4-33 shows the profile plot of RATION * PROMOTIONS effect on R1.OFR.
The interaction of different manufacturer rationing strategies with retail promotions
demand shock impacts order fulfillment rates for the manufacturer as well as order fill
rates for the focal retailer (Figure 4-32 and Figure 4-33). If the manufacturer utilizes
either a Proportional or a Linear rationing strategy, the results indicate that the strategy is
robust to the impact of retail promotions demand shock. Note that there are no
differences in the estimated marginal means for Proportional and Linear rationing
strategies between Promotions and No promotions for M.OFR (Figure 4-32) and R1.OFR
(Figure 4-33).
When the manufacturer utilizes a Uniform strategy, a retail promotions demand
shock results in higher order fill rates compared to No promotions for the manufacturer as
well as the focal retailer (Figures 4-32 and 4-33). As discussed in section 4.3.2.1
Interaction of RATION * PROMOTIONS * R1.GAME, these results may seem
counterintuitive since a retail promotions shock is hypothesized to set of a feedback cycle
of excessive demand and low order fill (see section 2.4 Experimental Design and
Hypotheses) However, the higher estimated marginal mean under a retail promotions
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demand shock may be an artifact of the simulation. The simulation allows Retailer 1 to
gain directly from ordering additional inventory for their retail promotions because the
single retail promotions order is met by the manufacturer at a minimum of 80 percent
order fill (see section 3.4.2.3 Retail Promotions Demand Shock). Subsequent quarters
within the simulation are subject to the normal functioning of inventory ordering and
fulfillment per each scenario’s rules, which in general yields order fill rates in the 40 to
50 percent range for the manufacturer (see Figure 4-80 RATION’S effect on M.OFR) and
for the focal retailer (see Figure 4-81 RATION’S effect on R1.OFR). The results of this
specific interaction may reflect the initial high order fill rate coupled with low subsequent
order fill rates for both parties involved in attending to the retail promotions demand
shock. These results are evident when the manufacturer utilizes a Uniform rationing
strategy because the strategy allocates the same absolute amount of inventory regardless
of shortage gaming whereas outcomes under a Proportional or Linear rationing strategy
reflects higher fill rates as a result of order rationing and may thus mask the initial high
order fill rate from the retail promotion demand. The higher long-term order fill rates
under a retailer promotions demand shock may reflect the initial high order fill rate
coupled with low subsequent order fill rates for both parties directly involved in the retail
promotions demand shock. These results should also be considered in context of relevant
three-way interactions such as the interaction of RATION * PROMOTIONS *
R1.GAME (see section 4.3.2.1) and the interaction of RATION * PROMOTIONS *
RA.GAME (see section 4.3.2.2), where shortage gaming actions from the focal retailer
and A Retailers are masked in this two-way interaction.
Finally, although this interaction is significant with medium level effects, its
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practical significance may be limited. Within the Uniform level, differences between
Promotions and No promotions are 3.5 percent (3.5 = 45.4 - 41.9) and 4.5 percent (4.5 =
47.0 - 42.5) for M.OFR and R1.OFR respectively.
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Figure 4-32 RATION * PROMOTIONS effect on M.OFR
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Figure 4-33 RATION * PROMOTIONS effect on R1.OFR
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Uniform

4.3.3.2 Interaction of RATION * R1.GAME
The second two-way interaction with at least medium effect sizes, RATION *
R1.GAME show a significant effect at p<0.001 on eight dependent variables: CV,
M.OFR, R1.OFR, RA.OFR, RB.OFR, RC.OFR, OPP.LOSS, and C.COST. Partial η2
values indicate large effects on the manufacturer’s demand variance (partial η2 = 0.718),
the manufacturer’s order fulfillment rate (partial η2 = 0.978), Retailer 1’s order fill rate
(partial η2 = 0.997), A Retailers’ order fill rates (partial η2 = 0.975), B Retailers’ order fill
rates (partial η2 = 0.982), and C Retailers’ order fill rates (partial η2 = 0.962). See Table 414.
Figure 4-34 shows the profile plot of RATION * R1.GAME effect on CV. Figure 435 shows the profile plot of RATION * R1.GAME effect on M.OFR. Figure 4-36 shows
the profile plot of RATION * R1.GAME effect on R1.OFR. Figure 4-37 shows the
profile plot of RATION * R1.GAME effect on RA.OFR. Figure 4-38 shows the profile
plot of RATION * R1.GAME effect on RB.OFR. Figure 4-39 shows the profile plot of
RATION * R1.GAME effect on RC.OFR.
The plots indicate that the interaction of Uniform order rationing strategy by the
manufacturer and Correction shortage gaming by the focal retailer results in detrimental
results for the manufacturer and for the focal retailer. Figure 4-34 shows that demand
variance is increased when there is an interaction of Uniform order rationing strategy and
Correction gaming, compared to No gaming. This interaction also results in the lowest
observed order fulfillment rates for the manufacturer at 31.2 percent (Figure 4-35) and
order fill rates for the focal retailer at 18 percent (Figure 4-36). However, note that these
results reflect the inclusion of order inflation by the focal retailer coupled with a similar
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absolute inventory allocation in the calculation of order fill rate (Figure 4-36). Three
levels of outcomes are observed as the denominator reflects No gaming, Correction
gaming, and Overreaction gaming levels of order inflation while the numerator reflects a
similar absolute inventory allocation under the Uniform rationing rule.
The specific interaction of manufacturer Linear order rationing and Retailer 1
Correction gaming benefits other large type A Retailers best (Figure 4-37), as this
interaction results in the highest order fill rates for A Retailers if Retailer 1 engages in
shortage gaming. Overall, A Retailers suffer decreased order fill rates when Retailer 1
engages in shortage gaming compared to No gaming. In contrast to the effect on A
Retailers, the interaction of manufacturer Linear order rationing strategy and Retailer 1
shortage gaming also results in the lowest order fill rates for B and C retailers (Figures 438 and 4-39).
A Uniform order rationing strategy appears to be robust against Retailer 1 shortage
gaming, as there are no differences in order fill rates for A retailers (Figure 4-37), B
retailers (Figure 4-38), and C retailers (Figure 4-39). However, this rationing strategy
results in low order fill rates for all.
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Figure 4-34 RATION * R1.GAME effect on CV
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Figure 4-35 RATION * R1.GAME effect on M.OFR
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Figure 4-36 RATION * R1.GAME effect on R1.OFR
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Figure 4-37 RATION * R1.GAME effect on RA.OFR
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Figure 4-38 RATION * R1.GAME effect on RB.OFR
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Figure 4-39 RATION * R1.GAME effect on RC.OFR
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4.3.3.3 Interaction of RATION * RA.GAME
The third two-way interaction with at least medium effect sizes, RATION *
RA.GAME show a significant effect at p<0.001 on eight dependent variables: CV,
M.OFR, R1.OFR, RA.OFR, RB.OFR, RC.OFR, OPP.LOSS and C.COST. Partial η2
values indicate large effects on the manufacturer’s demand variance (partial η2 = 0.899),
the manufacturer’s order fulfillment rate (partial η2 = 0.993), Retailer 1’s order fill rate
(partial η2 = 0.993), A Retailers’ order fill rate (partial η2 = 0.997), B Retailers’ order fill
rate (partial η2 = 0.994), C Retailers’ order fill rate (partial η2 = 0.991), and the
manufacturer’s opportunity loss (partial η2 = 0.948). See Table 4-14.
Figure 4-40 shows the profile plot of RATION * RA.GAME effect on CV. Figure
4-41 shows the profile plot of RATION * RA.GAME effect on M.OFR. Figure 4-42
shows the profile plot of RATION * RA.GAME effect on R1.OFR. Figure 4-43 shows
the profile plot of RATION * RA.GAME effect on RA.OFR. Figure 4-44 shows the
profile plot of RATION * RA.GAME effect on RB.OFR. Figure 4-45 shows the profile
plot of RATION * RA.GAME effect on RC.OFR. Figure 4-46 shows the profile plot of
RATION * RA.GAME effect on OPP.LOSS.
When the manufacturer utilizes a Uniform rationing strategy and the largest
customers utilizes a Correction shortage gaming response, outcomes for the manufacturer
and large customers suffer in comparison to other combinations of order rationing
strategies and shortage gaming responses. Quarterly order inflation adjustments by A
Retailers, who represent the largest retailer order volume, coupled with the
manufacturer’s Uniform rationing strategy results in high relative demand variance
(Figure 4-40). This specific interaction also results in the lowest observed order
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fulfillment rates for the manufacturer (Figure 4-41) as well as for themselves (Figure 443). It also results in the highest observed opportunity loss for the manufacturer (Figure
4-46). Over the long-term, this interaction shows the compounded impact of feedback
loops and decision policies. When A Retailers respond to inventory shortage with
Correction gaming, they inflate orders by observed shortage. Coupled with a Uniform
rationing strategy, where inventory is essentially allocated regardless of order volume, a
low allocation compared to their order and the response based on that low allocation
increases in impact over time.
However, smaller retailers such as type B and C customers benefit from a Uniform
rationing strategy. Figure 4-44 and Figure 4-45 show that a Uniform rationing strategy it
is most robust when A Retailers engages in shortage gaming, as there are no differences
in estimated marginal means for their respective order fill rates across the range of
Retailers A’s shortage gaming responses.
A Linear rationing strategy is more robust against A Retailers’ Correction gaming,
and benefits the manufacturer, the focal retailer, and A Retailers. When A Retailers
engage in Correction gaming and when the manufacturer utilizes a Linear rationing
strategy, order fill rates for the manufacturer (Figure 4-41), the focal retailer (Figure 442), and A Retailers (Figure 4-43) are higher relative to other combinations of rationing
strategies and shortage gaming responses.
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Figure 4-40 RATION * RA.GAME effect on CV
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Figure 4-41 RATION * RA.GAME effect on M.OFR
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Figure 4-42 RATION * RA.GAME effect on R1.OFR

RA No Gaming

RA Correction Gaming

RA Overreaction Gaming

0.90
0.743

Estimated Marginal Means

0.80
0.70

0.674

0.649

0.60
0.50
0.40
0.30

0.776

0.576

0.446

0.388

0.373

0.20
0.110

0.10
0.00
Proportional

Linear
Manufacturer Order Rationing

Figure 4-43 RATION * RA.GAME effect on RA.OFR
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Figure 4-44 RATION * RA.GAME effect on RB.OFR
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Figure 4-45 RATION * RA.GAME effect on RC.OFR
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Figure 4-46 RATION * RA.GAME effect on OPP.LOSS
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4.3.3.4 Interaction of RATION * RB.GAME
The fourth two-way interaction with at least medium effect sizes, RATION *
RB.GAME show a significant effect at p<0.001 on eight dependent variables: CV,
M.OFR, R1.OFR, RA.OFR, RB.OFR, RC.OFR, OPP.LOSS, and C.COST. Partial η2
values indicate large effects on the manufacturer’s order fulfillment rate (partial η2 =
0.985), Retailer 1’s order fill rate (partial η2 = 0.987), A Retailers’ order fill rate (partial
η2 = 0.986), B Retailers’ order fill rate (partial η2 = 0.962), and C Retailers’ order fill rate
(partial η2 = 0.963). There were also medium effects on the manufacturer’s opportunity
loss (partial η2 = 0.737). See Table 4-14.
Figure 4-47 shows the profile plot of RATION * RB.GAME effect on M.OFR.
Figure 4-48 shows the profile plot of RATION * RB.GAME effect on R1.OFR. Figure 449 shows the profile plot of RATION * RB.GAME effect on RA.OFR. Figure 4-50
shows the profile plot of RATION * RB.GAME effect on RB.OFR. Figure 4-51 shows
the profile plot of RATION * RB.GAME effect on RC.OFR. Figure 4-52 shows the
profile plot of RATION * RB.GAME effect on OPP.LOSS.
The interaction of manufacturer’s order rationing strategies and shortage gaming by
B Retailers, show that a Uniform rationing strategy is robust against either form of
shortage gaming by B Retailers whereas Proportional or Linear rationing strategies result
in variable outcomes depending on the level of shortage gaming. When the manufacturer
utilizes a Proportional rationing strategy and when B Retailers respond with either level
of shortage gaming, order fill rates for all parties decrease by approximately the same
amount compared to scenarios where B Retailers respond with No gaming (Figures 4-47,
4-48, 4-49, 4-50, and 4-51).
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The specific interaction of a Linear rationing strategy with Correction gaming
results in the lower order fill rates compared with B Retailers’ Overreaction gaming.
However, this is observed for the manufacturer (Figure 4-47) and for large retailers only
(Figures 4-48 and 4-49 respectively). For medium and small retailers, the manufacturer’s
Linear rationing strategy results in generally poor order fill rates, regardless of B
Retailers’ ordering behavior (Figure 4-50 and 4-51). This specific interaction also results
in higher opportunity loss for the manufacturer, compared to other both Overreaction
gaming or No gaming by B Retailers (Figure 4-52). A Linear rationing strategy shorts
each retailer an equal absolute amount. Order fill rates shows the impact of this rationing
rule coupled with the impact of large orders as well as large order inflation since these
actions serve to increase the denominator used in calculating order fill rates.
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Figure 4-47 RATION * RB.GAME effect on M.OFR
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Figure 4-48 RATION * RB.GAME effect on R1.OFR
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Figure 4-49 RATION * RB.GAME effect on RA.OFR
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Figure 4-50 RATION * RB.GAME effect on RB.OFR
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Figure 4-51 RATION * RB.GAME effect on RC.OFR
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Figure 4-52 RATION * RB.GAME effect on OPP.LOSS
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4.3.3.5 Interaction of RATION * RC.GAME
The fifth two-way interaction with at least medium effect sizes, RATION *
RC.GAME show a significant effect at p<0.001 on eight dependent variables: CV,
M.OFR, R1.OFR, RA.OFR, RB.OFR, RC.OFR, OPP.LOSS and C.COST. Partial η2
values indicate large effects on the manufacturer’s order fulfillment rate (partial η2 =
0.868), and Retailers C’s order fill rate (partial η2 = 0.965). There were medium effects on
Retailer 1’s order fill rate (partial η2 = 0.692), A Retailers’ order fill rate (partial η2 =
0.688), and B Retailers’ order fill rate (partial η2 = 0.575). See Table 4-14.
Figure 4-53 shows the profile plot of RATION * RC.GAME effect on M.OFR.
Figure 4-54 shows the profile plot of RATION * RC.GAME effect on R1.OFR. Figure 455 shows the profile plot of RATION * RC.GAME effect on RA.OFR. Figure 4-56
shows the profile plot of RATION * RC.GAME effect on RB.OFR. Finally, Figure 4-57
shows the profile plot of RATION * RC.GAME effect on RC.OFR.
The interaction of manufacturer’s order rationing strategies and shortage gaming by
C Retailers result in similar outcomes as the interaction of the manufacturer’s order
rationing strategies and shortage gaming by B Retailers (see section 4.3.3.3 Interaction of
RATION * RB.GAME). Outcomes do not change under a Uniform rationing strategy
across the range of C Retailer’s No gaming and shortage gaming responses (Figures 4-53
through 4-57).
The interaction of a Proportional rationing strategy and C Retailers’ shortage
gaming result in a similar decrease in order fill rates for the manufacturer (Figure 4-53),
Retailer 1 (Figure 4-54), and A Retailers (Figure 4-55). However, the specific interaction
of a Linear rationing strategy and Correction gaming by C Retailers appears to decrease
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order fill rates when compared to Overreaction gaming for the manufacturer (Figure 453), Retailer 1 (Figure 4-54), A retailers (Figure 4-55). For B Retailers, the results
suggest little practical difference between different levels of the interaction as evidenced
by Figure 4-56. When C Retailers engage in Correction gaming and when the
manufacturer utilizes a Linear order rationing strategy, C Retailers benefit from inflating
their orders, as evidenced by their relative higher order fill rate under this scenario
(Figure 4-57).
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Figure 4-53 RATION * RC.GAME effect on M.OFR
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Figure 4-54 RATION * RC.GAME effect on R1.OFR
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Figure 4-55 RATION * RC.GAME effect on RA.OFR
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Figure 4-56 RATION * RC.GAME effect on RB.OFR
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Figure 4-57 RATION * RC.GAME effect on RC.OFR
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4.3.3.6 Interaction of PROMOTIONS * R1.GAME
The sixth two-way interaction with at least medium effect sizes, PROMOTIONS *
R1.GAME show a significant effect at p<0.001 on seven dependent variables: CV,
M.OFR, R1.OFR, RA.OFR, RB.OFR, RC.OFR, and OPP.LOSS. Partial η2 values
indicate medium effects on the manufacturer’s order fulfillment rate (partial η2 = 0.772),
and Retailer 1’s order fill rate (partial η2 = 0.788). See Table 4-14.
Figure 4-58 shows the profile plot of PROMOTIONS * R1.GAME effect on
M.OFR and Figure 4-59 shows the profile plot of PROMOTIONS * R1.GAME effect on
R1.OFR.
The impact of a retail promotions demand shock coupled with Correction gaming
by Retailer 1 results in higher order fill rates for the manufacturer (Figure 4-58) and for
Retailer 1 (Figure 4-59) compared with no promotions demand shock. However, under
Overreaction gaming, a retail promotions demand shock changes minimally. These
results indicate that when Retailer 1 engages in Overreaction shortage gaming, the
addition of a retail promotions demand shock does not make much impact long-term,
possibly because the single retail promotions demand shock order is obscured by
subsequent consistent Overreaction orders (2 times the actual demand by Retailer 1) over
the five year period observed. When Retailer 1 engages in Correction gaming, their
orders are dynamically increased by the previous quarter’s unmet demand, and therefore
a retail promotions demand shock and the high order fill rate resulting from the
simulation’s parameters (see section 3.4.2.3 Retail Promotions Demand Shock) serves to
start Retailer 1 at a higher order fill rate level than they would otherwise over the five
year period observed.
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Figure 4-58 PROMOTIONS * R1.GAME effect on M.OFR
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Figure 4-59 PROMOTIONS * R1.GAME effect on R1.OFR
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4.3.3.7 Interaction of R1.GAME * RA.GAME
The seventh two-way interaction with at least medium effect sizes, R1.GAME *
RA.GAME show a significant effect at p<0.001 on eight dependent variables: CV,
M.OFR, R1.OFR, RA.OFR, RB.OFR, RC.OFR, OPP.LOSS and C.COST. Partial η2
values indicate large effects on the manufacturer’s order fulfillment rate (partial η2 =
0.910), Retailer 1’s order fill rate (partial η2 = 0.930), A Retailers’ order fill rate (partial
η2 = 0.900), B Retailers’ order fill rate (partial η2 = 0.960), C Retailers’ order fill rate
(partial η2 = 0.893), and the manufacturer’s opportunity loss (partial η2 = 0.996). See
Table 4-14.
Figure 4-60 shows the profile plot of R1.GAME * RA.GAME effect on M.OFR.
Figure 4-61 shows the profile plot of R1.GAME * RA.GAME effect on R1.OFR. Figure
4-62 shows the profile plot of R1.GAME * RA.GAME effect on RA.OFR. Figure 4-63
shows the profile plot of R1.GAME * RA.GAME effect on RB.OFR. Figure 4-64 shows
the profile plot of R1.GAME * RA.GAME effect on RC.OFR. Figure 4-65 shows the
profile plot of R1.GAME * RA.GAME effect on OPP.LOSS.
The profile plots show that shortage gaming by the focal retailer (Retailer 1) and A
Retailers is generally detrimental to all parties involved in the inventory ordering and
fulfillment feedback cycle. Compared to No gaming by Retailer 1 and A Retailers,
shortage gaming by both parties decreases the manufacturer’s order fill rates (Figure 460) and decreases all retailers’ order fill rates (Figures 4-61 through 4- 64).
When compared to other combinations of shortage gaming between the two parties,
the specific interaction of A Retailers’ Correction gaming and either level of shortage
gaming by Retailer 1 results in the lowest observed order fulfillment rates for the
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manufacturer (Figure 4-60) and the lowest observed fill rates for A Retailers (Figure 462), B Retailers (Figure 4-63), and C Retailers (Figure 4-64). Retailer 1 experiences
equally low order fill rates regardless of the type of shortage gaming exercised by A
Retailers (Figure 4-61).
When Retailer 1 does not shortage game, it experiences lower order fill rates when
A retailers employ Overreaction gaming compared to Correction gaming (Figure 4-61).
Likewise, when A Retailers do not shortage game, they experience lower order fill rates
when Retailer 1 employ Overreaction gaming compared to Correction gaming (Figure 462).
With regard to the manufacturer’s opportunity loss, if both Retailer 1 and A
Retailers utilize either Correction gaming or Overreaction gaming, the manufacturer’s
opportunity loss is similar to scenarios where both do not shortage game. However, if
Retailer 1 employs Correction gaming and A Retailers employs Overreaction gaming, or
vice versa, the manufacturer’s opportunity loss is increased from 18,353 units to 60,304
units and 72,911 units respectively. Although this result masks an additional interaction
of shortage gaming by B retailers, the overall pattern is also evident in that observed in
the three-way interaction of R1.GAME * RA.GAME * RB.GAME (see section 4.3.2.8
and Figure 4-31).
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Figure 4-60 R1.GAME * RA.GAME effect on M.OFR

RA No Gaming

RA Correction Gaming

RA Overreaction Gaming

0.90

Estimated Marginal Means

0.80

0.789

0.70
0.640
0.60

0.556

0.599

0.367

0.447
0.428

0.544
0.50
0.40

0.362
0.30
0.20
No Gaming

Correction Gaming
Overreaction Gaming
Retailer 1 Shortage Gaming

Figure 4-61 R1.GAME * RA.GAME effect on R1.OFR
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Figure 4-62 RI.GAME * RA.GAME effect on RA.OFR
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Figure 4-63 RI.GAME * RA.GAME effect on RB.OFR

214

Overreaction Gaming

RA No Gaming

RA Correction Gaming

RA Overreaction Gaming

Estimated Marginal Means

0.70
0.65

0.653
0.605

0.60
0.553

0.55
0.536
0.50

0.511

0.476

0.45

0.453

0.485
0.457

0.40
No Gaming

Correction Gaming

Overreaction Gaming

Retailer 1 Shortage Gaming

Figure 4-64 R1.GAME * RA.GAME effect on RC.OFR

RA No Gaming

RA Correction Gaming

RA Overreaction Gaming

80,000
72,911

Estimated Marginal Means

70,000
60,000
50,000

60,304

62,459
49,949

47,370

40,000

44,997

30,000
20,000

18,353

18,353

18,353

10,000
No Gaming

Correction Gaming
Retailer 1 Shortage Gaming

Figure 4-65 R1.GAME * RA.GAME effect on OPP.LOSS
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Overreaction Gaming

4.3.3.8 Interaction of R1.GAME * RB.GAME
The eighth two-way interaction with at least medium effect sizes, R1.GAME *
RB.GAME show a significant effect at p<0.001 on eight dependent variables: CV,
M.OFR, R1.OFR, RA.OFR, RB.OFR, RC.OFR, OPP.LOSS and C.COST. Partial η2
values indicate large effects on the manufacturer’s order fulfillment rate (partial η2 =
0.800), A Retailers’ order fill rate (partial η2 = 0.845), B Retailers’ order fill rate (partial
η2 = 0.887), and C Retailers’ order fill rate (partial η2 = 0.863). There was a medium effect
on Retailer 1’s order fill rate (partial η2 = 0.930). See Table 4-14.
Figure 4-66 shows the profile plot of R1.GAME * RB.GAME effect on M.OFR.
Figure 4-67 shows the profile plot of R1.GAME * RB.GAME effect on R1.OFR. Figure
4-68 shows the profile plot of R1.GAME * RB.GAME effect on RA.OFR. Figure 4-69
shows the profile plot of R1.GAME * RB.GAME effect on RB.OFR. Figure 4-70 shows
the profile plot of R1.GAME * RB.GAME effect on RC.OFR.
The profile plots show that the interaction of Retailer 1 shortage gaming and B
Retailers’ shortage gaming results in similar outcomes as the interaction of Retailer 1 and
A Retailers’ shortage gaming (see section 4.3.3.7). Shortage gaming by B Retailers
results in decreased order fill rates when compared to No gaming (Figures 4-66 through
4-70). The interaction of shortage gaming by B Retailers and Retailer 1 result in
decreased order fill rates compared to scenarios where either party does not shortage
game (Figures 4-66 through 4-70).
When compared to other combinations of shortage gaming between the two parties,
the specific interaction of B Retailers’ Correction gaming and either level of shortage
gaming by Retailer 1 results in the lowest observed order fill rates for the manufacturer
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(Figure 4-66), Retailer 1 (Figure 4-67), A Retailers (Figure 4-68), and C Retailers (Figure
4-70).
B Retailers generally experience higher order fill rates if they do not engage in
shortage gaming (Figure 4-69), however, when Retailer 1 engages in Overreaction
gaming, Correction gaming by B Retailers results in higher order fill rates of 1.5 percent
compared to No gaming or 3.3 percent compared to Overreaction gaming by B Retailers.
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Figure 4-66 R1.GAME * RB.GAME effect on M.OFR
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Figure 4-67 R1.GAME * RG.GAME effect on R1.OFR
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Figure 4-68 R1.GAME * RB.GAME effect on RA.OFR
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Figure 4-69 R1.GAME * RB.GAME effect on RB.OFR
RB No Gaming

RB Correction Gaming

RB Overreaction Gaming

0.65

Estimated Marginal Means

0.635
0.60

0.574

0.55
0.532

0.526
0.488

0.50

0.492
0.477

0.472

0.45

0.40
No Gaming

Correction Gaming
Overreaction Gaming
Retailer 1 Shortage Gaming

Figure 4-70 R1.GAME * RB.GAME effect on RC.OFR
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4.3.3.9 Interaction of RA.GAME * RB.GAME
The ninth two-way interaction with at least medium effect sizes, RA.GAME *
RB.GAME show a significant effect at p<0.001 on eight dependent variables: CV,
M.OFR, R1.OFR, RA.OFR, RB.OFR, RC.OFR, OPP.LOSS and C.COST. Partial η2
values indicate large effects on the manufacturer’s order fulfillment rate (partial η2 =
0.956), Retailer 1’s order fill rate (partial η2 = 0.972), A Retailers’ order fill rates (partial
η2 = 0.951), B Retailers’ order fill rates (partial η2 = 0.943), and C Retailers’ order fill
rates (partial η2 = 0.930). There were also medium effects on the manufacturer’s demand
variance (partial η2 = 0.765) and on the manufacturer’s opportunity loss (partial η2 =
0.549). See Table 4-14.
Figure 4-71 shows the profile plot of RA.GAME * RB.GAME effect on CV.
Figure 4-72 shows the profile plot of RA.GAME * RB.GAME effect on M.OFR. Figure
4-73 shows the profile plot of RA.GAME * RB.GAME effect on R1.OFR. Figure 4-74
shows the profile plot of RA.GAME * RB.GAME effect on RA.OFR. Figure 4-75 shows
the profile plot of RA.GAME * RB.GAME effect on RB.OFR. Figure 4-76 shows the
profile plot of RA.GAME * RB.GAME effect on RC.OFR. Finally, Figure 4-77 shows
the profile plot of RA.GAME * RB.GAME effect on OPP.LOSS.
The plots indicate that the interaction of shortage gaming by both A and B
Retailers result in detrimental outcomes for all parties involved in the inventory ordering
and fulfillment feedback loop. Shortage gaming by either A or B Retailers decrease order
fill rates for all compared to No gaming by either party (Figures 4-72 through 4-76).
When compared to other combinations of shortage gaming between the two parties,
the specific interaction of B Retailers’ Correction gaming and either level of shortage
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gaming by A Retailers results in the lowest observed order fill rates for the manufacturer
(Figure 4-72), Retailer 1 (Figure 4-73), A Retailers (Figure 4-74), and C Retailers (Figure
4-76).
B Retailers generally experience higher order fill rates if they do not engage in
shortage gaming Figure 4-75), however, when A Retailers engages in Overreaction
gaming, Correction gaming by B Retailers results in higher order fill rates of 2.8 percent
compared to No gaming or 5.8 percent compared to Overreaction gaming by B Retailers.
This result is similar to that observed for RB.OFR when there is an interaction between
R1.GAME and RB.GAME (section 4.3.3.9).
The specific interaction of Correction gaming by both A and B Retailers also results
in the highest observed demand variance (Figure 4-71) as well as the highest observed
loss of opportunity for the manufacturer (Figure 4-77).
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Figure 4-71 RA.GAME * RB.GAME effect on CV
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Figure 4-72 RA.GAME * RB.GAME effect on M.OFR
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Figure 4-73 RA.GAME * RB.GAME effect on R1.OFR
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Figure 4-74 RA.GAME * RB.GAME effect on RA.OFR
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Figure 4-75 RA.GAME * RB.GAME effect on RB.OFR
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Figure 4-76 RA.GAME * RB.GAME effect on RC.OFR
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Figure 4-77 RA.GAME * RB.GAME effect on OPP.LOSS
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Overreaction Gaming

4.3.3.10 Interaction of RA.GAME * RC.GAME
The tenth two-way interaction with at least medium effect sizes, RA.GAME *
RC.GAME show a significant effect at p<0.001 on eight dependent variables: CV,
M.OFR, R1.OFR, RA.OFR, RB.OFR, RC.OFR, OPP.LOSS and C.COST. However,
partial η2 values indicate a medium effect on C Retailers’ order fill rate only (partial η2 =
0.591). See Table 4-14.
Figure 4-78 shows the profile plot of RA.GAME * RC.GAME effect on RC.OFR.
This plot indicates that if A Retailers engage in shortage gaming, C Retailers benefit by
engaging in Correction gaming. This action results in higher long-term order fill rates
compared to when C Retailers either do not shortage game or if they engage in
Overreaction gaming.
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Figure 4-78 RA.GAME * RC.GAME effect on RC.OFR
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4.3.4 Univariate Results - Main Effects
Main effects with significant relationships to dependent variables are shown in
Table 4-15. All independent variables yielded significant relationships with dependent
variables at p < 0.001 with the exception of the impact of PROMOTIONS on RC.OFR (p
< 0.01). Many of the relationships also show at least a small effect with partial η2 values
over 0.2. The remaining discussion will focus on significant relationships.
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Table 4-15 Univariate Results - Main Effects
Between Effects Tests – Main Effects
Source

Dependent
Variable

F

df

Sig.

Partial η2

Observed
Power

CV
M.OFR
R1.OFR
RA.OFR
RB.OFR
RC.OFR
OPP.LOSS
C.COST

235450.757
245473.193
1160116.077
2093688.190
18887457.540
35577606.919
92511.993
436.363

2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2

0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000

0.971 ***
0.972 ***
0.994 ***
0.997 ***
1.000 ***
1.000 ***
0.929 ***
0.058

1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000

CV
M.OFR
R1.OFR
RC.OFR
OPP.LOSS

3253.065
16996.635
20000.038
8.654
1779.429

1
1
1
1
1

0.000
0.000
0.000
0.003
0.000

0.188
0.547 **
0.587 **
0.001
0.112

1.000
1.000
1.000
0.837
1.000

CV
M.OFR
R1.OFR
RA.OFR
RB.OFR
RC.OFR
OPP.LOSS
C.COST

6313.192
951068.121
1790176.154
463270.951
472836.783
219420.213
9770.804
883.711

2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2

0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000

0.473 *
0.993 ***
0.996 ***
0.985 ***
0.985 ***
0.969 ***
0.581 **
0.111

1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000

CV
18140.011
2
0.000
0.720 **
M.OFR
3907481.075
2
0.000
0.998 ***
R1.OFR
1445588.910
2
0.000
0.995 ***
RA.OFR
5030571.196
2
0.000
0.999 ***
RA.GAME
RB.OFR
1538878.983
2
0.000
0.995 ***
RC.OFR
773480.508
2
0.000
0.991 ***
OPP.LOSS
173800.862
2
0.000
0.961 ***
C.COST
883.711
2
0.000
0.111
Partial η2: *** Large effect size, ** Medium effect size, * Small effect size

1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000

RATION

PROMOTIONS

R1.GAME
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Table 4-15 Univariate Results – Main Effects (continued)
Between Effects Tests – Main Effects
Dependent
Variable

Observed
Power

Sig.

Partial η2

0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000

0.207 *
0.990 ***
0.989 ***
0.989 ***
0.940 ***
0.981 ***
0.806 ***
0.005

1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000

CV
1136.676 2
0.000
0.139
M.OFR
39673.475 2
0.000
0.849 ***
R1.OFR
14770.531 2
0.000
0.677 **
RA.OFR
15234.551 2
0.000
0.684 **
RC.GAME
RB.OFR
10000.188 2
0.000
0.587 **
RC.OFR
67535.012 2
0.000
0.906 ***
OPP.LOSS
2283.243 2
0.000
0.245 *
C.COST
25.226 2
0.000
0.004
Partial η2: *** Large effect size, ** Medium effect size, * Small effect size

1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000

Source

RB.GAME

CV
M.OFR
R1.OFR
RA.OFR
RB.OFR
RC.OFR
OPP.LOSS
C.COST

F

df

1841.876
691343.278
631898.768
628006.141
109720.568
356606.315
29214.848
34.766
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2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2

4.3.4.1 Main Effect of RATION
The first main effect, RATION, show a significant effect at p<0.001 on all eight
dependent variables: CV, M.OFR, R1.OFR, RA.OFR, RB.OFR, RC.OFR, OPP.LOSS
and C.COST. Partial η2 values indicate large effects on the manufacturer’s demand
variance (partial η2 = 0.971), the manufacturer’s order fulfillment rate (partial η2 = 0.972),
Retailer 1’s order fill rate (partial η2 = 0.994), A Retailers’ order fill rates (partial η2 =
0.997), B Retailers’ order fill rates (partial η2 = 1.000), C Retailers’ order fill rates (partial
η2 = 1.000), and on the manufacturer’s opportunity loss (partial η2 = 0.929). Overall,
manufacturer order rationing strategies strongly impacts long-term performance measures
as all partial η2 values range from 0.929 to 1.000 except for the very small impact of
RATION on C.COST (partial η2 = 0.058). See Table 4-15.
Figure 4-79 shows the profile plot of RATION’s effect on CV. Figure 4-80 shows
the profile plot of RATION’s effect on M.OFR. Figure 4-81 shows the profile plot of
RATION’s effect on R1.OFR, RA.OFR, RB.OFR, and RC.OFR. Figure 4-82 shows the
profile plot of RATION’s effect on OPP.LOSS. Finally, Figure 4-83 shows the profile
plot of RATION’s effect on C.COST. Scheffe post hoc tests, the most conservative of
post hoc tests with respect to Type I error according to Hair and colleagues (2010, page
379), for each dependent variable show significant differences (p<0.001) between
estimated marginal means of each level of RATION with the exception of C.COST. For
this outcome, there was no difference between a Proportional and a Linear Strategy
(p=0.787).
Figure 4-79 indicates that a Uniform strategy results in higher demand variance
than either a Proportional or Linear strategies. Consequently, Figure 4-80 shows that a

230

Uniform strategy also results in the lowest order fill rate for the manufacturer. A Uniform
strategy appears to be most beneficial for the B and C type, smaller volume retailers. This
strategy results in a 100 percent fill rate for those retailers. However, it limits the amount
of inventory allocated to larger volume type A retailers, resulting in a mean fill rate of
approximately 42 percent (see Figure 4-81). This strategy also results in higher loss of
opportunity for the manufacturer. All else being equal, a Uniform strategy yields a 23
percent higher loss of opportunity due to unfilled true demand than that of a Proportional
strategy, or a 21 percent higher loss of opportunity than that of a Linear strategy (see
Figure 4-70). In addition, a Uniform strategy results in 733 to 900 percent higher
quarterly inventory carrying costs compared to either a Proportional or a Linear strategy
respectively (Figure 4-83).
For the manufacturer, a Proportional strategy results in similar outcomes compared
to a Linear strategy. Both limit demand variance to approximately 0.100 (see Figure 479), limits order fill rate to approximately 50 percent (see Figure 4-80), and limits
opportunity loss to approximately 40,000-41,000 units per quarter (see Figure 4-82).
For retailers, a Proportional strategy results in equivalent order fill rates for each
representative retailer, approximately 50 percent (see Figure 4-81). This strategy
essentially treats all of the manufacturer’s customers equally, regardless of the volume
they purchase. A Linear strategy exhibits a range of outcomes for each representative
retailer. It is most beneficial to the larger volume retailers with fill rates above 60 percent,
compared to the smaller volume retailers with fill rates of 8 to 24 percent (see Figure 481). Under a Linear strategy, A Retailers fare better than others.
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Figure 4-81 RATION'S effect on R1.OFR, RA.OFR, RB.OFR, and RC.OFR

OPP.LOSS

Estimated Marginal Means

52,000
50,000

49,730

48,000
46,000
44,000
42,000
40,922
40,000

40,364

38,000
Proportional

Linear
Manufacturer Order Rationing

Figure 4-82 RATION'S effect on OPP.OSS
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Figure 4-83 RATION'S effect on C.COST
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4.3.4.2 Main Effect of PROMOTIONS
The second main effect, PROMOTIONS, show a significant effect at p<0.001 on
four dependent variables: CV, M.OFR, R1.OFR, and OPP.LOSS. There was also a
significant effect at p<0.01 on RC.OFR. Partial η2 values indicate medium effects on the
manufacturer’s order fulfillment rate (partial η2 = 0.547) as well as on Retailer 1’s order
fill rate (partial η2 = 0.587). There was a very small effect on the manufacturer’s demand
variance (partial η2 = 0.188), C Retailers’ order fill rates (partial η2 = 0.001), and the
manufacturer’s opportunity loss (partial η2 = 0.112). See Table 4-15.
Figure 4-84 shows the profile plot of PROMOTIONS’ effect on CV, Figure 4-85
shows the profile plot of PROMOTIONS’ effect on M.OFR, and Figure 4-86 shows the
profile plot of PROMOTIONS’ effect on R1.OFR. Finally, Figure 4-87 shows the profile
plot of PROMOTIONS’ effect on RC.OFR while Figure 4-88 shows the profile plot of
PROMOTIONS’ effect on OPP.LOSS.
The impact of a retail promotions demand shock results in consistent outcomes for
long-term demand variance (Figure 4-84), the manufacturer’s order fill rate (Figure 485), and on Retailer 1’s order fill rate (Figure 4-86). This main effect increases demand
variance, increases the manufacturer’s order fill rates, and increases the focal retailer’s
(Retailer 1) fill rate. Intuitively, if demand variance is increased, then additional negative
outcomes such as decreased order fill rates would also result. These results show an
opposite effect on the manufacturer and the focal retailer that can be explained by the
nature of the retail promotions demand itself. Within the simulation, the focal retailer is
designated as the customer who demands and receives a large, unexpected order for their
promotional efforts. Thus, their order fill rate reflects the successful order and fill of the
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retail promotions demand. The manufacturer’s fill rate also reflects this action. Overall,
these results suggest that a retail promotions demand shock primarily impact the demand
variance experienced by the manufacturer. Its impact on the manufacturer’s order fill rate
and the focal retailer’s order fill rate may reflect the simulation’s parameters regarding
how retail promotions demand shocks are addressed.
Among relationships with less than a small effect (partial η2 < 0.2), the impact of a
retail promotions demand shock results in an increase in order fill rates for C Retailers
(Figure 4-87) and a decrease in opportunity loss for the manufacturer (Figure 4-88).
While these relationships are statistically significant, their practical significance is small.
The long-term impact of retail promotions demand shock results in an increase of 0.001
(0.001 = 0.526-0.525) in C Retailers’ order fill rates and a decrease of 842 units in
opportunity loss (842 = 44,093-43,251) over the five-year period assessed.
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4.3.4.3 Main Effect of R1.GAME
The third main effect, R1.GAME, show a significant effect at p<0.001 on eight
dependent variables: CV, M.OFR, R1.OFR, RA.OFR, RB.OFR, RC.OFR, OPP.LOSS
and C.COST. Partial η2 values indicate large effects on the manufacturer’s order
fulfillment rate (partial η2 = 0.993), Retailer 1’s order fill rate (partial η2 = 0.996), A
Retailers’ order fill rates (partial η2 = 0.985), B Retailers’ order fill rates (partial η2 =
0.985), and C Retailers’ order fill rates (partial η2 = 0.969). There was also a medium
effect on the manufacturer’s opportunity loss (partial η2 = 0.581). Finally, partial η2 values
indicate a very small effect on the manufacturer’s cost of carrying inventory (partial η2 =
0.111). See Table 4-15.
Figure 4-89 shows the profile plot of R1.GAME’s effect on CV. Figure 4-90 shows
the profile plot of R1.GAME’s effect on M.OFR. Figure 4-91 shows the profile plot of
R1.GAME’s effect on R1.OFR, RA.OFR, RB.OFR, and RC.OFR. Figure 4-92 shows the
profile plot of R1.GAME’s effect on OPP.LOSS. Finally, Figure 4-93 shows the profile
plot of R1.GAME’s effect on C.COST. Scheffe post hoc tests for each dependent variable
show significant differences (p<0.001) between estimated marginal means of each level
of R1.GAME with the exception of C.COST. For this outcome, there was no difference
between Correction and Overreaction Gaming (p=1.000).
The profile plots show that in general, there is a negative impact on long-term
system performance when the focal retailer engages in shortage gaming. When compared
to No gaming, the manufacturer’s order fulfillment rates decreases by approximately 11.8
to 14.6 percent (Figure 4-90) and all retailers’ order fill rates decreases, including its own
order fill rate (Figure 4-91). In comparison to No gaming, Retailer 1’s order fill rate
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decreases by approximately 16.7 to 23.0 percent, A Retailers’ order fill rates decreases by
approximately 8.3 to 9.8 percent, B Retailers’ order fill rates decreases by approximately
7.5 to 12.2 percent, and C Retailers’ order fill rates decreases by approximately 5.6 to 6.9
percent (Figure 4-91). However, shortage gaming also results in zero inventory that is
carried over from quarter to quarter for the manufacturer, and they therefore do not incur
additional inventory carrying costs in this situation (Figure 4-93).
The profile plots show differences in impact when the focal retailer engages in
Correction versus Overreaction shortage gaming. Correction gaming increases demand
variance as predicted but Overreaction gaming decreases demand variance, when both are
compared to No gaming (Figure 4-89). These results reflect differences in consistency of
orders. Order inflation based on the Overreaction shortage gaming response, where actual
demand is consistently doubled, compared to the Correction shortage gaming response,
where actual demand is adjusted dynamically each quarter, results in different outcomes
over the five year period assessed.
Similarly, Correction gaming by the focal retailer results in less opportunity loss for
the manufacturer compared to No gaming while Overreaction gaming results in more
opportunity loss, when both are compared to No gaming (Figure 4-92). When the focal
retailer corrects and adjusts their orders based on last quarter’s unfilled orders (Correction
gaming), over time, the compounded effect of the order inflation results in excessive
levels of order inflation, which pushes the manufacturer past its capacity consistently. In
contrast, when the focal retailer consistently orders double their actual need
(Overreaction gaming) over time, this action may cause enough stress on the system to
cause difficulties in order fulfillment but may not be large enough to take up all of the
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manufacturer’s additional inventory, and therefore results in a higher amount of true
demand that is unmet by the manufacturer. Note that these results also mask interactions.
The same pattern is evident in the three-way interaction of R1.GAME * RA.GAME *
RB.GAME (see section 4.3.2.8 and Figure 4-31) and in the two-way interaction of
R1.GAME * RA.GAME (see section 4.3.3.7 and Figure 4-65).
Overall, when the focal retailer engages in shortage gaming, the manufacturer
suffers in the form of a significant decrease in order fill rates (Figure 4-90) and variable
changes in demand variance (Figure 4-89) as well as opportunity loss (Figure 4-92).
However, the manufacturer also benefits by having their inventory carrying costs
decreased (Figure 4-93). All retailers suffer significant decreases in order fill rates when
Retailer 1 engages in shortage gaming (Figure 4-91). For Retailer 1, they do not benefit
by engaging in shortage gaming as its mean order fill rates are significantly lower
compared to when it does not shortage game, however consistently Overreaction gaming
yields higher order fill rates than dynamically Correction gaming (Figure 4-91).
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Figure 4-90 R1.GAME'S effect on M.OFR
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Figure 4-92 R1.GAME'S effect on OPP.LOSS
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245

$0
Overreaction Gaming

4.3.4.4 Main Effect of RA.GAME
The fourth main effect, RA.GAME, show a significant effect at p<0.001 on eight
dependent variables: CV, M.OFR, R1.OFR, RA.OFR, RB.OFR, RC.OFR, OPP.LOSS
and C.COST. Partial η2 values indicate large effects on the manufacturer’s order
fulfillment rate (partial η2 = 0.998), Retailer 1’s order fill rate (partial η2 = 0.995), A
Retailers’ order fill rates (partial η2 = 0.999), B Retailers’ order fill rates (partial η2 =
0.995), C Retailers’ order fill rates (partial η2 = 0.991), and on the manufacturer’s
opportunity loss (partial η2 = 0.961). There was also a medium effect on the
manufacturer’s demand variance (partial η2 = 0.720) and a very small effect on the
manufacturer’s inventory carrying cost (partial η2 = 0.111). See Table 4-15.
Figure 4-94 shows the profile plot of RA.GAME’s effect on CV. Figure 4-95 shows
the profile plot of RA.GAME’s effect on M.OFR. Figure 4-96 shows the profile plot of
RA.GAME’s effect on R1.OFR, RA.OFR, RB.OFR, and RC.OFR. Figure 4-97 shows the
profile plot of RA.GAME’s effect on OPP.LOSS. Finally, Figure 4-98 shows the profile
plot of RA.GAME’S effect on C.COST. Scheffe post hoc tests for each dependent
variable show significant differences (p<0.001) between estimated marginal means of
each level of RA.GAME with the exception of C.COST. For this outcome, there was no
difference between Correction and Overreaction Gaming (p=1.000).
Shortage gaming by A Retailers, representing Retailers 2 and 3 in supply inventory
competition, has a strong impact on long-term system performance. Shortage gaming,
whether in Correction or Overreaction form, results in lower order fill rates for the
manufacturer (Figure 4-95) and for all retailers (Figure 4-96). Both forms of shortage
gaming also result in higher loss of opportunity for the manufacturer compared to No
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shortage gaming (Figure 4-97). Shortage gaming by A Retailers also limits the
manufacturer’s inventory carrying costs, because the additional demand results in zero
excess inventory from quarter to quarter (Figure 4-98).
Differences between specific forms of shortage gaming can be seen in the impact on
demand variance (Figure 4-94). Correction gaming results in higher demand variance
compared to No gaming whereas Overreaction gaming results in lower demand variance
compared to No gaming. These results suggest that when large A Retailers consistently
order double their actual demand from the manufacturer, collectively these retailers who
command approximately 48 percent of the manufacturer’s order volume can suppress the
manufacturer’s observed demand variance by dampening total demand with their large
order relative to other retailers. This outcome is similar to the impact of Overreaction
shortage gaming by Retailer 1 (see section 4.3.4.3 and Figure 4-89).
Overall, Correction gaming by A Retailers appears to be more detrimental than
Overreaction gaming for the manufacturer, resulting in the highest levels of demand
variance (Figure 4-94) as well as the lowest levels of manufacturer order fill rate (Figure
4-95). In addition, shortage gaming in general by A Retailers appears to be detrimental to
all retailers involved the inventory ordering and fulfillment feedback loop, including
themselves. This is due to the negative impact of shortage gaming on retailer order fill
rates (Figure 4-96). Correction gaming by A Retailers results in lower order fill rates for
themselves compared to Overreaction gaming (Figure 4-96). In a similar fashion to
Retailer 1 shortage gaming (see section 4.3.4.3 and Figure 4-91), A Retailers do not
benefit by engaging in shortage gaming as their mean order fill rates are significantly
lower compared to No shortage gaming, however Overreaction gaming yields higher
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order fill rates than Correction gaming (Figures 4-96 and 4-91).
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4.3.4.5 Main Effect of RB.GAME
The fifth main effect, RB.GAME, show a significant effect at p<0.001 on eight
dependent variables: CV, M.OFR, R1.OFR, RA.OFR, RB.OFR, RC.OFR, OPP.LOSS
and C.COST. Partial η2 values indicate large effects on the manufacturer’s order
fulfillment rate (partial η2 = 0.990), Retailer 1’s order fill rate (partial η2 = 0.989), A
Retailers’ order fill rates (partial η2 = 0.989), B Retailers’ order fill rates (partial η2 =
0.940), C Retailers’ order fill rates (partial η2 = 0.981), and on the manufacturer’s
opportunity loss (partial η2 = 0.806). There was also a small effect on the manufacturer’s
demand variance (partial η2 = 0.207) and a very small effect on the manufacturer’s
inventory carrying cost (partial η2 = 0.005). See Table 4-15.
Figure 4-99 shows the profile plot of RB.GAME’s effect on CV. Figure 4-100
shows the profile plot of RB.GAME’s effect on M.OFR. Figure 4-101 shows the profile
plot of RB.GAME’s effect on R1.OFR, RA.OFR, RB.OFR, and RC.OFR. Figure 4-102
shows the profile plot of RB.GAME’s effect on OPP.LOSS. Lastly, Figure 4-103 shows
the profile plot of RB.GAME’s effect on C.COST. Scheffe post hoc tests for each
dependent variable show significant differences (p<0.001) between estimated marginal
means of each level of RB.GAME with the exception of C.COST. For this outcome, there
was no difference between a Correction and Overreaction Gaming (p=1.00).
Shortage gaming by B Retailers, representing Retailers 4 through 7, has a strong
impact on order fill rates. Both forms of shortage gaming by B Retailers negatively
impacts order fill rates for all entities involved (Figures 4-100 and 4-101). In addition, the
manufacturer’s opportunity loss for not filling true demand is increased with both forms
of shortage gaming (Figure 4-102) while the manufacturer’s inventory carrying costs are
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decreased (Figure 4-103).
Statistical differences between Correction and Overreaction shortage gaming also
exist. Correction gaming by B Retailers decreases the manufacturer’s long-term demand
variance by 0.003 (0.003 = 0.123 – 0.117) whereas Overreaction gaming decreases
demand variance by 0.001 (0.001 = 0.123-0.122). See Figure 4-99. While these results
are statistically significant, they may be limited in practical significance due to the small
change between different levels of RB.GAME. In addition, the effect size of
RB.GAME’s impact on CV is small (partial η2 = 0.207) compared to partial η2 values of
0.806 to 0.990 for other dependent variables, indicating the limited relative importance of
this relationship.
Among relationships with large effect sizes, Correction gaming by B Retailers
appears to be more detrimental than Overreaction gaming to the manufacturer, resulting
lower order fill rates (Figure 4-100). For large retailers such as Retailer 1 and A retailers,
Correction gaming by B Retailers also appears to be more detrimental than Overreaction
gaming, resulting in lower order fill rates compared to Overreaction gaming (Figure 4101).
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4.3.4.6 Main Effect of RC.GAME
The final main effect, RC.GAME, show a significant effect at p<0.001 on eight
dependent variables: CV, M.OFR, R1.OFR, RA.OFR, RB.OFR, RC.OFR, OPP.LOSS
and C.COST. Partial η2 values indicate large effects on the manufacturer’s order
fulfillment rate (partial η2 = 0.849) and C retailers’ order fill rates (partial η2 = 0.906).
There were also medium effects on Retailer 1’s order fill rate (partial η2 = 0.677), A
Retailers’ order fill rates (partial η2 = 0.684), and B Retailers’ order fill rate (partial η2 =
0.587). Small effects exist for the manufacturer’s opportunity loss (partial η2 = 0.245)
while very small effects were observed for the manufacturer’s demand variance (partial
η2 = 0.139) and inventory carrying cost (partial η2 = 0.004). See Table 4-15.
Figure 4-104 shows the profile plot of RC.GAME’s effect on CV. Figure 4-105
shows the profile plot of RC.GAME’s effect on M.OFR and Figure 4-106 shows the
profile plot of RC.GAME’s effect on R1.OFR, RA.OFR, RB.OFR, and RC.OFR. Figure
4-107 shows the profile plot of RC.GAME’s effect on OPP.LOSS. Lastly, Figure 4-108
shows the profile plot of RC.GAME’s effect on C.COST. Scheffe post hoc tests for each
dependent variable show significant differences (p<0.001) between estimated marginal
means of each level of RC.GAME with the exception of CV and C.COST. For CV, there
was no difference between No Gaming and Overreaction gaming (p=1.000). For
C.COST, there was no difference between Correction and Overreaction gaming
(p=0.763).
Shortage gaming by C Retailers, representing Retailers 8 and 9, yields similar
outcomes as shortage gaming by B Retailers (see section 4.3.4.5). Shortage gaming
decreases order fill rates for the manufacturer (Figure 4-105) and for other retailers
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(Figure 4-106) in comparison to No gaming by C Retailers. Shortage gaming also
increases the manufacturer’s opportunity loss (Figure 4-107) and decreases inventory
carrying costs (Figure 4-108).
Similar to B Retailers, Correction shortage gaming by C Retailers decreases
demand variance for the manufacturer (Figure 4-104). While these results are statistically
significant, they may be limited in practical significance. The absolute change in demand
variance (Figure 4-104), from No gaming (CV = 0.122) to Correction gaming (CV =
0.118) is minimal and the overall effect size of this test is very small (partial η2 = 0.139).
Overall, C Retailers benefit from their own Correction gaming which yields the
highest relative order fill rates for themselves, whereas Overreaction gaming does not
yield a practically different order fill rate compared to No gaming (Figure 4-106).
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4.3.4.7 Comparison of Supply Inventory Competition Main Effects
In this simulation, supply inventory competition consists of shortage gaming by
retailers other than the focal retailer (Retailer 1). Although main effects of shortage
gaming by A Retailers, B Retailers, and C Retailers are shown in sections 4.3.4.4, 4.3.4.5,
and 4.3.4.6, the results were not presented in relation to each other. This section provides
a comparison of the main effects of shortage gaming by A Retailers, B Retailers, and C
Retailers for each dependent variable.
Figure 4-109 shows a comparison of the profile plots for RA.GAME, RB.GAME,
and RC.GAME’s effect on CV. Figure 4-110 shows a comparison of the profile plots for
RA.GAME, RB.GAME, and RC.GAME’s effect on M.OFR. Figure 4-111 shows a
comparison of the profile plots for RA.GAME, RB.GAME, and RC.GAME’s effect on
R1.OFR. Figure 4-112 shows a comparison of the profile plots for RA.GAME,
RB.GAME, and RC.GAME’s effect on RA.OFR. Figure 4-113 shows a comparison of
the profile plots for RA.GAME, RB.GAME, and RC.GAME’s effect on RB.OFR. Figure
4-114 shows a comparison of the profile plots for RA.GAME, RB.GAME, and
RC.GAME’s effect on RC.OFR. Figure 4-115 shows a comparison of the profile plots for
RA.GAME, RB.GAME, and RC.GAME’s effect on OPP.LOSS. Finally, Figure 4-116
shows a comparison of the profile plots for RA.GAME, RB.GAME, and RC.GAME’s
effect on C.COST.
Shortage gaming by A Retailers differs from shortage gaming by B or C Retailers
in their effects on the manufacturer’s demand variance. Figure 4-109 shows that
Correction gaming by A Retailers increases demand variance while Overreaction gaming
by A Retailers decreases demand variance relative to No gaming. In comparison,
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Correction gaming by B or C Retailers appears to decrease demand variance while
Overreaction gaming results in little change from No gaming. Partial η2 values indicate
differences in effect sizes between the three types of retailers (Table 4-15). There were
large effects from RA.GAME (partial η2 = 0.720) whereas RB.GAME and RC.GAME
demonstrated small or very small effects (partial η2 = 0.207 and partial η2 = 0.139
respectively). These results suggest that the impact of B and C Retailers is smaller than
the impact of A Retailers. Furthermore, as discussed in sections 4.3.4.5 Main Effect of
RB.GAME and 4.3.4.6 Main Effect of RC.GAME, while there is statistical significance in
the results for RB.GAME and RC.GAME, there may be limited practical significance
regarding long-term demand variance. The main result of supply inventory competition
on CV involves shortage gaming from A Retailers. When A Retailers dynamically adjust
and over-order based on their previous quarter’s unmet demand, long-term demand
variance is increased. When A Retailers consistently over-order with double their actual
demand, this action appears to suppress the manufacturer’s observed demand variance.
The impact of various retailer types in supply inventory competition is seen in
effects on order fulfillment rates for the manufacturer as well as in order fill rates for each
retailer type. Shortage gaming by A, B, and C Retailers significantly decrease the
manufacturer’s order fulfillment rates when compared to No gaming (Table 4-15). Profile
plots indicate that shortage gaming by A Retailers produce the greatest detrimental
impact, indicated by the lowest absolute order fulfillment rates whereas shortage gaming
by C Retailers produce the least detrimental impact, indicated by the highest absolute
order fill rates under both forms of shortage gaming (Figure 4-110). This pattern is also
generally seen in the impact of shortage gaming by A, B, and C Retailers on order fill
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rates for all retailers (Figures 4-111 through 4-114). Of note would be the detrimental
effect of RA.GAME on its own order fill rates, more so than shortage gaming by other
retailers (Figure 4-112). Also, while shortage gaming by both A and B Retailers
decreases order fill rates for C Retailers, these small retailers benefit from Correction
shortage gaming compared to No gaming (Figure 4-114). This result is in contrast to the
impact of shortage gaming by A and B Retailers on their own order fill rates. In those
instances, the highest order fill rates result from No shortage gaming (Figures 4-112 and
4-113).
Shortage gaming by A, B, and C Retailers also impact the manufacturer in the form
of increased opportunity loss (Figure 4-115) and decreased inventory carrying costs
(Figure 4-116). Specifically, Correction shortage gaming by A Retailers results in the
highest absolute opportunity loss (Figure 4-115) while any shortage gaming by A
Retailers result in zero excess inventory and zero inventory carrying costs (Figure 4-115).

264

RA

RB

RC

0.14

Estimated Marginal Means

0.132
0.13

0.13

0.123
0.122

0.122
0.118

0.12
0.119

0.117

0.12

0.111

0.11
No Gaming

Correction Gaming

Overreaction Gaming

Supply Inventory Competition

Figure 4-109 Comparison of RA.GAME, RB.GAME, and RC.GAME'S effect on CV

RA

RB

RC

0.70

Esstimated Marginal Means

0.65

0.655

0.60
0.55
0.50

0.552
0.464

0.496

0.483
0.470

0.45

0.437

0.40

0.421

0.35
0.351
0.30
No Gaming

Correction Gaming

Overreaction Gaming

Supply Inventory Competition

Figure 4-110 Comparison of RA.GAME, RB.GAME, and RC.GAME'S effect on
M.OFR
265

RA

RB

RC

Estimated Marginal Means

0.70
0.65
0.60
0.55

0.648
0.594

0.536

0.530
0.527

0.515

0.50

0.477
0.453

0.45

0.454

0.40
No Gaming

Correction Gaming
Overreaction Gaming
Supply Inventory Competition

Figure 4-111 Comparison of RA.GAME, RB.GAME, and RC.GAME'S effect on
R1.OFR

RA

RB

RC

0.80

Estimated Marginal Means

0.75

0.731

0.70
0.65
0.60
0.55

0.591
0.515

0.536

0.50
0.45

0.462

0.527
0.525
0.470

0.40
0.377

0.35
0.30
No Gaming

Correction Gaming
Overreaction Gaming
Supply Inventory Competition

Figure 4-112 Comparison of RA.GAME, RB.GAME, and RC.GAME'S effect on
RA.OFR
266

RA

RB

RC

Estimated Marginal Means

0.75
0.70

0.705

0.65
0.60

0.611

0.570

0.587

0.578

0.569

0.55

0.553

0.530

0.50

0.499

0.45
No Gaming

Correction Gaming

Overreaction Gaming

Supply Inventory Competition

Figure 4-113 Comparison of RA.GAME, RB.GAME, and RC.GAME'S effect on
RB.OFR

RA

RB

RC

0.63

Estimated Marginal Means

0.61
0.59
0.57

0.604
0.578
0.549

0.55
0.53
0.51

0.513

0.514
0.504
0.491

0.494

0.49
0.482

0.47
0.45
No Gaming

Correction Gaming

Overreaction Gaming

Supply Inventory Competition

Figure 4-114 Comparison of RA.GAME, RB.GAME, and RC.GAME'S effect on
RC.OFR
267

RA

RB

Estimated Marginal Means

55,000

RC

51,241

50,000
46,790
45,000

40,000

43,434

42,992

44,590

40,919

43,308
42,869

35,000

36,906

30,000
No Gaming

Correction Gaming

Overreaction Gaming

Supply Inventory Competition

Figure 4-115 Comparison of RA.GAME, RB.GAME, and RC.GAME'S effect on
OPP.LOSS

RA

RB

RC

$1,400
Estimated Marginal Means

$1,281
$1,200
$1,000
$800
$600
$400

$596
$368

$570

$342

$342

$200

$0

$0
No Gaming

Correction Gaming

$0
Overreaction Gaming

Supply Inventory Competition

Figure 4-116 Comparison of RA.GAME, RB.GAME, and RC.GAME'S effect on
C.COST
268

4.4 HYPOTHESES TESTING
This section discusses support for the hypotheses based on the preceding results
analysis. A summary of hypotheses tests is provided in Table 4-16.
Table 4-16 Summary of Hypotheses Tests
H1

H2

H3

Hypotheses
Manufacturer order rationing strategies significantly
impact long-term system performance in the form of:

Results

a. the manufacturer’s demand variance,
b. the manufacturer’s order fill rates,
c. the focal retailer’s order fill rate,
d. other retailers’ order fill rates,
e. the manufacturer’s cost of lost opportunity, and
f. the manufacturer’s inventory carrying cost
Uniform order rationing strategy, compared to either
Proportional or Linear order rationing strategies, has a
greater positive impact on:

a. SUPPORTED
b. SUPPORTED
c. SUPPORTED
d. SUPPORTED
e. SUPPORTED
f. SUPPORTED

a. increasing the manufacturer’s demand variance,
b. decreasing the manufacturer’s order fill rates,
c. decreasing focal retailer order fill rate,
d. decreasing other retailers’ order fill rates,
e. increasing the manufacturer’s cost of lost
opportunity, and
f. increasing the manufacturer’s inventory carrying cost
Focal retailer (Retailer 1) shortage gaming directly
impacts long-term system performance by:

a. SUPPORTED
b. SUPPORTED
c. SUPPORTED
d. Partially Supported
e. SUPPORTED
f. SUPPORTED

a. increasing the manufacturer’s demand variance,
b. decreasing the manufacturer’s order fill rates,
c. decreasing focal retailer order fill rate,
d. decreasing other retailers’ order fill rates,
e. increasing the manufacturer’s cost of lost
opportunity, and
f. increasing the manufacturer’s inventory carrying cost

a. Partially Supported
b. SUPPORTED
c. SUPPORTED
d. SUPPORTED
e. Partially Supported
f. Not Supported
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Table 4-16 Summary of Hypotheses Tests (continued)
Hypotheses
H4
For the focal retailer (Retailer 1), Correction shortage
gaming when compared to Overreaction shortage
gaming, has a greater positive impact on:

H5

H6

H7

Results

a. increasing the manufacturer’s demand variance,
b. decreasing the manufacturer’s order fill rates,
c. decreasing focal retailer order fill rate,
d. decreasing other retailers’ order fill rates,
e. increasing the manufacturer’s cost of lost
opportunity, and
f. increasing the manufacturer’s inventory carrying cost
Supply inventory competition, in the form of either
Correction or Overreaction gaming by retailers other
than the focal retailer directly impacts long-term
system performance by:

a. Not Supported
b. SUPPORTED
c. SUPPORTED
d. Not Supported
e. Not Supported
f. Partially Supported

a. increasing the manufacturer’s demand variance,
b. decreasing the manufacturer’s order fill rates,
c. decreasing focal retailer order fill rate,
d. decreasing other retailers’ order fill rates,
e. increasing the manufacturer’s cost of lost
opportunity, and
f. increasing the manufacturer’s inventory carrying cost
Supply inventory competition from retailers ordering a
larger volume compared to other retailers will exhibit a
greater positive impact on:

a. Partially Supported
b. SUPPORTED
c. SUPPORTED
d. SUPPORTED
e. SUPPORTED
f. Not Supported

a. increasing the manufacturer’s demand variance,
b. decreasing the manufacturer’s order fill rates,
c. decreasing focal retailer order fill rate,
d. decreasing other retailers’ order fill rates,
e. increasing the manufacturer’s cost of lost
opportunity, and
f. increasing the manufacturer’s inventory carrying cost
Retail promotions demand shock directly impacts longterm system performance by:

a. Partially Supported
b. SUPPORTED
c. Partially Supported
d. SUPPORTED
e. SUPPORTED
f. SUPPORTED

a. increasing the manufacturer’s demand variance,
b. decreasing the manufacturer’s order fill rates,
c. decreasing the focal retailer’s order fill rate,
d. decreasing other retailers’ order fill rates,
e. increasing the manufacturer’s cost of lost
opportunity, and
f. increasing the manufacturer’s inventory carrying cost

a. SUPPORTED
b. Not Supported
c. Not Supported
d. Not Supported
e. Not Supported
f. Not Supported
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Table 4-16 Summary of Hypotheses Tests (continued)
Hypotheses
H8
The two-way interaction of manufacturer order
rationing and focal retailer shortage gaming
significantly impact long-term system performance in
the form of:

H9

H10

H11

Results

a. the manufacturer’s demand variance,
b. the manufacturer’s order fill rates,
c. the focal retailer’s order fill rate,
d. other retailers’ order fill rates,
e. the manufacturer’s cost of lost opportunity, and
f. the manufacturer’s inventory carrying cost
The two-way interaction of manufacturer order
rationing and supply inventory competition
significantly impact long-term system performance in
the form of:

a. SUPPORTED
b. SUPPORTED
c. SUPPORTED
d. SUPPORTED
e. SUPPORTED
f. SUPPORTED

a. the manufacturer’s demand variance,
b. the manufacturer’s order fill rates,
c. the focal retailer’s order fill rate,
d. other retailers’ order fill rates,
e. the manufacturer’s cost of lost opportunity, and
f. the manufacturer’s inventory carrying cost
The two-way interaction of manufacturer order
rationing and retail promotions demand shock
significantly impact long-term system performance in
the form of:

a. SUPPORTED
b. SUPPORTED
c. SUPPORTED
d. SUPPORTED
e. SUPPORTED
f. SUPPORTED

a. the manufacturer’s demand variance,
b. the manufacturer’s order fill rates,
c. the focal retailer’s order fill rate,
d. other retailers’ order fill rates,
e. the manufacturer’s cost of lost opportunity, and
f. the manufacturer’s inventory carrying cost
The two-way interaction of focal retailer shortage
gaming and supply inventory competition significantly
impact long-term system performance in the form of:

a. SUPPORTED
b. SUPPORTED
c. SUPPORTED
d. SUPPORTED
e. SUPPORTED
f. Not Supported

a. the manufacturer’s demand variance,
b. the manufacturer’s order fill rates,
c. the focal retailer’s order fill rate,
d. other retailers’ order fill rates,
e. the manufacturer’s cost of lost opportunity, and
f. the manufacturer’s inventory carrying cost

a. SUPPORTED
b. SUPPORTED
c. SUPPORTED
d. SUPPORTED
e. SUPPORTED
f. SUPPORTED
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Table 4-16 Summary of Hypotheses Tests (continued)
Hypotheses
H12 The two-way interaction of focal retailer shortage
gaming and retail promotions demand shock
significantly impact long-term system performance in
the form of:

H13

H14

H15

Results

a. the manufacturer’s demand variance,
b. the manufacturer’s order fill rates,
c. the focal retailer’s order fill rate,
d. other retailers’ order fill rates,
e. the manufacturer’s cost of lost opportunity, and
f. the manufacturer’s inventory carrying cost
The two-way interaction of supply inventory
competition and retail promotions demand shock
significantly impact long-term system performance in
the form of:

a. SUPPORTED
b. SUPPORTED
c. SUPPORTED
d. SUPPORTED
e. SUPPORTED
f. Not Supported

a. the manufacturer’s demand variance,
b. the manufacturer’s order fill rates,
c. the focal retailer’s order fill rate,
d. other retailers’ order fill rates,
e. the manufacturer’s cost of lost opportunity, and
f. the manufacturer’s inventory carrying cost
The three-way interaction of manufacturer order
rationing, focal retailer shortage gaming, and supply
inventory competition significantly impact long-term
system performance in the form of:

a. Partially Supported
b. Partially Supported
c. Partially Supported
d. Partially Supported
e. Partially Supported
f. Not Supported

a. the manufacturer’s demand variance,
b. the manufacturer’s order fill rates,
c. the focal retailer’s order fill rate,
d. other retailers’ order fill rates,
e. the manufacturer’s cost of lost opportunity, and
f. the manufacturer’s inventory carrying cost
The three-way interaction of manufacturer order
rationing, focal retailer shortage gaming, and retail
promotions demand shock significantly impact longterm system performance in the form of:

a. SUPPORTED
b. SUPPORTED
c. SUPPORTED
d. SUPPORTED
e. SUPPORTED
f. SUPPORTED

a. the manufacturer’s demand variance,
b. the manufacturer’s order fill rates,
c. the focal retailer’s order fill rate,
d. other retailers’ order fill rates,
e. the manufacturer’s cost of lost opportunity, and
f. the manufacturer’s inventory carrying cost

a. SUPPORTED
b. SUPPORTED
c. SUPPORTED
d. SUPPORTED
e. SUPPORTED
f. Not Supported
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Table 4-16 Summary of Hypotheses Tests (continued)
Hypotheses
H16 The three-way interaction of manufacturer order
rationing, supply inventory competition, and retail
promotions demand shock significantly impact longterm system performance in the form of:

H17

H18

Results

a. the manufacturer’s demand variance,
b. the manufacturer’s order fill rates,
c. the focal retailer’s order fill rate,
d. other retailers’ order fill rates,
e. the manufacturer’s cost of lost opportunity, and
f. the manufacturer’s inventory carrying cost
The three-way interaction of focal retailer shortage
gaming, supply inventory competition, and retail
promotions demand shock significantly impact longterm system performance in the form of:

a. Partially Supported
b. Partially Supported
c. Partially Supported
d. Partially Supported
e. Partially Supported
f. Not Supported

a. the manufacturer’s demand variance,
b. the manufacturer’s order fill rates,
c. the focal retailer’s order fill rate,
d. other retailers’ order fill rates,
e. the manufacturer’s cost of lost opportunity, and
f. the manufacturer’s inventory carrying cost
The four-way interaction of manufacturer order
rationing, focal retailer shortage gaming, supply
inventory competition, and retail promotions demand
shock significantly impact long-term system
performance in the form of:

a. Partially Supported
b. Partially Supported
c. Partially Supported
d. Partially Supported
e. Partially Supported
f. Not Supported

a. the manufacturer’s demand variance,
b. the manufacturer’s order fill rates,
c. the focal retailer’s order fill rate,
d. other retailers’ order fill rates,
e. the manufacturer’s cost of lost opportunity, and
f. the manufacturer’s inventory carrying cost

a. Partially Supported
b. Partially Supported
c. Partially Supported
d. Partially Supported
e. Partially Supported
f. Not Supported
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4.4.1 Hypothesis H1
This hypothesis states that, “Manufacturer order rationing strategies significantly
impact long-term system performance in the form of: a. the manufacturer’s demand
variance, b. the manufacturer’s order fill rates, c. focal retailer order fill rate, d. other
retailers’ order fill rates, e. the manufacturer’s cost of lost opportunity, and f. the
manufacturer’s inventory carrying cost.” All tests indicate that manufacturer order
rationing strategy significantly and strongly impacts performance. Multivariate and
univariate test results (Tables 4-10 and 4-15) indicate that effects of order rationing
strategies on all dependent variables are statistically significant at p<0.001. In addition,
evaluation of partial η2 values and marginal means plots indicate a strong effect on all
outcome variables with the exception of the impact on C.COST, which is statistically
significant with a very small effect (Table 4-15 and Figures 4-79 through 4-83).
Therefore, Hypotheses H1a through H1f are supported.
4.4.2 Hypothesis H2
This hypothesis states that, “Uniform order rationing strategy, compared to either
Proportional or Linear order rationing strategies, has a greater positive impact on: a.
increasing the manufacturer’s demand variance, b. decreasing the manufacturer’s order
fill rates, c. decreasing focal retailer order fill rate, d. decreasing other retailers’ order
fill rates, e. increasing the manufacturer’s cost of lost opportunity, and f. increasing the
manufacturer’s inventory carrying cost.” Main effect plots indicate that Uniform order
rationing strategy has a greater positive impact than Proportional or Linear order
rationing strategies on increasing the manufacturer’s demand variance (Figure 4-79),
decreasing the manufacturer’s order fill rates (Figure 4-80), decreasing the focal retailer’s
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order fill rate (Figure 4-81), increasing the manufacturer’s cost of lost opportunity
(Figure 4-82), and increasing the manufacturer’s inventory carrying cost (Figure 4-83).
Therefore Hypotheses H2a, H2b, H2c, H2e, and H2f are supported. However, there is
only partial support for Hypothesis H2d. Figure 4-81 shows that while a Uniform order
rationing strategy decreases large retailers’ (A Retailers) order fill rates compared to
other order rationing strategies, for medium and small retailers (B and C Retailers), a
Uniform order rationing strategy provides 100 percent order fill rates, a higher order fill
rate than the retailers would receive under a Proportional or Linear order rationing
strategy.
4.4.3 Hypothesis H3
This hypothesis states that, “Focal retailer (Retailer 1) shortage gaming directly
impacts long-term system performance by: a. increasing the manufacturer’s demand
variance, b. decreasing the manufacturer’s order fill rates, c. decreasing focal retailer
order fill rate, d. decreasing other retailers’ order fill rates, e. increasing the
manufacturer’s cost of lost opportunity, and f. increasing the manufacturer’s inventory
carrying cost.” Both multivariate and univariate test results (Tables 4-10 and 4-15) show
a significant effect at p<0.001 of Retailer 1’s shortage gaming on all outcome variables.
Profile plots show that when compared to No shortage gaming, both Correction and
Overreaction gaming decreases the manufacturer’s order fill rates (Figure 4-90),
decreases the focal retailer’s order fill rate (Figure 4-91), and decreases other retailers’
order fill rates (Figure 4-91). Therefore, Hypotheses H3b, H3c, and H3d are supported.
There is also partial support for Hypotheses H3a and H3e. Figure 4-89 shows that
while Correction gaming increases the manufacturer’s demand variance, Overreaction
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gaming results in lower demand variance compared to No gaming. Additionally, Figure
4-92 shows that in comparison with No gaming, the manufacturer’s cost of lost
opportunity increases with Overreaction gaming but decreases with Correction gaming.
Finally, there is no support for Hypothesis H3f. Figure 4-93 shows that when the
focal retailer shortage games, the manufacturer does not incur inventory carrying costs as
there is no inventory carried over from the previous quarter.
4.4.4 Hypothesis H4
This hypothesis states that, “For the focal retailer (Retailer 1), Correction
shortage gaming when compared to Overreaction shortage gaming, has a greater
positive impact on: a. increasing the manufacturer’s demand variance, b. decreasing the
manufacturer’s order fill rates, c. decreasing focal retailer order fill rate, d. decreasing
other retailers’ order fill rates, e. increasing the manufacturer’s cost of lost opportunity,
and f. increasing the manufacturer’s inventory carrying cost.” Main effect plots show
that Correction gaming does not specifically have a greater positive impact on increasing
the manufacturer’s demand variance (Figure 4-89). Instead, Correction gaming results in
an increase in demand variance compared to No gaming, whereas Overreaction gaming
results in a decrease in demand variance compared to No gaming. Therefore Hypothesis
H4a is not supported.
Hypotheses H4b and H4c are supported. Main effect plots show that Overreaction
gaming results in less of a positive impact on the manufacturer’s order fill rates as well as
the focal retailer’s order fill rates when compared to Correction gaming (Figure 4-90 and
4-91 respectively). Overreaction gaming compare to Correction gaming does show a
greater positive impact on order fill rates for all other retailers (Figure 4-91), and
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therefore H4d is not supported.
With regard to Hypothesis H4e, Overreaction versus Correction gaming by the
focal retailer results in variable outcomes with regard to the manufacturer’s opportunity
loss, thus H4e is not supported. Finally, both forms of shortage gaming result in a
decrease of the manufacturer’s inventory carrying costs to zero, reflecting the lack of
excess inventory each quarter (Figure 4-93), indicating partial support for Hypothesis
H4f.
4.4.5 Hypothesis H5
This hypothesis states that, “Supply inventory competition, in the form of either
Correction or Overreaction gaming by retailers other than the focal retailer directly
impacts long-term system performance by: a. increasing the manufacturer’s demand
variance, b. decreasing the manufacturer’s order fill rates, c. decreasing focal retailer
order fill rate, d. decreasing other retailers’ order fill rates, e. increasing the
manufacturer’s cost of lost opportunity, and f. increasing the manufacturer’s inventory
carrying cost.” Both multivariate and univariate test results (Tables 4-10 and 4-15) show
a significant effect at p<0.001 of the impact of RA.GAME, RB.GAME, and RC.GAME
on all outcome variables. Profile plots show that Correction gaming by A Retailers
increases demand variance whereas Overreaction gaming does not. This relationship has
a larger effect on the dependent variable than the effect of shortage gaming by B and C
Retailers’ on demand variance (Table 4-15). For B and C Retailers, both forms of
shortage gaming results in limited impact on demand variance when compared to No
gaming (Figure 4-109). Thus, H5a is partially supported.
Shortage gaming in both forms by the three types of retailers decrease the
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manufacturer’s order fill rates (Figure 4-110), decrease the focal retailer’s order fill rates
(Figure 4-111), decrease other retailers’ order fill rates (Figures 4-112 through 4-114) and
increase the manufacturer’s cost of lost opportunity (Figure 4-115). Therefore, H5b, H5c,
H5d, and H5e are all supported. Lastly, H5f is not supported. Shortage gaming by A, B,
and C Retailers results in lower excess inventory carrying costs for the manufacturer
compared to No gaming (Figure 4-116).
4.4.6 Hypothesis H6
This hypothesis states that, “Supply inventory competition from retailers ordering
a larger volume compared to other retailers will exhibit a greater positive impact on: a.
increasing the manufacturer’s demand variance, b. decreasing the manufacturer’s order
fill rates, c. decreasing focal retailer order fill rate, d. decreasing other retailers’ order
fill rates, e. increasing the manufacturer’s cost of lost opportunity, and f. increasing the
manufacturer’s inventory carrying cost.” A comparison of main effects plots for A, B,
and C Retailer shortage gaming shows that Correction shortage gaming by A Retailers,
who collectively order approximately 46 percent of the manufacturer’s total demand,
does increase the manufacturer’s demand variance (Figure 4-109). However,
Overreaction gaming does not and these results vary from that of B and C retailers. Thus
H6a is partially supported. Supply inventory competition from A Retailers compared to B
and C Retailers does exhibit a greater positive impact on decreasing the manufacturer’s
order fill rates, yielding the lowest absolute order fill rates (Figure 4-110). Therefore H6b
is supported. Hypotheses H6d, H6e, and H6f are also supported. In general, this pattern is
also seen in terms of other retailers order fill rates (Figure 4-112 through 4-114), the
manufacturer’s opportunity costs (Figure 4-115), and the manufacturer’s inventory
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carrying costs (Figure 4-116). Finally, for H6c, the impact of supply inventory
competition from A Retailers on the focal retailer’s order fill rates yields the lowest
absolute order fill rates under Overreaction gaming, but does not for Correction gaming
(Figure 4-111). Instead, Correction gaming by B Retailers results in lower order fill rates
compared to A Retailers. Thus, H6c is partially supported.
4.4.7 Hypothesis H7
This hypothesis states that, “Retail promotions demand shock directly impacts
long-term system performance by: a. increasing the manufacturer’s demand variance, b.
decreasing the manufacturer’s order fill rates, c. decreasing focal retailer order fill rate,
d. decreasing other retailers’ order fill rates, e. increasing the manufacturer’s cost of lost
opportunity, and f. increasing the manufacturer’s inventory carrying cost.” Multivariate
test results (Table 4-10) show a significant effect at p<0.001 of retail promotions demand
shock on the multivariate variable. However, univariate test results (Table 4-15) show
mixed effects on outcome variables. There was a significant effect at p<0.001 on four
dependent variables: demand variance, the manufacturer’s order fill rates, Retailer 1’s
order fill rates, and the manufacturer’s opportunity loss. There was also a significant
effect at p<0.01 on C retailer’s order fill rates. There was no significant effect on A
Retailer order fill rates, B Retailer’s order fill rates, and the manufacturer’s inventory
carrying costs. Profile plots show that when compared to no promotions, a retail
promotions demand shock increases the manufacturer’s demand variance (Figure 4-84),
thus supporting Hypothesis H7a. However, the remaining hypotheses are unsupported. A
retail promotions demand shock increases the manufacturer’s order fill rates (Figure 485), increases the focal retailer’s order fill rates (Figure 4-86), decreases the
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manufacturer’s cost of lost opportunity (Figure 4-88) Therefore, Hypotheses H7b, H7c,
and H3e are not supported. Hypothesis H7d is also not supported as there was no
significant effect of retail promotions demand shock on A and B Retailer’s order fill rates
and the significant effect of retail promotions demand shock increased C Retailer’s order
fill rates (Figure 4-87). Lastly, H7f is also not supported as there was no significant effect
on inventory carrying cost.
4.4.8 Hypothesis H8
This hypothesis states that, “The two-way interaction of manufacturer order
rationing and focal retailer shortage gaming significantly impact long-term system
performance in the form of: a. the manufacturer’s demand variance, b. the
manufacturer’s order fill rates, c. the focal retailer’s order fill rate, d. other retailers’
order fill rates, e. the manufacturer’s cost of lost opportunity, and f. the manufacturer’s
inventory carrying cost.” All tests indicate that the interaction of manufacturer order
rationing and focal retailer shortage gaming significantly and strongly impacts
performance. Multivariate and univariate test results (Tables 4-9 and 4-14) indicate that
effects of this two-way interaction on all dependent variables are statistically significant
at p<0.001. In addition, evaluation of partial η2 values indicates a strong effect (partial η2
> 0.8) on all outcome variables with the exception of the impact on the manufacturer’s
inventory carrying costs, which is statistically significant but with a very small effect
(partial η2 = 0.110). See Table 4-14. Therefore, Hypotheses H8a through H8f are
supported.
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4.4.9 Hypothesis H9
This hypothesis states that, “The two-way interaction of manufacturer order
rationing and supply inventory competition significantly impact long-term system
performance in the form of: a. the manufacturer’s demand variance, b. the
manufacturer’s order fill rates, c. the focal retailer’s order fill rate, d. other retailers’
order fill rates, e. the manufacturer’s cost of lost opportunity, and f. the manufacturer’s
inventory carrying cost.” The interaction of manufacturer order rationing and supply
inventory competition significantly and strongly impacts performance. Supply inventory
competition involves shortage gaming from A, B, or C Retailers. Multivariate and
univariate test results (Tables 4-9 and 4-14) indicate that impacts of this two-way
interaction on all dependent variables are statistically significant at p<0.001.
Specifically for A Retailers in supply inventory competition, evaluation of partial
η2 values indicates a strong effect (partial η2 > 0.8) on all outcome variables with the
exception of the impact on the manufacturer’s inventory carrying costs, which is
statistically significant but with a very small effect (partial η2 = 0.110). See Table 4-14.
For B Retailers, partial η2 values indicate a strong effect (partial η2 > 0.8) on all outcome
variables with the exception of the manufacturer’s opportunity loss (medium effect,
partial η2 = 0.737) and the manufacturer’s demand variance (small effect, partial η2 =
0.428). Lastly, for C Retailers, partial η2 values show at least a small effect (partial η2 >
0.2) on all outcome variables with the exception of inventory carrying costs (partial η2 =
0.002). Overall, these results show support for Hypotheses H9a through H9f.
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4.4.10 Hypothesis H10
This hypothesis states that, “The two-way interaction of manufacturer order
rationing and retail promotions demand shock significantly impact long-term system
performance in the form of: a. the manufacturer’s demand variance, b. the
manufacturer’s order fill rates, c. the focal retailer’s order fill rate, d. other retailers’
order fill rates, e. the manufacturer’s cost of lost opportunity, and f. the manufacturer’s
inventory carrying cost.” The interaction of manufacturer order rationing and retailer
promotions demand shock significantly impacts performance. Multivariate and univariate
test results (Tables 4-9 and 4-14) indicates that impact of this two-way interaction on all
dependent variables are statistically significant at p<0.001 for all dependent variables
with the exception of the manufacturer’s inventory carrying cost.
However, the two-way interaction’s effects are weak. Evaluation of partial η2
values indicates a medium effect (partial η2 > 0.5) on the manufacturer’s order fill rate
and the focal retailer’s order fill rate only. There was a small effect (partial η2 = 0.228) on
the manufacturer’s opportunity loss. Otherwise, partial η2 values were very small, ranging
from 0.004 to 0.145 for significant relationships. See Table 4-14. These results show
support for Hypotheses H10a through H10e, while Hypothesis 10f is not supported.
4.4.11 Hypothesis H11
This hypothesis states that, “The two-way interaction of focal retailer shortage
gaming and supply inventory competition significantly impact long-term system
performance in the form of: a. the manufacturer’s demand variance, b. the
manufacturer’s order fill rates, c. the focal retailer’s order fill rate, d. other retailers’
order fill rates, e. the manufacturer’s cost of lost opportunity, and f. the manufacturer’s
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inventory carrying cost.” The interaction of focal retailer shortage and supply inventory
competition from either A, B, or C Retailers significantly and strongly impacts
performance. Multivariate and univariate test results (Tables 4-9 and 4-14) indicate that
impacts of this two-way interaction on all dependent variables are statistically significant
at p<0.001.
The effects of this interaction is strong when A Retailers shortage game, compare
to when C retailers shortage game. The specific interaction of focal retailer and A
Retailers’ shortage gaming yields significant relationships with primarily high partial η2
values, ranging from 0.893 to 0.996. The effect on two outcomes, demand variance and
inventory carrying costs, were small (partial η2 = 0.261 and 0.201 respectively). The
specific interaction of focal retailer and B retailers’ shortage gaming also yielded four
relationships with large effects, two relationships with medium effects, two relationships
with small effects, and only one relationship with very small effects. In contrast, the
specific interaction of focal retailer and C Retailers’ shortage gaming yielded primarily
very small effects, ranging from partial η2 values of 0.007 to 0.167. Only one
relationship, with C Retailer’s order fill rate, was classified as a small effect (partial η2 =
0.211). Overall, Hypotheses H11a through H11f are supported.
4.4.12 Hypothesis H12
This hypothesis states that, “The two-way interaction of focal retailer shortage
gaming and retail promotions demand shock significantly impact long-term system
performance in the form of: a. the manufacturer’s demand variance, b. the
manufacturer’s order fill rates, c. the focal retailer’s order fill rate, d. other retailers’
order fill rates, e. the manufacturer’s cost of lost opportunity, and f. the manufacturer’s
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inventory carrying cost.” The interaction of focal retailer shortage gaming and retailer
promotions demand shock significantly impacts performance. Multivariate and univariate
test results (Tables 4-9 and 4-14) indicates that impact of this two-way interaction on all
dependent variables are statistically significant at p<0.001 for all dependent variables
with the exception of the manufacturer’s inventory carrying cost.
However, the two-way interaction’s effects are mixed. Evaluation of partial η2
values indicates two medium sized effects (partial η2 > 0.5) on the manufacturer’s order
fill rate and the focal retailer’s order fill rate. There were also two small sized effects
(partial η2 > 0.2) on the manufacturer’s demand variance and opportunity loss. Otherwise,
partial η2 values were very small in size, ranging from 0.029 to 0.060 for significant
relationships. See Table 4-14. These results show support for Hypotheses H12a through
H12e, but Hypothesis 12f is not supported.
4.4.13 Hypothesis H13
This hypothesis states that, “The two-way interaction of supply inventory
competition and retail promotions demand shock significantly impact long-term system
performance in the form of: a. the manufacturer’s demand variance, b. the
manufacturer’s order fill rates, c. the focal retailer’s order fill rate, d. other retailers’
order fill rates, e. the manufacturer’s cost of lost opportunity, and f. the manufacturer’s
inventory carrying cost.” The interaction of supply inventory competition from A, B, or
C Retailers and retail promotions demand shock results in variable impact on long-term
system performance. Multivariate results indicate that the two-way interaction is
significant at p<0.001 for supply inventory competition involving A and B Retailers but
not for C Retailers (Table 4-9). Univariate test results (Table 4-14) indicate that the
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impact of this two-way interaction involving A retailers are significant on all dependent
variables at p<0.001, with the exception of its impact on the focal retailer’s order fill rate
and on the manufacturer’s inventory carrying cost. For the two-way interaction involving
B Retailers, there is a significant effect at p<0.01 on all dependent variables with the
exception of the manufacturer’s inventory carrying costs (Table 4-14).
Evaluation of partial η2 values indicates a weak effect of this interaction. Each
significant relationship yielded very small effect sizes (partial η2 < 0.2) on all outcome
variables with one exception. The specific interaction of A Retailers shortage gaming and
retail promotions demand shock and its impact on the manufacturer’s order fill rate
(partial η2 = 0.347). See Table 4-14. Overall, these results show support for Hypotheses
H13a through H13e. Hypothesis H13f is not supported.
4.4.14 Hypothesis H14
This hypothesis states that, “The three-way interaction of manufacturer order
rationing, focal retailer shortage gaming, and supply inventory competition significantly
impact long-term system performance in the form of: a. the manufacturer’s demand
variance, b. the manufacturer’s order fill rates, c. the focal retailer’s order fill rate, d.
other retailers’ order fill rates, e. the manufacturer’s cost of lost opportunity, and f. the
manufacturer’s inventory carrying cost.” Multivariate and univariate test results indicate
a significant effect at p<0.001of the three-way interaction of manufacturer order
rationing, focal retailer shortage gaming, and supply inventory competition from either A,
B, or C Retailers on all outcomes (Tables 4-8 and 4-13).
Similar to the conclusions for Hypothesis H11, the effects of this interaction is
strong when A Retailers shortage game, compare to when C Retailers shortage game.
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Within the three-way interaction, A Retailers’ shortage gaming primarily yields
significant relationships with high partial η2 values, ranging from 0.876 to 0.980,
although the effect on inventory carrying costs was very small (partial η2 = 0.199). B
Retailers’ shortage gaming within this three-way interaction also yielded three
relationships with large effects, two relationships with medium effects, one relationship
with small effects, and two relationships with very small effects. In contrast, C Retailers’
shortage gaming within this three-way interaction yielded primarily very small effects,
There were five relationships ranging from partial η2 values of 0.008 to 0.142. Three
relationships, with the focal retailer’s order fill rate, B Retailers’ order fill rates, and C
Retailers’ order fill rates, was classified as a small effect (partial η2 =0.215, 0.240, and
0.414 respectively). Overall, Hypotheses H14a through H14f are supported.
4.4.15 Hypothesis H15
This hypothesis states that, “The three-way interaction of manufacturer order
rationing, focal retailer shortage gaming, and retail promotions demand shock
significantly impact long-term system performance in the form of: a. the manufacturer’s
demand variance, b. the manufacturer’s order fill rates, c. the focal retailer’s order fill
rate, d. other retailers’ order fill rates, e. the manufacturer’s cost of lost opportunity, and
f. the manufacturer’s inventory carrying cost.” Multivariate test results indicate a
significant effect at p<0.001of the three-way interaction of manufacturer order rationing,
focal retailer shortage gaming, and retailer promotions demand on the multivariate
outcome (Table 4-8). However, univariate tests indicate significant impact on seven out
of eight dependent outcomes (Table 4-13). There was no significant impact of this threeway interaction on the manufacturer’s inventory carrying costs (Table 4-13). The impact
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of this interaction is mixed. Partial η2 values indicate a strong effect on the
manufacturer’s order fill rate (partial η2 = 0.821) and the focal retailer’s order fill rate
(partial η2 = 0.850). There was also a small effect on the manufacturer’s demand variance
(partial η2 = 0.320) and opportunity loss (partial η2 = 0.464). However, the impact of this
interaction on A, B, and C Retailers’ order fill rates were very small (partial η2 = 0.061,
0.065, and 0.079 respectively). The results support Hypotheses H15a through H15e.
However, Hypothesis H15f is not supported.
4.4.16 Hypothesis H16
This hypothesis states that, “The three-way interaction of manufacturer order
rationing, supply inventory competition, and retail promotions demand shock
significantly impact long-term system performance in the form of: a. the manufacturer’s
demand variance, b. the manufacturer’s order fill rates, c. the focal retailer’s order fill
rate, d. other retailers’ order fill rates, e. the manufacturer’s cost of lost opportunity, and
f. the manufacturer’s inventory carrying cost.” Multivariate test results indicate a
significant effect at p<0.001of the three-way interaction of manufacturer order rationing,
supply inventory competition from either A or B Retailers, and retailer promotions
demand on the multivariate outcome (Table 4-8). However, if C Retailers are considered,
multivariate test results indicate no significant impact of this three-way interaction on the
multivariate outcome (p=0.992).
Univariate test results (Table 4-14) indicate that the impact of this three-way
interaction involving A Retailers is significant on all dependent variables at p<0.001,
with the exception of its impact on the manufacturer’s inventory carrying cost. For the
three-way interaction involving B retailers, there is a significant effect at p<0.001 on all
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dependent variables with the exception of the manufacturer’s opportunity loss and
inventory carrying costs (Table 4-14).
Of the significant univariate relationships, partial η2 values indicate a generally
weak effect on dependent variables, as most values are very small, ranging from 0.002 to
0.054. Only the specific interaction of A retailers shortage gaming in supply inventory
competition yielded medium and small sized effects on the manufacturer’s order fill rate
(partial η2 = 0.512) and opportunity loss (partial η2 = 0.232). Overall, the results provide
partial support for Hypotheses H16a through H16e, and no support for Hypothesis H16f.
4.4.17 Hypothesis H17
This hypothesis states that, “The three-way interaction of focal retailer shortage
gaming, supply inventory competition, and retail promotions demand shock significantly
impact long-term system performance in the form of: a. the manufacturer’s demand
variance, b. the manufacturer’s order fill rates, c. the focal retailer’s order fill rate, d.
other retailers’ order fill rates, e. the manufacturer’s cost of lost opportunity, and f. the
manufacturer’s inventory carrying cost.” Multivariate test results indicate a significant
effect at p<0.001of the three-way interaction of focal retailer shortage gaming, supply
inventory competition from either A or B Retailers, and retailer promotions demand on
the multivariate outcome (Table 4-8). However, if C Retailers are considered,
multivariate test results indicate no significant impact of this three-way interaction on the
multivariate outcome (p=0.994).
Univariate test results (Table 4-14) indicate that the impact of this three-way
interaction involving either A or B Retailers is significant on all dependent variables at
p<0.001, with the exception of its impact on the manufacturer’s inventory carrying cost.
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These relationships are weak as indicated by partial η2 values of 0.001 to 0.115. Only the
specific interaction of A Retailers shortage gaming in supply inventory competition
yielded a small sized effect on the manufacturer’s order fill rate (partial η2 = 0.344).
Overall, the results provide partial support for Hypotheses H17a through H17e, and no
support for Hypothesis H17f.
4.4.18 Hypothesis H18
This hypothesis states that, “The four-way interaction of manufacturer order
rationing, focal retailer shortage gaming, supply inventory competition, and retail
promotions demand shock significantly impact long-term system performance in the form
of: a. the manufacturer’s demand variance, b. the manufacturer’s order fill rates, c. the
focal retailer’s order fill rate, d. other retailers’ order fill rates, e. the manufacturer’s
cost of lost opportunity, and f. the manufacturer’s inventory carrying cost.” Multivariate
test results (Tables 4-7) indicate that effects of the four-way interaction all dependent
variables are statistically significant at p<0.001 when considering supply inventory
competition from A and B Retailers. However, supply inventory competition from C
Retailers do not result in significant multivariate results (p=1.00, see Table 4-7).
Univariate results for the four-way interaction including supply inventory competition
from A Retailers show significant effect on all dependent variables at p<0.001, with the
exception of the effect on inventory carrying cost (Table 4-12). This relationship was not
significant. Likewise, univariate results for the four-way interaction including supply
inventory competition from B Retailers show significant effect on all dependent variables
at p<0.001, with the exception of the effects on opportunity loss and inventory carrying
cost (Table 4-12). These relationships were not significant.
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Evaluation of partial η2 values indicates a weak effect of this four-way interaction.
Among supply inventory competition with A Retailers, there was a single medium sized
effect on the manufacturer’s order fill rate and a small effect on opportunity loss. All
other partial η2 values ranged from 0.027 to 0.064 for significant relationships (Table 412). Among supply inventory competition with B Retailers, there were partial η2 values
were very small, ranging from 0.003 to 0.006 (Table 4-12). Overall, these results indicate
partial support for Hypotheses H18a through H18e and no support for Hypothesis H18f.
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CHAPTER 5
CONCLUSION
5.0 INTRODUCTION
This chapter discusses the findings and implications of the research. First, the
chapter discusses the key findings of this research. Second, the chapter discusses the
theoretical contributions of this research. Third, the chapter discusses managerial
implications for both manufacturers and retailers. Finally, the chapter concludes with
limitations and suggestions for future research.

5.1 DISCUSSION OF RESULTS
This study explores the impact of supply inventory competition within a
horizontal echelon in order to understand the full dynamics of business systems. Two
research questions, 1. Does supply inventory competition impact vertical industrial
business systems and 2. How can supply inventory competition impact the inventory
ordering and fulfillment process in the context of a retail promotions demand shock over
time, are addressed through a discrete event simulation experiment.
In order to determine the impact of supply inventory competition, the research
specifically examines the effects of manufacturer order rationing, retailer shortage
gaming, and retail promotions demand shock on the long-term system performance of
multiple retailers and a shared manufacturer connected by an inventory ordering and
fulfillment feedback loop. Analysis of results suggests several findings, discussed below
and summarized in Table 5-1 (located at the end of this section).
First, manufacturer order rationing strategy strongly impact long-term system
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performance. Eleven out of twelve hypotheses regarding the main effects of order
rationing strategies (H1a through H1f; H2a through H2c; H2e and H2f) were supported
and the remaining hypothesis (H2d) was partially supported, indicating the significant
impact of order rationing strategy. Three types of order rationing strategies were
examined. Results show that a Uniform rationing strategy results in clear differences in
outcomes when compared to Proportional or Linear rationing strategies. A Uniform
rationing strategy allocates inventory to retailers based solely on the number of retailers
in the system. Order inflation by retailers does not impact the amount of inventory
allocated under this strategy. As a consequence, large retailers who order large volumes
suffer because their uniform allocation is small compared to their order. Small retailers
benefit because their uniform allocation typically exceeds their order volume. In contrast,
both Proportional and Linear rationing strategies are not only sensitive to order inflation
by retailers but the results suggest that there is variance in how sensitive each strategy is
to the magnitude of order inflation. Within either a Proportional or Linear order rationing
strategy scenario, detrimental outcomes generally result from shortage gaming compared
to no shortage gaming. In addition, the results reveal a greater range of outcomes from
the interaction of Linear rationing strategy across the two shortage gaming responses,
when compared to the interaction of Proportional rationing strategy across the two
shortage gaming responses.
Second, shortage gaming by either the focal retailer or other retailers (supply
inventory competition) significantly impacts other parties involved in the inventory
ordering and fulfillment feedback loop but there is variance in the manner in which the
impact is felt. Thirteen out of twenty-four hypotheses regarding the main effects of
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shortage gaming by all retailers (H3b through H3d; H4a and H4b; H5b through H5e;
H6b; H6d through H6f) were supported. Of the remaining hypotheses, six were partially
supported (H3a; H3e; H4f; H5a; H6a; H6c) while five were not supported (H3f; H4a;
H4d and H4e; H5f). Results show that shortage gaming by focal, A, B, and C Retailers
significantly decrease the manufacturer’s order fulfillment rates when compared to No
gaming. In similar fashion, order fill rates for all retailers are also decreased. Additional
measures of performance such as the manufacturer’s demand variance, opportunity loss,
and inventory carrying costs are also significantly impacted. Overall, when retailers
engage in shortage gaming, the system experiences detrimental long-term outcomes.
However, shortage gaming also provides a range of risks and rewards to different parties
within the system. Large retailers do not benefit from shortage gaming as their order fill
rates decrease in scenarios when they inflate orders. In contrast, small retailers such as
type C Retailers benefit from high order inflation (such as from Correction gaming) in the
form of high order fill rates compared to No gaming, subject to the manufacturer’s use of
an order inflation friendly strategy. The manufacturer benefits when retailers inflate
orders because excess inventory is taken up, resulting in zero excess inventory carrying
costs. Still, when there is excessive order inflation, the manufacturer suffers from high
demand variance, low order fulfillment rates, and high opportunity loss. These results
suggest that the positive and negative impact of shortage gaming should be considered
relative to the manufacturer’s capacity. If there is sufficient slack in the manufacturer’s
capacity, then a moderate level of shortage gaming may be beneficial because more
inventory can be sold to retailers than their baseline need. Nevertheless, if shortage
gaming is excessive and far exceeds capacity, then the resulting perturbations within the
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inventory ordering and fulfillment feedback loop may outweigh any benefit in selling
excess inventory.
Third, a single retail promotions demand shock has limited long-term impact on
system performance. Five out of six hypotheses regarding the main effects of retail
promotions demand shock (H7b through H7f) were not supported, indicating limited
impact. This simulation tested the effect of one retail promotions demand shock over a
five-year period. Although results show significant differences between no retail
promotions demand shock and a single retail promotions demand shock, the results
indicate a strong effect on only the two entities directly involved. The manufacturer
experiences increased demand variance, which supports hypothesis H7a, while both the
manufacturer and the focal retailer experience higher mean order fill rates under a retail
promotions demand shock. The direction of this change may be a result of the simulation
parameters that stipulate a high order fill rate for the retail promotions request itself. As
discussed in sections 4.3.2.1, 4.3.2.2, 4.3.3.1, and 4.3.3.6, when the manufacturer fills a
retail promotions demand, the initial high level of order fulfillment is evident over the
long-term for both the manufacturer and the retailer in the form of higher order fill rates,
specifically when the manufacturer utilizes a Uniform rationing strategy.
Finally, when considered overall, the interactions of order rationing, shortage
gaming, and retail promotions demand shock significantly impact long-term system
performance, but impacts on specific outcomes are not supported uniformly. For two-way
interactions, twenty-eight out of thirty-six hypotheses were supported (H8a through H8f;
H9a through H9f; H10a through H10e; H11a through H11f; H12a through H12e). Of the
remaining two-way interaction hypotheses, five were partially supported (H13a through
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H13e) and three were not supported (H10f; H12f; H13f). For three-way interactions,
eleven out of twenty-four hypotheses were supported (H14a through H14f; H15a through
H15e) while ten were partially supported (H16a through H16e; H17a through H17e).
Three out of twenty-four hypotheses were not supported (H15f; H16f; H17f), again
involving the impact on the manufacturer’s inventory carrying cost. For four-way
interactions, five out of six total hypotheses were partially supported (H18a through
H18e) and one hypothesis was not supported (H18f). Non-supported hypotheses for twoway, three-way, and four-way interactions all relate to a specific outcome. The
hypotheses each predicted significant impact of various interactions on the
manufacturer’s inventory carrying cost. In some instances, demand from retailers
consistently exceeded the manufacturer’s supply and no inventory was carried over from
quarter to quarter, resulting in zero inventory carrying costs and non-support of the
hypotheses.
Overall, these results relate back to the research questions posed for this study.
Research question 1 asked, does supply inventory competition impact vertical industrial
business systems? The findings suggest that both vertical and horizontal entities within
business systems are significantly impacted by each entity’s actions within the inventory
ordering and fulfillment feedback loop. Research question 2 asked, how can supply
inventory competition impact the inventory ordering and fulfillment process in the
context of a retail promotions demand shock over time? The results reveal that
interactions between manufacturer order rationing strategies, retailer shortage gaming
responses, and retail promotions demand shock are complex, particularly when
considered over time. There are both positive and negative impacts relative to each entity
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within the inventory ordering and fulfillment feedback loop.
Table 5-1 Summary of Results
Main Effects

•
•
•
•
•
•

Interaction with
Focal Retailer
Shortage Gaming

•

Interaction with
Retail
Promotions
Demand Shock

•

•

•
•

Interaction with
Supply Inventory
Competition

•

•

•

Manufacturer Order Rationing
Strong impact on long-term system performance
Clear differences between Uniform (worst) and Proportional
/ Linear strategies
Strategies also impact manufacturer and each retailer type
differently
Large retailers suffer from low order fill rates under Uniform
Small retailers benefit from high order fill rates under
Uniform
Proportional and Linear strategies generally result in
detrimental outcomes for all parties
Interaction of specific strategies and shortage gaming
response results in differences in outcomes
Although results are generally detrimental to other retailers,
each retailer type is impacted differently
Impact is on parties involved directly in retail promotions
demand shock (manufacturer and focal retailer)
Promotions increase demand variance and order fill rates
long-term
Interaction of Uniform order rationing strategy and
Correction shortage gaming results in higher long-term order
fill rates for the manufacturer and focal retailer only,
showing a compounding effect of high initial order fill with
subsequent uniform allocation
When A Retailers engage in shortage gaming, specific
interaction of Uniform rationing strategy and Correction
shortage gaming results in detrimental outcomes for the
manufacturer and larger retailers but smaller retailers benefit
in general from a Uniform strategy
When B Retailers engage in shortage gaming, specific
interaction with a Proportional strategy results in similar
detrimental outcomes regardless of level of shortage gaming
while specific interaction with a Linear strategy results in
variable outcomes depending on the level of shortage
gaming
When C Retailers engage in shortage gaming, the results are
similar to that of B Retailers, but with less of a detrimental
impact
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Table 5-1 Summary of Results (continued)
Main Effects

Interaction with
Retail Promotions
Demand Shock

Interaction with
Supply Inventory
Competition

Main Effects

Interaction with
Supply Inventory
Competition

Main Effects

Focal Retailer Shortage Gaming
Strong impact on long-term system performance
Shortage gaming by focal retailer results in negative
impact for focal retailer
• The focal retailer benefits from its own retail promotions
demand
• Interaction of retail promotions demand shock and
Correction shortage gaming by the focal retailer results in
higher order fill rates long-term
• Interaction with shortage gaming by A, B, and C retailers
generally exacerbates the negative impact of shortage
gaming by the focal retailer to all entities involved in the
inventory ordering and fulfillment feedback cycle
•
•

Retail Promotions Demand Shock
• A single retail promotions demand shock has limited
long-term impact on system performance
• Biggest impact is on increasing the manufacturer’s
demand variance, and increasing the manufacturer’s
order fulfillment rate and increasing the focal retailer’s
order fill rate
• Although significant interactions exist with A and B
Retailers’ shortage gaming the interactions indicate
minimal impact due to very small effect sizes
Supply Inventory Competition
Strong impact on long-term system performance
Shortage gaming by large retailers show stronger impact
than shortage gaming by small retailers on other entities
within the system
• Shortage gaming by large retailers result in negative
impact for themselves
• Shortage gaming by small retailers result in positive
impact for themselves
• The manufacturer benefits by selling more inventory and
reducing excess inventory carrying costs but also suffers
from high demand variance and high opportunity loss
•
•
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5.2 THEORETICAL CONTRIBUTIONS
Three theoretical contributions emerge from this research. They are related to
Forrester’s theory of industrial dynamics, order rationing strategies and shortage gaming
responses, and retail promotions demand shock.
5.2.1 Forrester’s Theory of Industrial Dynamics
First, this research tests Forrester’s theory of industrial dynamics (1958; 1961).
The results confirm the theory’s premise that economic and industrial activities can be
characterized as information-feedback systems and that interaction of structural elements,
time relationship delays, and amplification relevant decision policies will impact the
stability and long-term performance of the system (Forrester 1961).
In particular, supply inventory competition within the context of an inventory
ordering and fulfillment feedback loop is shown to impact long-term system performance
via interaction of order rationing strategies, shortage gaming responses, and retail
promotions demand shock. These results also confirm Forrester’s assertion that
considering competition among firms in an industry because “the factors interlocking
their behavior are sufficiently strong” (1961, p336) is important. According to Größler
and colleagues (2008), Forrester’s conceptualization of multiple business entities as a
structural system with interdependencies paved the foundation for the idea that one firm’s
activities can impact another firm’s performance. Yet, few supply chain management
studies expand their investigation beyond a vertical dyad (e.g. Choi & Wu 2009; Wan &
Evers 2011; Morgan 2007; Wathne & Heide 2004). Results from this study fill a gap in
the literature as it explicitly incorporates multiple horizontal entities and their impact on
the more commonly researched vertical supply chain system. The findings complement
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vertically oriented supply chain management research by highlighting horizontally
oriented inventory competition as an overlooked factor in supply chain management
performance. In addition, the results suggest that identification of relevant supply chain
entities in supply chain management research should take into account an entity’s role in
existing feedback loops.
5.2.2 Order Rationing Strategies and Shortage Gaming Responses
Second, this research expands knowledge about the long-term impact of various
rationing strategies and shortage gaming responses. Three rationing strategies were
identified from the literature and tested within the research. The findings both confirm
and extend extant literature regarding the differential impact of each rationing strategy
(e.g. Cachon & Lariviere 1999b) through exploration of their overlooked interactions
with shortage gaming responses. Unlike prior studies which employ an analytical
approach, a simulation experiment methodology was utilized which allowed for the
detailed examination of the comprehensive set of interactions for these variables
identified through literature and manager input. The results also reveal complex
interactions over time between order rationing strategies and shortage gaming responses
from multiple retailers, which provides greater insight into the assumptions underlying
the research models.
Previous relevant research involving order rationing and shortage gaming had
involved multiple retailers without competitive behavior (e.g. Cachon & Lariviere
1999a), or assumed that competing retailers will all respond similarly in maximizing their
expected payoff (e.g. Mallik & Harker 2004) in order to identify a mechanism to produce
optimal supply chain profits. In contrast, this research involves multiple and competing
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retailers of different volume classes who exhibit a range of shortage gaming responses.
The results suggest that research models involving order rationing should explicitly
account for competition among horizontal members of an echelon in order to capture a
broader range of significant influences. Moreover, the assumption that multiple
horizontal members of a customer echelon will behave in a similar fashion regarding
their ordering behavior may overlook significant sources of variation within the inventory
ordering and fulfillment process. The results also indicate the need for research models to
make explicit order volume differences between customers. Large order volume
customers are impacted differently than small order volume customers with regard to
various order rationing strategies and competition from other customers.
5.2.3 Retail Promotions Demand Shock
Finally, this research contributes to a greater understanding of the consequences
of a single retail promotions demand shock. Research specific to the demand impact of
retail promotions is limited (Tokar et al. 2011) despite the pervasive use of retail
promotions to stimulate consumer demand (Blattberg et al. 1995). However, demand
shocks arising from retail promotions are generally considered detrimental in the supply
chain management discipline. For example, retail promotions and the negative outcomes
from demand shocks are mentioned in textbooks (e.g. Coyle et al. 2013 p52; Simchi-Levi
et al. 2008 p161) and the literature (e.g. Lee 2004; Disney & Towill 2003; Daugherty et
al. 2002; Fisher 1997) but do not go into much detail regarding the exact nature of impact
from retail promotions demand shocks. Rather, the various articles focus on tangential
supply chain topics. Coupled with increasing use of retail promotions to make sales
(Huchzermeier & Iyer 2006), this marketing variable is seen to pose significant
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management challenges to upstream supply chain entities.
Interestingly, the results suggest that a single retail demand shock has a weak
impact on system performance over time. Over the long-term (5 years) the system
appears to recover from the demand shock, however over the short term the impact may
be stronger in comparison. Therefore, an explicit identification of the time-period under
study should be considered in research involving retail promotions demand shock. In
addition, as this study investigated a single demand shock, it is possible that additional,
overlapping demand shocks could produce negative outcomes congruent with beliefs
expressed in literature. Thus, specification of the quantity of demand shocks under
consideration should also be made in promotions research. Overall, the results regarding
retail promotions demand shock suggests that additional research is required in order to
understand the impact of retail promotions on supply chains.

5.3 MANAGERIAL CONTRIBUTIONS
Although the generalizability of results from a discrete event simulation
experimental methodology is limited to the system that is modeled, the findings suggest
two main managerial implications related to supply inventory competition as well as
order rationing and shortage gaming.
5.3.1 Managing Supply Inventory Competition
First and foremost, the findings suggest that managers facing supply and demand
misalignment must be aware of the impact of supply inventory competition. The research
shows /suggests that both vertical and horizontal entities within business systems are
impacted by each entity’s actions within the inventory ordering and fulfillment feedback
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loop. Actions may be taken to avoid excessive supply inventory competition through
focused communication regarding capacity and overall demand.
This research modeled an inventory ordering and fulfillment system in the US
major appliances industry. The major appliance industry has yielded reports of
collaboration initiatives between a manufacturer and retail customers. In particular,
Whirlpool and its largest customers have embarked on Collaborative Planning,
Forecasting, and Replenishment (CPFR) initiatives which coordinate forecasting, demand
planning and order replenishment between the manufacturer and participating retailers
(VICS 2010; Slone 2004; Sagar 2003). Although operational gains have been reported as
a result of this structured collaboration between a manufacturer and its retail customers,
the initiative does not solve all supply / demand misalignment issues. Within this
framework of collaboration, supply inventory competition can still occur.
Dittman (2012), Sagar (2003), and Slone (2004) describe the process of
collaboration between a consumer durables manufacturer and a major retailer. The two
companies followed a simple process wherein each created a forecast. On a weekly basis,
they compared the two forecasts. They discussed any differences of more than 15 percent
between the respective SKU forecasts and resolved the differences. Dittman (2012)
relates an example where the two parties notes that the forecast for a certain SKU was
more than 100 percent greater in the retailer’s forecast than in the supplier’s. Further
discussion revealed that the retailer planned a promotion that had not been communicated
to the supplier. According to Dittman (2012), this short conversation not only translated
into a major improvement in forecast accuracy, but also avoided expediting costs for the
supplier and provided a much better level of availability for the retailer.
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Supply inventory competition can occur within these situations because retailers
may still feel incentive to shortage game, particularly in the step when they resolve
differences in forecast with the manufacturer. If a retail promotion is planned, a retailer
may engage in shortage gaming without realizing the long-term impact of their actions on
themselves and interconnected parties. Moreover, despite participation in supply chain
collaboration initiatives, retailers in these situations are aware of their competitors and
this awareness may impact their collaboration actions. For example, Croson and
colleagues (2005) discuss the concept of coordination risk, where managers many not
make long-term optimal decisions due to a fear that they cannot be sure how their supply
partners and other parties will behave, despite understanding that they all contribute to a
collective outcome (i.e. long-term system performance). If one retailer refrains from
shortage gaming but suspects their competitors of doing so, then the competitors may
gain inventory at the expense of the “honest” retailer. Croson et al. (2005) suggest that
common knowledge of an optimal policy, a guarantee that others will use it, and
coordination stock to buffer each party against the risk of non-optimal behavior by others
may reduce how aggressively managers will respond to inventory shortage. If shortage
gaming appears to be an issue within supply chain collaboration initiatives, these
suggestions may be beneficial to all parties over the long-term.
Shortage gaming from retailers who are not part of the CPFR initiative can also
occur. The results show that shortage gaming from mid- and small- volume retailers can
collectively impact the manufacturer and large-volume retailers. Although these retailers
may not participate in a structured collaboration initiative such as CPFR, communication
between managers should include information specific to the rationing process as a way
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to limit reactions to shortage.
In general, all parties connected by an inventory ordering and fulfillment feedback
loop benefit if retailers do not engage in shortage gaming. While communication
regarding actions to resolve supply / demand misalignment appears to be obvious
prescriptive advice, communication from the manufacturer regarding not only the amount
of demand that will be fulfilled, but also the process of allocation may temper retailers’
shortage gaming responses. In addition, communication regarding long-term outcomes
arising from various shortage gaming scenarios may deter consistent shortage gaming
responses.
5.3.2 Managing Order Rationing and Shortage Gaming Interactions
Second, the findings suggest that risk management scenarios may be developed to
address specific incidences of rationing and shortage gaming interactions, or to
prescriptively avoid specific interactions. Plans for allocating demand when demand
exceeds supply is a major area within enterprise risk management initiatives (Chopra et
al. 2013).
The research shows that interactions between manufacturer order rationing
strategies and retailer shortage gaming responses are complex, especially when
considered over time. Please refer to Table 5-1 for a summary of results. Although these
results are relevant to the system being modeled and are subject to the assumptions
incorporated in the simulation model, the interaction of a Uniform rationing strategy with
shortage gaming can be highlighted for prescriptive advice. For example, in situations
where large-volume retailers appear to engage in shortage gaming, the use of a Uniform
order rationing strategy by a manufacturer would exacerbate the negative situation from a
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system perspective. Managers may benefit from utilizing a Linear order rationing strategy
instead, as results show that this strategy is more robust for the manufacturer and large
retailers against excessive shortage gaming from other large retailers (for example, see
section 4.3.3.3 Interaction of RATION * RA.GAME). However, this action should also
take into account the impact on small retailers. The results indicate that a Linear order
rationing strategy results in lower order fill rates for small retailers compared to a
Uniform or Proportional rationing strategy.
Overall, an assessment of the positive or negative impact from these results must
be considered from the perspective of each party. For the manufacturer, the differential
impact of one order rationing strategy over another suggests that the choice of strategy
must be aligned not only with its production and capacity goals but also with their
management of each customer relationship. For retailers, the differential impact of
shortage gaming in various forms suggests that their choice of response to shortage must
be considered in light of their short and long-term benefit as well as their interconnected
impact with other retailers.

5.4 LIMITATIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH
This research supports the conclusion that supply inventory competition from
horizontal members of a supply chain echelon impacts the more commonly investigated
vertical business system. However, this study is subject to several limitations that may be
addressed in future research.
First, the use of a simulation methodology sets up an environment that may not be
wholly reflective of the complexity of business situations. The simulation is modeled
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upon one real-life industry focusing on a specific set of manufacturers and retailers, for a
single product. Thus, the results may not generalize to additional industries with varying
supply chain structures, different buyer-supplier dynamics, and various product demand
characteristics. Future research can simulate diverse industries and product demand
characteristics in order to determine the robustness of the results.
Second, the simulation makes certain assumptions in order to limit the scope of
analysis to the three major factors identified through literature and manager input. In
particular, assumptions regarding the manufacturer’s treatment of a retail promotions
demand shock and its subsequent order fulfillment represent one typical response as
described through managerial interviews. However a range of responses exist as well as
the possibility of multiple retail promotions demand shock from various retailers. The use
of retail promotions to stimulate consumer demand has been described as pervasive
(Blattberg et al. 1995), and it has been noted that the intensity and frequency of retail
promotions have increased over time (Huchzermeier & Iyer 2006). As discussed in
section 5.2.3, the results from this study suggest that a single retail demand shock has a
weak impact on system performance over time, however it is possible that additional or
overlapping demand shocks could produce negative outcomes congruent with beliefs
expressed in literature. Overall, results regarding retail promotions demand shock
suggests that additional research is required in order to understand the impact of retail
promotions on supply chains. Future research should investigate the impact of a range of
manufacturer responses as well as the impact of multiple retail promotions demand shock
in order to determine differences in long-term system performance.
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Third, assumptions regarding fixed production capacity were determined via
interview data but the results may differ in light of higher or lower overall production
capacity, or with adjustments to capacity and production throughout a year. Future
research could investigate a range of production capacity in order to determine an optimal
range that minimizes cost and mitigates the impact of shortage gaming. A more detailed
simulation regarding production could also yield interesting results. This study treated
production as a “black box” in order to focus the study on order rationing and shortage
gaming between a manufacturer and its retailer customers. However, if production was
simulated to reflect detailed procurement, inventory, and production processes; the
impact on supplier management, inventory management, and capacity management can
be determined. Moreover, the addition of an extra echelon of supply chain interaction in
the form of raw materials suppliers could allow for bullwhip effect investigations.
Finally, this study is exploratory as it focuses on demonstrating the significant
impact of supply inventory competition from horizontal echelon members. Future
research should expand upon this study by further delineating the dynamics of how
supply inventory competition impact long-term system performance. For example, there
is opportunity to refine the simulation with a higher degree of granularity. The simulation
focused on a quarterly unit of analysis in accordance with interview data but simulating
this system at a daily or weekly unit of analysis can provide an opportunity to investigate
the impact of lead-times, transportation, storage, and the intersection of inventory reorder
policies with shortage gaming. The simulation also models each retailer’s ordering
actions to follow a single scenario if triggered by a hard signal of unfilled orders. Results
from investigating the impact of dynamic decision rules over time may yield additional
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insight into the effects of shortage gaming. Additional research incorporating symmetric
information sharing, trust between the manufacturer and retailers, and the degree of
coordination risk that each retailer experiences (Tokar et al. 2012; Croson et al. 2011)
may also yield findings that illuminate the impact of supply inventory competition.
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